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Abstract 
This WZB discussion paper is a collection of five papers dealing with current shifts in the boundaries 
between science and politics and their consequences on governance arrangements in science policy. In 
his article, Dietmar Braun analyses international developments in publicly funded research systems, 
diagnosing a currently emerging model of “network governance” – a policy approach based upon the 
management of interdependence of autonomous public (and private) agencies in horizontal relations. 
Daniel Barben takes an internationally comparative and transnational perspective and examines changes 
in science and policy regimes together with the interaction between them. His article stresses the value 
of the “regime” concept to analyse complex and interdependent transformations in science and politics. 
Henry Etzkowitz discusses his “triple helix” model developed to understand the joint innovation proc-
esses of science, industry and the state. His article specifically points out the implications of triple helix 
innovation processes for the state, manifest for example in economic policies and on the regional policy 
level. Peter Weingart criticises the often inadvertent consequences of assessment procedures and bibli-
ometrical measurement on the science system. He argues for a critical reflection and reform of the peer 
review system in order to improve the instruments for research evaluation and quality assurance in 
science. These articles represent a promising and growing field of scholarship combining approaches of 
science policy studies with those of science and technology studies.  
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieses WZB Discussion paper umfasst Beiträge, die sich mit aktuellen Veränderungen im Verhältnis 
zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik und deren Konsequenzen für Governance-Ansätze der Wissen-
schaftspolitik beschäftigen. Dietmar Braun analysiert in seinem Beitrag internationale Entwicklungen in 
öffentlich finanzierten Forschungssystemen. Er diagnostiziert die Herausbildung eines Modells von 
„Netzwerk Governance“ – ein Politikansatz, der auf dem Management der Interdependenzen von un-
abhängigen öffentlichen (und privaten) Einrichtungen in horizontalen Beziehungen beruht. Daniel 
Barben untersucht in einer international komparativen und transnationalen Perspektive Veränderungen 
im Wissenschafts- und im Politikregime sowie die Interaktionen zwischen beiden. Sein Beitrag unter-
streicht den Wert des Regimekonzepts für die Analyse komplexer und interdependenter Transformati-
onen in Wissenschaft und Politik. Henry Etzkowitz diskutiert sein „Triple Helix“-Modell, das zum 
Verständnis der wechselseitigen Innovationsprozesse von Wissenschaft, Industrie und Staat entwickelt 
wurde. Ein spezielles Augenmerk gilt den Folgen von Triple-Helix-Innovationsprozessen für die Poli-
tik, wie sie sich etwa in der Wirtschaftspolitik oder auf regionalpolitischer Ebene manifestieren. Peter 
Weingart schließlich kritisiert die zahlreichen nicht-intendierten Nebenfolgen von Evaluationsverfahren 
und biliometrischen Messtechniken auf das Wissenschaftssystem. Er fordert eine kritische Reflexion 
und Reform des Peer-review-Systems zur Verbesserung der Evaluations- und Qualitätssicherungsin-
strumente in der Wissenschaft. Die hier versammelten Beiträge stehen für ein viel versprechendes und 
wachsendes Forschungsfeld, das Ansätze der Science Policy Studies mit solchen der Wissenschafts- und 
Technikforschung verbindet.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Shifting Boundaries between Science and Politics –  
Recent Work on New Governance Arrangements in  
Science Policy 
 
Martin Lengwiler, Dagmar Simon 
 
 
In current science policy debates, the boundaries between science and politics are 
significantly redrawn – a process observed and commented by many authors in 
science studies.1 Thus, the boundary area between the two institutions became a 
particularly dynamic field. In recent years, science policy actors increasingly 
demanded social and economic legitimation from publicly funded research (guided 
by external, output-oriented categories), which put basic research above all under a 
hitherto unknown political pressure. Today, science and research are commonly seen 
as important if not decisive driving forces for dynamic economies in the 21st 
century. At the same time, research in science studies and in science policy studies 
indicates that the couplings between science, industry and the public – as well as 
between basic and applied research – are intensifying. Some authors have stated a 
fundamental shift from disciplinary academic research to a new mode of knowledge 
production responding more directly to social and environmental problems and co-
operating with civil actors outside academe. The consequences of this process, in 
particular for the governance of science, are still the object of scholarly debates 
(Nowotny et al. 2001; Etzkowitz 2001; Rammert 2003; Braun 1997). Are changes in 
science policy gradual or fundamental, and to what extent is the concept of a “regime 
change” adequate? Are the traditional instruments of science policy out of date or 
can they be reformed and adapted? Are the procedures for the assessment and 
funding of innovative research still adequate?  
 
                                                 
1 The contributions to this publication were originally presented at an international conference on 
“Shifting Boundaries between Science and Politics – New Research Perspectives in Science Studies”, 
initiated by Martin Lengwiler and Dagmar Simon (of the WZB Project Group “Science Policy Stud-
ies”) and held at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozial-
forschung, WZB). For this publication, we collected the papers dealing specifically with new forms of 
governance arrangements in science policy. For more information on the conference, see the program 
attached in the annex.  
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These current debates are set within a specific historical context. From a historical 
perspective, most studies on the development of science policy in Western countries 
converge on a similar picture. Authors usually distinguish between two periods since 
the Second World War. The first period is usually set between 1945 and the early 
1970s. In this era, science policy was based upon a “social contract for science”, 
under which the relations between science and politics were guided by the principle 
of “blind delegation” granting science wide autonomies of self-regulation (Guston 
2000). Since the 1970s or 1980s, as most scholars argue, this social contract has been 
replaced by new forms of governance in science policy. As part of this process, the 
seemingly clear-cut boundary between science and politics was redefined and science 
in particular was held more accountable to political authorities and to the public. The 
current literature offers different interpretations for this process: some understand it 
as the contemporary answer to the “delegation problem of principal-agent-relations” 
(Braun/Guston 2003); others see the process as the emergence of complex, 
heterogeneous “government arrangements” (Rip 2002) or as a new regime of “colla-
borative assurance” in science aiming at increasing the integrity and productivity of 
research (Guston 2000: 144f.); again others highlight the changing models of inno-
vation, distinguishing the traditional linear from a new co-evolutionary model of 
innovation as illustrated, for example, in the “triple-helix” model 
(Etzkowitz/Leydesdorff 1997). Finally, there is a wide literature on the changing 
research practices, stressing the rising significance of interdisciplinary or 
transdisciplinary approaches when research is increasingly done in applied contexts 
with close interactions between theoretical and practical work (Rammert 2003; 
Nowotny et al. 2003). All studies agree that the social sub-systems of science, indus-
try and the state are increasingly interacting – often indeed with differing intentions 
and expectations – and that this process has led to new approaches in science policy.  
This conventional wisdom forms the starting point for the arguments of the fol-
lowing articles. They all deal with empirical manifestations of these new arrange-
ments in science policy. Although the distinction between the “old” model and 
current developments seems to be quite clear, the final contours of the “new model” 
are still debated and not discernible yet. In particular, it is still an open question 
whether the old model will be replaced or rather amended by elements of a new 
model in order to meet the future social and economic challenges. The boundaries 
between science and politics are not fixed and a priori given entities anymore, but 
continually and controversially redefined areas. Actors involved in this reformulation 
process include political and scientific actors but also business and industry repre-
sentatives or actors speaking for the public. The following articles not only present 
empirical cases to analyse current shifts in science policy, in national and trans-
national perspectives; they also ask for their theoretical implications. 
In his article on “How to govern research in the ‘age of innovation’: Compatibil-
ities and incompatibilities of policy rationales”, Dietmar Braun analyses international 
developments in publicly funded research systems and their consequences for science 
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policy. The current “age of innovation”, he diagnoses, is marked by an increasing 
entanglement between actors of knowledge production; examples are co-operations 
between universities and industries, public-private partnerships or the co-ordination 
of industrial and research policies. Braun argues for an interactive model of innova-
tion and strategic research governed by key trends such as 'value for money', effi-
ciency and participation. Braun suggests that an adequate answer to these new forms 
of knowledge production can be seen in the currently emerging model of “network 
governance” – a policy approach based upon the management of interdependence of 
autonomous public (and private) agencies in horizontal relations, consensus orienta-
tion in policy making and coordination between different governance organisations.  
Daniel Barben also states a changing role of science and research policy, stressing 
that they are at the same time objects and agents of transformation processes. In his 
article on “Changing Regimes of Science and Politics: Comparative and Trans-
national Perspectives for a World in Transition”, Barben takes an internationally 
comparative and transnational perspective analysing changes in science and policy 
regimes together with the interactions between them. The article stresses the value of 
the “regime” concept to analyse transformations in science and politics without 
underestimating the complexity of interactions between science and technology, 
institutions and organisations, discourses and practices. Based upon a methodological 
combination of science and technology studies with science policy studies, Barben 
argues for a research agenda dedicated to the development of a general framework of 
regime analysis.  
The conditions of a meta-innovation system, encompassing the whole spectre of 
basic and applied research and clearly distinct from the traditional linear model of 
knowledge and technology transfer, are at the centre of Henry Etzkowitz' article on 
“Meta-Innovation: The optimum role of the state in the Triple Helix”. His “triple 
helix” model sheds a light on the complex interactions between science, industry and 
the state allowing for example for adequately analysing organisations such as 
academic spin-offs or entrepreneurial universities. A research and technology policy 
supporting these interactions and acting in co-operation with universities and indus-
trial organisations can also have implications for economic policies, in particular on a 
regional level. Etzkowitz estimates that indirect, decentralised forms of innovation 
policy are significantly more efficient than traditional forms based upon a linear con-
cept of transfer. A dynamic co-operation between different levels of governments 
and different institutional spheres is seen as the “hallmark of an innovative society”.  
The article of Peter Weingart on “The Ritual of Assessment and the Seduction of 
Numbers” also deals with the changing relation between science, politics and the 
public.2 The manifest and rising needs of legitimation of science and research have 
led to an increasing role of quality control and quality assurance in science. Weingart 
                                                 
2 The article here is printed in German; for an English version of the argument, see reference in foot-
note 1 on page 83. 
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analyses the impact of bibliometrics upon the science system, with a particular 
interest for the inadvertent consequences of this process. Although the spread of 
evaluation and assessment techniques forms a broad trend, their impact on the 
scientific system is rarely studied and therefore hardly known. Moreover, there is a 
good chance for the occurrence of unintended effects such as ”oversteering”. A 
minimal condition for the use of ranking and rating data is the continuous quality 
control of the underlying data and the professionalisation of assessment practices. 
Weingart particularly argues for a critically reflected application of peer review 
approaches, amended by the collection and analysis of bibliometric data, as an 
improved, reasonable instrument for research evaluation and quality assurance.  
Theoretically and methodologically, the articles represent a promising and grow-
ing field of scholarship marked by two often distinct, but increasingly overlapping 
approaches: science policy studies on the one and science and technology studies 
(STS) on the other hand. In recent years, the correspondences between the two 
research fields have intensified. Science policy studies have started to take construc-
tivist STS and its findings into account, whereas work in STS has increasingly opened 
up to macro-level analyses. Of course, STS has always been interested in the notion 
of the political ever since the field emerged in the 1970s. The sociology of scientific 
knowledge already pointed out the social and political interests involved in the pro-
duction of scientific knowledge; the social construction of technology programme 
revealed the hidden “politics” of artefacts; and more recent work, inspired by a social 
anthropological perspective, criticised the historical divide between the realms of 
nature and of society (including politics), calling for an encompassing “parliamentary 
of things” (Cambrosio et al. 1990; Latour 2004). But over the past years, STS has 
increasingly examined the political institutions themselves and their relevance for 
science (Jasanoff 2004; Guston 2000: 27-30). We hope that this collection of articles 
encourages other researchers to enter this fascinating field and continue investigating 
the relations and boundaries between science and politics from an internationally 
comparative and historically reflected perspective. 
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How to Govern Research in the “Age of Innovation”: 
Compatibilities and Incompatibilities of Policy Rationales 
 
Dietmar Braun 
 
 
Introduction 
If one looks at the latest OECD publications dealing with the governance of public 
sector research (OECD 2003, 2004a, 2004b), one finds an astonishing variety of 
changes to governance instruments during the last two decades. To mention just a 
few and in no particular order: a shift from institutional to competitive grants: more 
(inclusive) priority setting: the transfer of intellectual property rights to the perform-
ing institutions; increasing use of centres of excellence and public-private partner-
ships; the establishment of contracts with public sector research and funding institu-
tions; a greater autonomy for such institutions; increasing attempts to coordinate 
policy formulation as well as fostering cooperation between research institutions; an 
increasing role of foresight mechanisms and advisory bodies; ex ante, ongoing and ex 
post evaluation of funding schemes and research performance; an increasing integra-
tion of stakeholders in funding and research institutions; a stronger role for higher 
education institutions compared to other public sector research institutions. Without 
a doubt, the change in the use of research policy instruments has been important. 
However, one wonders to what extent these changes have been the result of an over-
all change in the guiding principles and “rationales” of research policy makers? Is 
there any coherence in the use of instruments? 
Without applying any serious content analysis, one can discern a number of key 
terms that are used by the OECD to explain why these instruments were imple-
mented. Here one finds in close association to each other: strategic thinking, learn-
ing, reflexivity, thinking in relational and systemic terms, competition, accountability, 
efficiency, control, autonomy, enhancement of economic and social benefits of re-
search, responsiveness to the civil society, cooperation, trust building, the fostering 
of networks, and the sustainability of academic research. Even a cursory glance re-
veals that the co-existence of such rationales is unlikely to be the result of one unify-
ing paradigm that has taken control of the governance design across research policy 
making. The effort to promote autonomy and control; cooperation and competition; 
priority setting; the enhancement of economic and social benefits of research on the 
one hand and serendipity and the sustainability of academic research on the other 
suggest that there are tensions that may derive from the different building blocks of 
the policy rationales in the research sector.  
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It is my contention in this article that policy makers and administrators of re-
search are subject to several and varying ideational influences that give rise to a “mix 
of policy rationales and instruments”. A mix does not mean that it cannot work or 
that it is inefficient. My intention here is only to identify the various “ideas” or “ra-
tionales” that may influence the governance design at a given point in time and reveal 
their impact on the creation of research policies. Another study would be needed to 
investigate in more detail the extent to which the different instruments used are in 
conflict with each other or may have synergetic effects. 
I will proceed as follows: The next chapter serves to distinguish between three 
cognitive levels that influence the decision-making in sectoral policy areas. This dis-
tinction is the access point to the further discussion on ideational developments in 
the “age of innovation”. It will be demonstrated that the emerging policy-mix of 
instruments we find today is the result of changes in rationales on all three cognitive 
levels. A number of these changes is compatible with each other and brings forward 
a powerful new governance design during the 1980s and 1990s. Though not yet in-
stitutionalised in a similar manner, this design is contested by a new governance de-
sign based on systemic and network thinking. This new design will be discussed in 
the second part of the article. 
 
 
1. Analytical distinctions  
Decisions on the design of governance consist of different cognitive influences 
which must be combined and reconstructed to fit the particular policy sector in ques-
tion. Such “constructive work” is seldom taken into account in research policy stud-
ies. In particular, it is rarely understood that part of the cognitive influences in a pol-
icy sector are coming from “outside”, i.e. they are developed in a larger context and 
do not emerge as part of the work of research policy makers and administrators.  
Analytically one can discern at least three different cognitive influences on the 
governance design in a policy sector managing a particular resource (e.g. knowledge 
in research policy, the environment in environmental policy, or health in health pol-
icy): the level of practical experiences of policy makers and administrators in the pol-
icy sector (1); ideas deriving from theories on the production, maintenance and diffu-
sion of the resource (2); global ideas about the role of the state in society and the 
organisation of state action (3).  
(1) Policy makers considering change in a policy sector base their decisions at 
least in part on their past experiences (“goodness-of-fit”) and the experiences of 
other countries. Powerful influences include the experiences of strong and successful 
competitors and/or countries that have a high reputation in managing the resource. 
In the case of research policies we find a long tradition of countries that are consi-
dered “leaders” in research performance in different historical periods, with France, 
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Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA and Japan among the main examples. 
Learning from such examples or emulating the policy practices of these countries has 
always been a major strategy for countries coping with problems in innovation or 
research. A governance design developed on the base of “emulation” is, therefore, 
developed at the sectoral level by policy makers and administrators who are coping 
with governance problems and/or who are busy with improving the performance of 
the policy sector in question.  
(2) Emulation as part of the development of a governance design can be distin-
guished from general cognitive “frames” that actors use when interpreting the world, 
i.e. in our case when they are assessing performance and governance structures (for 
the notion of frames see Rein and Schön 1991; Kahnemann and Tversky 1982; Esser 
1999; Lindenberg 2000). The first cognitive frame is developed in direct relation to 
the production of the resource in question and can also be considered a sectoral-
bound ideational level.  
Such cognitive frames take the characteristics of the resource into account and 
discuss structures and dynamics of resource production and diffusion. In research 
these are theories about knowledge production and diffusion. As a well-known ex-
ample, the “science-push theory”, presented after the Second World War by V. Bush 
(1990), furnished for a long time not only a rationale for how best to innovate, but 
also how policy makers should behave in order to best support the production and 
diffusion of the resource. Theories on knowledge production and diffusion are, 
therefore, almost always accompanied by suggestions for political governance. In the 
case of the science-push model, the recommendation was to abstain from political 
intervention and to distribute government money to funding agencies or research 
institutions led by scientists and leave it up to the scientific community to deal with 
the efficient distribution of money. In addition, it was not necessary to take into ac-
count any interlinkages between production and diffusion or between academia and 
industry, as the theory promised an automatic spin-off of basic research knowledge 
into technological application. Government interference was not needed. In the re-
search and innovation field such theories are usually developed by sociologists (soci-
ology of science) and economists. Ideas may then be communicated by “policy en-
trepreneurs” like Vannevar Bush or by scientists themselves in advisory bodies.  
(3) The third level of rationales – what one might label the “global governance 
frame” – is valid for a large number of policy areas, representing general ideas of the 
government on how to organise state intervention and governance. The belief an-
chored in Keynesianism, for example, of being able to actively intervene into the 
economic cycle also had side effects on the use of policy instruments in social policy 
or research policy. Confidence in the possibility of planning research and guiding the 
behaviour of scientists in desired directions was prominent in research policies in the 
1960s, during the heydays of Keynesianism. Policy makers and administrators within 
the different policy sectors are required to integrate such frames on global govern-
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ance and make them compatible with other more sectoral-bound frames. Changes in 
the global governance frame can arise from complete exogenous influences, such as a 
change in the overall ideology of the government from Keynesianism to neo-liberal-
ism which do not take into account the peculiarities of the governance of a particular 
resource or its performance.  
Changes in the design of governance can result from changes in either type of 
cognitive influence. First, failing performance may lead to intensified activities to find 
better functioning examples and build policy-instruments using examples from other 
countries. However, it will be difficult to do this when these examples are in conflict 
with existing cognitive frames. Second, there may be changes in the scientific analysis 
of the resource and the emergence of new theories that inform policy-making. This 
will, in the long run, affect the use of instruments. Finally, there may be independent 
changes at the level of global governance that need to be integrated in the research 
sector by changing governance processes, which also influences the choice of in-
struments. It is possible that a change may occur at all three levels and this may cre-
ate new and potentially contradictory information for policy makers who must then 
attempt to integrate these influences into the governance design (or filter them so 
that coherent governance design is possible).  
In what follows I will analyse the changes in the governance design during the 
“age of innovation”, commencing at the beginning of the 1980s, by using this ana-
lytical framework which distinguishes between “emulation”, “production frame” and 
“global governance frame” to assess how coherent the current governance design is.  
 
 
2. Learning by competition and the rise of an interactionist frame of 
knowledge production 
From the early 1980s onwards one sees the rise of new funding instruments linked to 
the exemplary model of Japan and to the emergence of new theories on the produc-
tion of knowledge and diffusion, in particular the “new growth theory”. Both types 
of cognitive developments can be seen as reinforcing rather than incompatible.  
In the 1980s, European countries realised that there was an increasing “techno-
logical gap” between Europe and the USA and, above all, Japan. Declining produc-
tivity and the trend towards globalisation forced policy makers in poorly performing 
countries to think about how to deal with such a gap. The importance of the tech-
nological gap became even more obvious when the “new growth theory” in eco-
nomics pointed to the fact that technological knowledge had been a significantly un-
derrated factor in the search for economic growth with astounding advantages in the 
competition between nations (Arrow 1962, Romer 1986, 1987, 1994; Lucas 1988). 
Investment in knowledge has the potential to bring “increasing returns” to enter-
prises instead of “constant returns” as expected in older growth theories which fo-
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cused on investments in capital and labour as the main growth factors (Solow 1957). 
To increase knowledge rather than capital and labour creates opportunities for nearly 
boundless growth (Cortright 2001). As new ideas are never scarce they do not suffer 
from marginal utilities or decreasing returns. If one recognises therefore that new 
knowledge is the essential driver of economic growth, one should invest as much as 
possible in infrastructure and institutions that are able to constantly generate new 
ideas. Though one cannot, of course, make any direct causal links between the trend 
towards emulation of Japan’s joint technological projects on the one hand (see be-
low) and the new growth theory on the other, one can state nevertheless that “ideas 
were in the air” that helped to argue for more investments into technological re-
search. Moreover, these ideas suggested a close link between industrial, economic 
and research policies. While old industrial policies mostly consisted of subsidies to 
decaying sectors in order to save jobs, the new industrial policies, which emerged 
from the beginning of the 1980s, focused on investments in new technologies and 
new ideas. Science and technology policies became an integral part of such strategies 
and funding for technological research in general became more “high politics” than 
“low politics” by its affiliation to industrial and economic policies.  
Under intensive brokerage and guidance by the industrial ministry in Japan 
(MITI), the country had since the 1960s promoted a substantial number of large 
scale programmes to catch up with the technological development in more advanced 
countries. Such projects involved working relationships between governmental labs 
and industry. The implementation of the “Next Generation Programme” of MITI 
since 1981 as well as the “Comprehensive Joint Research” in the same year financed 
by the STA, brought several changes. First, it was now openly acknowledged that 
Japan wanted to become a forerunner in key technological areas rather than an emu-
lator of existing technologies (Freeman 1987; Pempel 1998; Sigurdson 1995; Braun 
2004). Second, this required a more intensive process of identifying key areas with a 
major potential for economic returns. Thus, “foresight procedures” became a part of 
research policy-making and, since then, have been institutionalised in almost all 
OECD countries (Martin 1995; Grupp and Linstone 1999). Third, the development 
of new generic technologies like biotechnology and ICT were dependent on a much 
closer interaction between basic research and technological research. Direct collabo-
ration in public private partnerships or “consortia” between academic researchers in 
universities and industrial enterprises became the main organisational principle in 
setting up research programmes in this context (see Odagiri et al. 1997; Hayashi 
2003). The role of the government was mainly to create the necessary infrastructure 
to select the key areas and to help to build the consortia. Usually, a large part of the 
research projects was financed by the enterprises themselves (Sigurdson 1995).  
These three components – identification of key areas of technology, collaborative 
research projects between industry and academia, and an active brokering role for the 
government – became the new model for organising innovation research from the 
early 1980s onwards.  
How to Govern Research in the “Age of Innovation”: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities of Policy Rationales 
 
16 
The development of such research collaboration was further supported by new 
cognitive frames concerning the production of knowledge. The already mentioned 
“new growth theory” pointed to the importance of “learning by doing” and know-
ledge development on the job as well as to the influences of technological knowledge 
on basic research (Romer 1986). Stokes (1997) summarised these lessons in his 
model of “Pasteur’s quadrant” by pointing out the significance of interaction be-
tween the basic and technological trajectory for innovation. Irvine and Martin (1984) 
had earlier identified the new type of research that was emerging in this context and 
labelled it “strategic research”, i.e. research that is still strongly anchored in basic 
research but with obvious applications in mind. Such strategic research, set up in 
potential key technological areas, was obviously what Japan used in its promotion of 
research programmes during the 1980s and 1990s.  
This new model of research collaboration was copied in many countries. In 
Germany, for example, the “Verbundprojekte” or joint projects were being imple-
mented by the Research Ministry since the early 1980s (Lütz 1993). The Netherlands 
developed their “large technological projects” with considerable success (OECD 
2003). All these programmes followed the same model of close cooperation between 
academic research, technological research and user participation in consortia or com-
parable organisational forms. Research policy-makers, now often including the eco-
nomic departments, were active in organising the exchange and ensuring that promi-
sing areas were developed. Elzinga and Jameson (1995: 592) speak of an “orchestra-
tion policy” that obliged scientists to participate and that was built on an alliance 
between, what they called the “economic” and “bureaucratic” cultures. 
In summary, one sees in the 1980s an increasing tendency among policy makers 
to look for new ways to organise knowledge production and diffusion given the tech-
nological gap between many European countries on the one hand and the USA and 
Japan on the other. The most obvious solution for research policy makers was to 
imitate what was going on in the more successful countries Japan became the leading 
example of a successful path to economic growth according to the “new growth” 
principles. New growth theory and other contributions in the sociology of science 
supported the new model by pointing to the importance of technology as a growth 
factor and the importance of business in the production and diffusion of knowledge. 
A new type of research was identified, i.e. strategic research, that seemed to have the 
potential to make new discoveries in the field of new generic technologies like bio-
technology and ICT, i.e. technologies that can be used in many areas with unpredict-
able outcomes and discoveries. Foresight was a rational measure for investing money 
efficiently and effectively by selecting research areas that seemed to have the best 
potential for future returns.  
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3. Global Governance: Steady State, Efficiency State and Good 
Governance 
At the level of “experiences” of policy makers and the cognitive frame about the 
production of knowledge we find changes that are directly linked to each other and 
which come to similar conclusions concerning the organisation of research and its 
governance. It is not possible to make any conjectures about which ideational level 
has influenced the other. It suffices here to see that cognitive developments on these 
levels were compatible with each other.  
The cognitive level of global governance ideas however, follows an autonomous 
development and changes at this level in the 1980s have little to do with the govern-
ance of knowledge. However they have influenced how the governance of knowl-
edge developed in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The new emerging governance model did not contradict, but rather strengthened, 
the “orchestration policy” by influencing the choices of research institutions and 
scientists. The underlying philosophy of government action became neo-liberalism. It 
had two main effects on the organisation of governance in policy sectors: first, it led 
to the “steady state” which made public funds scarce and, second, it promoted the 
development of the “efficiency state” which was dedicated to enhancing efficiency 
and effectiveness measures in public policy making. A third cognitive frame, “good 
governance”, which emerged in the 1990s, was not linked to neo-liberalism, but 
rather to the rise of democratic participatory ideals. This also became an important 
influence on the organisation of governance in the research sector.  
 
3.1 Neo-liberalism 
Neo-liberalism has been the main ideological influence since the end of the 1970s in 
many countries. The trademark of neo-liberalism as implemented by Margaret 
Thatcher in the U.K. and, to a lesser degree, by Ronald Reagan in the U.S. was a pro-
found distrust of the ability of the state to steer society. Neo-liberalism meant the 
retreat of the interventionist state from market affairs and the emphasis of market 
mechanisms as the primary coordination mode in the delivery of public services. 
Deregulation and devolution should strengthen the capacity of public sector units to 
act in the (quasi-)market. The government should act to structure the market, by the 
distribution of property rights, in such a way that optimal outcomes from compe-
tition can be expected.  
One of the first objectives of neo-liberal policies was to attack the deficit burden 
of many states. In this context not only was a more efficient public sector envisaged 
(the “efficiency state”, see below) but cuts to funding for the different public services 
were implemented. These policies resulted in what John Ziman (1987) called the 
“steady state”, i.e. a situation where actors could no longer count on increasing re-
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sources, but instead were required to deal with scarce resources under the label of 
“value for money”. 
 
3.2 The “Steady State” 
The influence of neo-liberal “global ideas of governance” on the research sector – as 
on many other policy sectors – was profound. The first obvious change was that the 
whole public sector, including the research sector, lost its privileges in terms of fi-
nancial security and relatively unrestrained and uncontrolled functioning. The whole 
public sector had to prove their value to the government and to the public at large.  
It was therefore probably not cuts in budgets as such which mattered, though 
one finds a clear policy of disinvestment by governments from the 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s when it comes to financing public sector research institutes 
(which were also partly privatised). Cuts have been less spectacular for universities 
though one finds a downturn in the first half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, scientists 
really felt the lack of resources when an increasing number of promising research 
fields were at hand and needed additional financing (Calvert and Martin 2002). More 
important than budget cuts was the change in governance philosophy, as already 
indicated. Neo-liberalism sought a clear demonstration of “value for money” in the 
public sector. This principle trickled down to funding agencies, which had to adjust 
their selection process for the funding of research projects. Funding agencies came 
under pressure – and of course public sector research institutions in general – to 
demonstrate their ability for promoting “useful science”3. This often led to a reshuff-
ling in the distribution of funding money from investigator initiated grants to pro-
gram grants with strings attached. More visible funding projects like centre grants 
gained hold to the detriment of smaller and less directed projects. Whole institutes 
started discussing how to better “sell” their products.  
Thus, the free choice of scientists to select research projects of their liking was 
reduced and there were tendencies to rush into those areas promoted by political or 
economic interests while other fields of scientific research tended to become neg-
lected. Though the financing of basic research never completely dried up, scientists 
were drawn to more applied research and to research areas that seemed to promise 
results for policy makers and enterprises. Researchers were obliged to develop more 
skills and better coping strategies to find their research resources and they were sub-
ject to more competition. Whether this changed the “value systems” of scientists, as 
Ziman (1987) has claimed (see also Rip 1994), is debatable, but one does find the co-
existence of traditional scientific norms directed to universality and objectivity, as 
Merton (1973) summarised them, alongside the more “proprietary”, “local” and “ap-
plied” norms induced by the steady state.  
                                                 
3 Or as Calvert and Martin say: “There were increasing pressures on scientists to be accountable for 
the money they were spending on research” (2002: 23) 
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In summary the steady state has undoubtedly opened the “ivory tower” of sci-
ence. It curtailed the traditional protection of basic research institutions and tried to 
reduce risks in research investments by holding scientists more accountable. Its in-
tention was to bring returns more clearly into sight and thereby improve the justifi-
cation for the use of public money. Neo-liberalism had the effect of depriving scien-
tists of their independence in using research money from the state. The research sec-
tor became one policy sector among many others and was subject to the same con-
trol and evaluation as all the other sectors were. A shift towards an increasing use of 
instruments with strings attached occurred.  
The ideas brought in by the cognitive frame of neo-liberalism and the steady state 
were not incompatible with the changes in the model at the operational level of 
knowledge production. On the contrary, the need to be accountable and to find re-
sources under competitive conditions as well as the pressure to apply for research 
resources in more strategic and applied fields has made it more attractive for a large 
number of scientists working in fields linked with the new generic technologies to 
engage themselves in collaborative projects with industry. Analysing the develop-
ments in the 1990s, this statement seems to be confirmed if one takes into account 
the increasing amount of business money flowing into universities, the rising number 
of university and public research labs being established and the growing number of 
collaborative projects (OECD 2004b).  
 
3.3 The Efficiency State 
The steady state oriented the public sector towards “value for money” by curtailing 
and programming resources of public sector institutions. The “efficiency state”, 
which is influenced by neo-liberal philosophy in general, and by new public manage-
ment ideas, public choice theory and rational choice institutionalism in particular, 
attacked the inefficiency of public administration by reorganising authority and ser-
vice structures in the public sector (the classic reference is Osborne and Gaebler 
1992). This had effects on all policy sectors including the research sector. While 
some of the rationales offered by this approach seem to be immediately compatible 
with the emerging model in research (for example, the quest for objectives and the 
use of foresight were complementary), there are other features such as the more ac-
tive role of the top administration in “guiding” and “steering” which seemed to go 
beyond what has been asked by the “broker model”.  
One of the main challenges for neo-liberalism was to provide guidance to the 
public sector (programming research for example) without falling into the trap of 
overcommitted planning and without violating the basic philosophy of maintaining 
market coordination and a reduced role for the state. New public management was 
successful because it offered an answer to this problem. At the same time, it incorpo-
rated sufficient ideas of steering and guidance that even left leaning governments 
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accepted the basic ideas of new public management. In this way, this approach swept 
over countries and profoundly changed the organisation of public services (Pollit and 
Bouckaert 2000). The main idea was that, in order to have an efficient and effective 
public service, it needed clear objectives, monitoring and evaluation as well as public 
sector institutions that were embedded in a market context.  
The “efficiency state” argument runs as follows; in a turbulent, changing and in-
creasingly complex world command and control lines, standardised rules and behav-
iour are outdated and useless. New reflections are needed on how to organise public 
bureaucracy so that public organisations can adapt flexibly to changing circumstances 
without, however, having complete discretion. In fact, one of the major aims in new 
public management, derived from “corporate governance”, was to maintain, or in-
troduce general political guidelines directing the behaviour of public organisations 
without preventing bottom-up initiatives in these organisations.  
New public management used notions of principal-agent theory, as developed in 
the framework of bounded rationality (Williamson 1975), to set up new governance 
structures in the public sector. Policy makers should fulfil the role of principals and 
dedicate themselves to the task of steering, though steering was mainly restricted to 
the development of strategic visions, the conclusion of contracts and monitoring of 
the activities of “agents”. Public sector institutions as “agents”, on the other hand, 
were granted “operational autonomy”, which allowed for the flexibility necessary to 
react in a turbulent environment. Agents “rowed”, which does not mean that they 
simply executed what policy makers had conceived, but rather they implemented in 
an intelligent way, according to local contexts and within the general guidelines pre-
scribed. They were bound to the principal by contracts that stipulated what the 
agents had to achieve, what time-frame was allowed, and what could be expected as 
outcomes. One notices immediately that such authority structures correspond per-
fectly with the general idea of “value for money”; new public management allowed 
for a more concrete and precise definition of the value of public sector activities. In 
this sense, the efficiency state was instrumental for the steady state.  
The ability to steer depended on more intensive activities at the political top 
level. Here “foresight” is useful. Steering meant having sufficient information and a 
rational process of selection and decision making. Foresight in research policy could 
help to deliver useful and prospective information. The rise of numerous advisory 
bodies since the 1990s demonstrates that policy makers became more active and ea-
ger to develop policy guidelines in an intelligent way.  
The setting up of “delegation” relationships is, however, prone to “moral haz-
ard” as principal-agent theory explains: agencies may abuse the (operational) discre-
tion they have received. In order to avoid moral hazard, principal-agent theory sug-
gests three major organisational principles that should be followed:  
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(1) Delegation relationships should, as stated above, be organised by contracts, 
which stipulate general objectives, time-span, “deliverables” and, if possible, sanc-
tions. The use of contracts within the public sector introduced a new and important 
element into the system which altered relationships fundamentally. While bureau-
cratic agencies in the old bureaucratic model were regarded as pure implementing 
bodies bound by hierarchical authority command lines, contracts in delegation rela-
tionships are concluded between equal partners, though, in reality, there are clear 
asymmetries in power. Nevertheless, the important point is that public agencies were 
not only recognised, but also promoted as quasi-autonomous entities able to enter 
into contractual relationships.  
Delegation in the form of the new public management thus changed the func-
tioning of public sector institutions and is behind the development of such institu-
tions as “actors” who are able to fulfil contracts, who have incentives to use re-
sources efficiently and who develop a clear sense of responsibility for their action. 
Hierarchical command and control lines of authority in the public sector became a 
rarity. In the research sector research institutions and funding agencies were seldom 
organised in the “Weberian” style of command and control. The unpredictability of 
knowledge production has always demanded a certain amount of flexibility and 
autonomy for institutions. Nevertheless, the efficiency state also changed the work-
ing of research institutions. While traditionally the general objectives of research in-
stitutions have been very broad, the development of contracts now demanded more 
specific descriptions of objectives and more precise time frames. Previously policy 
makers’ expectations were seldom precisely articulated, now output criteria were de-
veloped and used to measure the performance of research institutions. These exigen-
cies demanded, as explained above, a much stricter internal organisation and man-
agement that was able to pursue the contractual obligations by rational strategies. 
Thus, even research organisations became increasingly like “corporate enterprises”.  
Such a change was conducive to the development of collaboration with industry. 
Universities and research institutes learned how to behave as “entrepreneurs” in a 
turbulent environment and how to be more active in relation to demands from in-
dustry and other stakeholders. Becoming an entrepreneur meant searching for op-
portunities to improve the performance of the institution and bidding for contracts 
and money from different organisations. The “entrepreneurial university” is one out-
come of changes to the governance of the public sector (Etzkowitz et al. 2000).  
(2) In order to avoid moral hazard, control became a second component of the 
new authority structure of delegation. Control was needed to monitor whether con-
tractual obligations had been fulfilled and assess whether it was necessary to change 
contractual conditions or use sanctions etc. Ex post evaluation of the activities and 
output of institutions was one of the major reforms in governance structures. The 
research sector was not exempt, though it was particularly difficult to define reason-
able output criteria. Notwithstanding this fact, there was real growth of output meas-
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urement in the industry and evaluations began to emerge that changed the practices 
and habits of research institutions.  
For policy makers control was a major requirement of the efficiency state. Only 
in the case of constant evaluation of performance could one select the best agencies, 
avoid mismanagement and make the overall system “fit for the future” by constant 
adaptation (see Schick 2003). Pressure built up in the system due to the linking of 
resource allocation to the outcome of performance measurement. In this way, even 
research agencies had to think in terms of “profits”, i.e. in terms of survival and per-
forming better than competitors even though this was often artificial as “quasi-mar-
kets” had to be established to uphold the principle of competition. This brings us to 
the third principle of how to avoid moral hazard.  
(3) The conviction that market principles of coordination are superior forms of 
organisation has been another important cognitive influence on the organisation of 
the efficiency state with profound consequences for governance in research. With the 
introduction of “quasi-markets”, policy makers hoped to raise the quality of services 
as well as the efficiency of public sector organisations. As early as 1971 we find fore-
runners of such thinking in research policy in the famous “Rothschild Report” in the 
UK where the “customer-contractor” principle was introduced in order to raise the 
accountability of research councils. This is a good example for the introduction of 
quasi-markets. In this report, ministries were considered to be the customers of re-
search councils, which were then supposed to address at least a part of their research 
money directly to the needs of a ministry. This demanded negotiations with and clari-
fication from the ministry about what it actually wanted from research councils. It 
often happened that the determination of demands was quite difficult so many of 
these first quasi-markets broke down (Braun 1997). New public management revived 
these ideas and research institutions were increasingly supposed to think in terms of 
customer and contractors which could mean relationships with industry, but also 
with other stakeholders and, of course, with ministries. Supply and demand were 
brought together and research agencies learnt how to satisfy and even anticipate de-
mands from stakeholders. In this way, the “marketisation” supported the “account-
ability” of research institutions as well as the “value for money” principle. At least 
part of the research should be inspired by the wishes of stakeholders and the agen-
cies should learn to develop sensors and organisational procedures to identify and 
“hear” their customers. So, research policy makers could, by obligating research 
agencies to enter the frame of “customer-contractors”, strengthen their grip on these 
agencies as it became easier for them to know what to expect.  
The customer-contractor principle was one part of the market rationale with 
competition as another key aspect. Of course, scientists are always more or less com-
peting, especially if they are dependent on scarce resources. But it is quite a different 
story when we consider institutions. For a long time research institutions were fi-
nanced by block grants without ever – perhaps with the exception of research mis-
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sion agencies in the U.S. – getting into serious trouble. Research agencies did not 
usually compete with each other. Often they were active in different fields of science 
or were busy pursuing different stages of research. Relationships were therefore con-
sidered to be more complementary than competitive. As already indicated, this view 
changed with the diffusion of new public management ideas. Competition among 
“contractors” is one of the most important principles for efficiency and innovation 
on the market. Rivalry is supposed to be one of the keys to lowering costs and raising 
quality in the public sector.  
In the research sector the market rationale flourished under the influence of new 
public management. Quasi-markets were created where research agencies could bid 
for money. As is indicated in the latest publications by the OECD (see the introduc-
tion), a majority of countries deliberately reduced block grants and further funding 
(the share depends on the “proximity” of research agencies to stakeholders) was ex-
pected to be found in the “private market” or from another part on the “public mar-
ket”, i.e. with different ministries or departments within one ministry. Research 
councils had to compete with each other for their budgets. So by artificially reducing 
the resources and introducing a quasi-market, as well as demanding activities on the 
private market, research agencies were increasingly subjected to “marketisation”.  
The consequence for the role of policy makers in the governance of research was 
to abstain from command and control and instead use “indirect steering” by chang-
ing the constitutional principles of research agencies. Previously political governance 
relied on direct steering mechanisms such as financial incentives directed to research-
ers. The governance philosophy of the efficiency state changed the “software” of 
research institutions by “programming” these institutions in such a way that effi-
ciency, performance and accountability become part of the functional logic of these 
organisations. This creates the conditions for a functioning “market” in research and 
for higher performance. One should not see financial incentives and structuring as 
opposing principles: to the extent that institutions and, in due course, their research-
ers follow the rules of new public management, it becomes easier to find scientists 
interested in research programmes which have strings attached. In this sense, then, 
both the steady state and the efficiency state create the structures that are needed to 
overcome the self-induced isolation of the academic enterprise and open it up to the 
demands of stakeholders. Though neo-liberalism had little to do with the search for 
solutions in the research sector, it created favourable conditions for the solutions that 
emerged by emulation and cognitive scripts about the production of knowledge.  
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3.4 Good Governance 
More recently these insights from new public management theory have been com-
plemented by another dimension in a move towards the framework of “good gov-
ernance” (see especially the latest report of the Independent Commission on Good 
Governance in Public Services in the UK; 2004). Good governance has been built on 
the experiences of corporate management (see OECD 2004c) and the introduction 
of democracy in former authoritarian states. It is more practical and normative 
driven than scientifically informed. Nevertheless it has achieved a high status in the 
thinking of top administrators and policy makers in the last decade or so. Good gov-
ernance can be seen as the mix of a number of principles that have been put forward 
by new public management and the insight that the success of administrative meas-
ures depends to a large extent on the consent and cooperation of addressees. There-
fore, the participation of stakeholders becomes an important asset in the working 
and effectiveness of governance structures. Accountability means not only identify-
ing probable customers and preparing work for them but also integrating these cus-
tomers, i.e. the public in general, into the processes of decision making. Nowotny et 
al. (2001) analyse this dimension and demonstrate the extent to which “socially ro-
bust knowledge” must become a primary preoccupation of scientists in the age of 
innovation. Without going into too much detail here, one can point to new initiatives 
to open the scientific world to the public, i.e. being transparent about what has been 
accomplished, openly defending and explaining research activities, building platforms 
with the public and institutionalising permanent participation of stakeholders in re-
search agencies. 
Though the integration of stakeholders into the priority setting of research can 
without a doubt technically be considered an improvement of the effectiveness of 
governance structures in the sense that local information is flowing in and a consen-
sus can be created that is needed when objectives are implemented, the participation 
dimension has different connotations from the neo-liberal perspective. It does not 
originate from public choice theory but is inspired by preoccupations with the estab-
lishment of democratic structures in developing countries. There is a normative di-
mension behind this notion. Good governance has nevertheless become a “script” 
for policy makers and administrators in many institutions and the participation of 
stakeholders has become a constant topic in the discussion of contracts between 
“principal” and “agent”, especially in the research sector because of the negative im-
age that has emerged since the Club of Rome Report at the end of the 1960s and in 
the context of biotechnology and genetic engineering. Ethical questions are more 
important today and this justifies the early integration of stakeholders in discussions 
on research objectives and instruments.  
Participation of stakeholders is added to the framework of good governance 
alongside the other notions of steady and efficient states, i.e. to accountability, effec-
tiveness, transparency, responsibility. It, therefore, adds to the complexity of action 
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in research institutes which must now reorganise their internal structures, develop 
contracts, undergo permanent evaluation procedures, bid for money in competition 
with other agencies, look for financial support among stakeholders and become en-
trepreneurs with good relations with industry. In addition, they must pay attention to 
the sensibilities of the public and use information from stakeholders to become suc-
cessful.  
 
 
4. From vertical to horizontal governance 
The steady state and efficiency state are not just policy rationales but have been 
transformed into governance design and policy instruments which have been 
implemented on a large scale in many OECD countries (see Pollit and Bouckaert 2000). 
The research sector was no exception as numerous OECD publications testify. One 
sees a restructuring of funding habits and instruments as well as a reorganisation of 
governance structures throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Some countries were advancing 
ahead (like the UK) while others followed later.  
The important point is that in many ways these changes, which were promoted in 
the “age of innovation”, developed a dynamic of their own that resulted in new 
problems and which in turn, demanded new solutions. The development of public-
private partnerships, for example, had profound consequences on the scientific sys-
tem and how it operates. The introduction of “agents” into governance structures 
and the resulting inclination towards “entrepreneurial strategies” produced new and 
multiple interdependencies between increasing numbers of institutions that often 
worked in different systems. Since the mid 1990s, discussion about the role of gov-
ernment shifted from the efficiency state to the question of how to manage interde-
pendencies and coordination between the various institutions and actors in the re-
search sector.  
Similarly, one finds new ideas and rationales at the global governance level. As a 
reaction to new public management, partly to its consequences (decentralisation and 
empowerment lead to more active units and need for horizontal cooperation), partly 
to its failures (strategic management suffers from information overload and planning 
failure), a new “narrative” or rationale of state intervention appears on the agenda of 
administrative scientists (the “network approach” in organisational sociology and 
public administration), sociologists of science (see for example Geuna et al. 2003) 
and policy makers. In contrast with the efficiency state, this new rationale still lacks 
sufficient institutionalisation to speak of a change in the governance of knowledge 
production and diffusion. However, there is a forceful epistemic community that is 
bringing the new rationale to the agenda and there are some preliminary findings that 
suggest some of the governance design and practices are beginning to move in the 
direction of what one might call the ”network state”.  
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At the practical cognitive level of policy makers, we do not find fundamental re-
forms. Though the U.S. increasingly replaces Japan as a model, this does not mean 
new cognitive frames or scripts for governance. One finds a more active role that 
universities play in the collaboration with business, the development of “science dis-
tricts”, an interest in the geographical proximity of the organisation of collaborative 
research projects, and “tacit knowledge” as well as for the handling of intellectual 
property rights. More important for our discussion on governance structures is the 
development of ideas at the level of production where a number of approaches 
emerge that try to cope with the increasing complexity and the “network structure” 
of research due to the need for collaboration in the age of innovation. These theories 
present some new and insightful recommendations for the role that policy makers 
should play in the governance of research. At the level of global governance ideas 
new organisational theories gain importance.  
The major cognitive step that is taken with regard to the governance of research 
is the shift from a “vertical approach” where governance is manifested by the “dele-
gation” and “contract” perspective to a “horizontal approach” where the manage-
ment of interdependencies becomes the main preoccupation.  
 
4.1 Changes in ideas about the production of knowledge 
The new “production” theories that develop in economics and sociology since the 
1980s, accentuate key terms of “post-modern” thinking like evolution, complex sys-
tems, uncertainty and non-linear relationships.4 Both knowledge production and 
knowledge diffusion become an interactive project between knowledge producers 
and knowledge users. This has already been identified in the above-mentioned “new 
growth theory” but this aspect gains momentum in theory-building as research col-
laboration for the benefit of technological innovation is becoming a more regular 
feature of research. Taken together, these approaches stress the non-linearity of the 
knowledge process, the increasing interdependence and entanglement of basic, ap-
plied, and technological research, the complex recursive relationships and particularly 
the blurring of boundaries and co-evolution of until recently well confined functional 
areas. In terms of governance the message is clear; in a world of strong interdepen-
dence and interaction, the prediction of results is extremely difficult. Contingency 
becomes a buzzword in this context, meaning that there are so many influences en-
tering into the matrix of actions that one cannot intervene in a pointed and goal ori-
ented way. The message for the policy makers is to shift from “optimising” to “adap-
tive” policy making, to improve framework conditions instead of developing grand 
designs, to enable actors in the innovation process to organise the process and to 
                                                 
4 I would briefly subsume the “mode-2” approach (Gibbons et al. 1994); the “triple helix” approach 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1998; Leydesdorff 2000); “evolutionary economicy” (Nelson 1982, 
Krugman 1996; Metcalf and Georghiou 1998; Kline and Rosenberg 1986); and the “system of 
innovation” approach (Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997) to this type of reasoning.  
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learn. Moreover, policy goals in such a process become contingent. The process of 
defining policy goals must be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. 
This directly contradicts the democratic vision of the “responsible policy makers” 
fostered in the “good governance” vision.  
 
4.2 The Network State 
At the level of global governance frames one finds a rising number of organisational 
studies, advisory reports and practitioners’ reflections that address visible structural 
(and often negative) consequences of the efficiency state by constructing a different 
“narrative” about how the state should govern in general and how knowledge pro-
duction in particular should be governed. In what follows I will endeavour, by refer-
ring to a number of publications, to unravel this narrative and its consequences for 
the governance of knowledge production.  
 
4.2.1 The Consequences of the Efficiency State 
It is argued in a number of administrative studies that the new organisational forms 
and governance principles of the efficiency state prepared the ground for its trans-
formation5: The decentralisation of functions in the process of delegation and the 
increasing discretion public service agencies have been accorded, has contributed to 
the rise of relatively small autonomous organisations that are required to enter into 
exchange with organisations in different sectors and systems to fulfil their functions. 
Thus, horizontal contacts and interdependencies become more important. As these 
contacts often address specific problems and have specific purposes, they have a 
temporary character. So, one sees a constant grouping and re-grouping of organisa-
tions, a permanent re-shuffling of clusters of organisations. This demonstrates the 
need for constant adaptation to an increasingly turbulent environment. Frissen’s 
(1999) evocation of an “archipelago” is very apt for describing these new horizontal 
relationships at the operational level. In such a world of interdependent clusters of 
organisations the role of the state in guiding in a goal oriented way what these or-
ganisations should do or when they should change strategies or decide on collabora-
tions etc. no longer exists. The capacity to act in a decentralised and flexible manner 
demands the transfer of authority to such institutions in a more profound way. To 
cope with these transformations towards horizontal cooperation on the operational 
level, the state needs to learn, as Mayntz (1993) proposes, to manage interdependencies, 
i.e. to create the adequate conditions for cooperation and to accompany the process 
                                                 
5 Functional pressures like shorter product life cycles, greater service variety and greater user choice 
sustain this transformation (see Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996). All these pressures demand more flexible 
modes of production, accelerate the pace of internal change and the need for organisational learning. 
Above all, networks can be helpful in opening up new information sources that are increasingly spread 
among sectors and institutions and which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. 
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of adaptation and re-adaptation. In this unfolding context enabling to learn begins to be 
substituted for the main notions of the efficiency state, i.e. how to design and steer. 
Therefore, the implementation of new public management principles leads to some 
unintended outcomes. It becomes increasingly difficult to guide the behaviour of 
public sector organisations, even by using general frameworks and contracts. A verti-
cal organisation of governance, even with operational discretion, is not adequate for 
the organisation of horizontal cooperation. The maintenance of specific and fixed 
policy goals in an environment where constant adaptation is needed seems to be 
counter-productive. Contracts must therefore become more flexible or should be 
abandoned altogether.  
The literature on the “hollow state” has further evoked some of these arguments 
(Milward and Provan 2000; Klijn 2002; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). This approach 
in the literature on public administration has focused on recent trends of “contract-
ing out” many of the services of the state to so-called “third-party organisations” or 
to the private sector. Contracting out leads to an increasingly interdependent number 
of networks in public service provision. Joint production, however, has its own ra-
tionales and rules of organisation. In addition, one sees as a “result of specialization 
and growing demands of consumers….chains of networks of specialised firms” and a 
dispersion of specialised information among various actors (Klijn 2002: 156). Klijn 
arrives at the same conclusion as sketched above: 
“This characteristic of interdependency increases the importance of horizontal relations at the ex-
pense of vertical relations. Quality of products and services increasingly rely on the chain between 
organizations instead of on the performance of one single organization” (ibid.).  
Also, at the level of political governance, there is a growing awareness of multi-fac-
eted problems and the interactive effects of intervention measures. It is said that the 
new public management procedures are overly based on the logic of incentive setting 
in vertical principal-agent relationships and therefore fail to identify horizontal ef-
fects of these structures. New public management relies on “hierarchies of objec-
tives, targets, and performance measurement” (Davies and Rhodes 2000: 96) that are 
not suitable for horizontal and inter-organisational contexts. In such a context a 
manager cannot impose objectives on other participating organisations. Scott (2003) 
asserts that centralised command and control structures become dysfunctional and 
obsolete as the increase of horizontal contacts shifts the centre of the organisation to 
the “boundaries” rather than to the core. Managers are obliged to learn to manage 
horizontally as well as vertically (ibid.: 12). Management by persuasion and objectives 
that are agreed between independent actors are needed in this situation. A “matrix 
management style” where managers build and uphold links and institutionalise stra-
tegic alliances seems to be more suitable in the “post-modern” context. The task of 
the network state is to refrain from the manipulation of behaviour and to foster “re-
ciprocal relationships” in strategic collaborations as well as to install long-term rela-
tionships that are based on trust (ibid.).  
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In summary, the coordination and interdependence problem is identified in this 
“narrative” as the central problem in a complex world where apparently only alli-
ances can still generate the necessary resources to survive in a world full of competi-
tion. Both in administrative theory and practice, we are experiencing a shift from 
“substantialist self-action” definitions of organisations to “substantialist interaction 
definitions” (Scott 2004: 13). Organisations change according to varying circum-
stances and they become “inseparable from the transactional context in which they 
are embedded” (ibid.). This conception of organisations adheres to a relational and 
process view. Even the identity of institutions is constructed through the process of 
interaction with other organisations.  
A systemic and network approach can help to address these fundamental changes 
in the production of resources. The system approach allows interaction effects to be 
taken into account and helps to design more encompassing strategies. The network 
approach takes into account how actors and organisations behave in horizontal me-
dium and long term relationships. Contracts, incentives and control, the trademarks 
of the efficiency state, have been replaced by notions of trust and social capital (Put-
nam 1993) which are at the heart of reciprocity and collaborative action in horizontal 
relations.  
The message of this “post-modern” turn in global governance theory is that 
modern organisations must invest in both competition and cooperation and that the 
latter becomes a central aspect of organisational survival in a complex and interde-
pendent world. The governance design of the efficiency state is too much focused on 
competition between agencies. In addition, the theoretical background of the effi-
ciency state always assumes “opportunistic behaviour among organisations”. The 
notions of trust and learning are not on the radar of the efficiency state and this has 
counter-productive consequences.  
These reflections have unequivocal consequences for political governance. Just as 
managers at the operational level are supposed to delegate competencies to the 
“boundaries” of their organisation and deal with the organisation of “boundary con-
tacts”, political decision makers should not be striving for prescriptions, objectives 
and controllable targets. Governments should be satisfied with identifying a problem 
and framing the context of a situation (Paquet 2001). They should be there to stimu-
late learning and the finding of new and interesting solutions. As knowledge is widely 
dispersed, the stimulation of various decentralised solutions can be helpful (Klijn 
2002: 161). The stress is on the stimulation of “permanent” learning in multiple 
places. One should not stop once a solution is found and the problem is fixed, but 
should continue to look for other solutions (Schick 2003). One shall not find – here 
evolutionary economics and the sociology of organisations agree – one optimal solu-
tion. In addition, each situation and country is different. As a consequence, policy 
makers should not focus on control and priority setting, but instead reflect on how 
to guide “learning processes” better and how to create the necessary conditions for 
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learning. They should do everything to enable actors in the field to develop long 
standing horizontal contacts, to foster the building of social capital and networks. 
The state should be a catalyst for horizontal coordination across organisational and 
systemic boundaries (Lind 1992). A turbulent environment needs less steering from 
above and more adaptable models and flexible structures. In the new turbulent envi-
ronment, strategic management is no longer sufficient. What is required instead is the 
development of capacities for collaborative action, the “collective action by dissimilar 
organisations whose fates are positively correlated” (Paquet 2004: 203).  
In addition, reflexivity becomes an important asset of government action, i.e. the 
ability of the government to reflect on public sector arrangements as a whole system. 
This requires different information than that needed in the efficiency state; more 
encompassing and comprehensive diagnostic tools are required that are able to take 
into account the interaction effects of governmental action. However, without the 
intention to better control the system, but rather to learn how to better “structure” 
for improving the self-governing capacities of the autonomous and decentralised 
entities.  
Perhaps, most important in this context – and here evolutionary economics has 
been the primary inspiration – is the question of policy objectives. In the 1960s, 
emerging research policy began to develop its own programmes and areas of concern 
that were financed by research grants with strings attached. In the age of the effi-
ciency state objectives were broadly outlined in contracts and linked to ex post 
evaluations. In the network state political objectives should be restricted to structur-
ing purposes for the benefit of good working networks. Even if objectives are de-
fined for such networks, processes can result in an adjustment of such objectives and 
policy makers should be prepared to accept such a shift in objectives. Good working 
processes become more important than the linear realisation of objectives. A second 
dimension entailed in the enabling state is that policies become increasingly subject 
to interdependent decision making. New public management insisted on the author-
ity of the principal to develop the general objectives. In the network state this should 
be the task of all parties involved. In other words, common problem solving be-
comes the dominant rationale of the governance design, especially in research policy 
(Hackman 2003). Policy making should emerge and evolve in collaborative relations 
and should not be planned and pursued. Priority setting is part of the management of 
interdependencies.  
Such a change in orientation demands a considerable adjustment by policy mak-
ers. If one can no longer judge actors’ performance in terms of objectives and output 
and if trial and error and emerging policies become part of policy making then the 
legitimacy of policy makers becomes a problem. Processes can seldom be sold in 
terms of success and failure of policy making and policy makers need a long breath 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of such a network approach.  
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5. Conclusions 
The following table summarises the changes in rationales during the “age of 
innovation” characterising science, technology and innovation policies nowadays. They 
focus on interaction, “value for money”, efficiency and participation.  
 
Table 1: Key notions in the “age of innovation” 
 
Level of experiences 
of policy-makers 
Foresight 
Research collaboration between academia and industry; public-private 
partnerships 
Policy makers as active brokers and priority setters 
Level of production 
ideas 
Technology as a decisive variable for economic growth 
Industrial and research policy growing together 
Interactive model of innovation emerging 
Investment into knowledge creation on all levels (public sector, business, 
society) 
Strategic research as new category 
Level of global 
governance: Steady 
State 
Value for money 
Directing resources from unspecified to specified purposes 
Introduce active search for money in public sector, competitive tendering 
Level of global 
governance: 
Efficiency State 
Efficiency and effectiveness of governance processes 
Contracts with clear objectives, monitoring procedures and output criteria 
Markets and competition 
Accountability and responsiveness 
Level of global 
governance: Good 
Governance 
Participation of stakeholders 
 
It was demonstrated above that the governance design in research policy making in the 
age of innovation was subject to changes on all three cognitive levels that were 
identified to be of relevance for the governance of research policies. While changes at 
the level of experiences of research policy makers and theories about the production of 
knowledge were certainly linked to and reinforced each other, developments at the 
global governance level were independent from the research sector. Nevertheless, the 
governance principles of the research sector had to be adapted to these broadly 
encompassing principles. Despite such autonomous changes at the global governance 
level, the analysis suggests that the principles pushed forward by neo-liberalism in the 
form of the steady and efficient states were conducive to the changes which 
simultaneously took place at the level of research policy making.  
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The steady state supports the move towards closer cooperation in science/ 
innovation between academia and business enterprise by compelling public sector 
research institutions and scientists to become more responsive and look for re-
sources outside of government.  
The efficiency state makes public sector institutions “fit” for acting as “entrepre-
neurs”, by organising internal structures in more efficient and effective ways. The 
combination of fewer guaranteed resources and contractually agreed objectives leads 
to stronger interest from such institutions to collaborate with business. Though the 
changes in governance structures were not developed at the level of the research 
sector, they strengthen the trend for the opening of the research sector, and encour-
aged it to be more responsive and accountable.  
This is strengthened by the emphasis on participation in good governance. Again, 
research institutions have to develop a more open attitude for their organisation. 
This dimension is, however, not directly linked to neo-liberalism. It adds complexity 
to the working of the research institutions. The efficiency advantage, however, is 
that, by integrating stakeholders in priority setting, more relevant information is 
made available and research projects become better aligned with the interests and 
problems of user systems.  
All in all, there seem to be no overtly conflicting objectives in the policy ration-
ales that have emerged since the 1980s. There are a number of relatively autonomous 
developments at each ideational level but these developments are compatible with 
each other. Though the global governance ideas were not designed to encourage 
collaboration in research, their adaptation by the research sector contributes in many 
ways to the feasibility of changing the attitudes of researchers and enterprises in the 
direction of an “innovation enterprise”.  
While these rationales are more or less institutionalised in most countries’ inno-
vation policies, the “narrative” of network governance is still emerging. In various 
parts it contests fundamental belief systems of the efficiency state. It focuses on the 
building of horizontal relations. The following figure summarises the key notions.  
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Table 2: Key notions in network governance 
 
Level of experiences 
of policy-makers 
USA as example 
Research collaboration between academia and industry; public-private 
partnerships continue to be the major aim; “entrepreneurial university” 
comes to the fore; organisation of “science-innovation interface”; changes 
in intellectual property rights: delegation to operating research institutions 
Policy makers as network brokers 
Level of production 
ideas 
Blurring boundaries; co-evolution of economy, science and politics; non-
linear processes of innovation, unpredictable knowledge creation; foster 
learning processes; policy makers as “facilitator” and “adaptive agent” 
Systemic view of innovation 
Level of global 
governance:  
Management of interdependence of autonomous public (and private) 
agencies in horizontal relations;  
Creating trust and fostering reciprocal relations in networks;  
Consensus orientation in policy making; emergence of changing priorities 
in networks;  
Encompassing and reflexive view of problems and solutions 
Horizontal organisation of governance structures 
Not objectives but framing and structuring horizontal relations 
Enable to learn and react flexibly 
Coordinate different governance organisations 
 
One sees that the new thinking is based on ideational developments both on the 
production and the global governance level. The key term becomes “evolution”: 
Knowledge production and governance are seen as emerging phenomena. They are 
constructed in the process of making. As a consequence government should refrain 
from objectives, targets and ex post evaluation on the base of output. Networks must 
be flexible and it is more important to grant discretion to these networks than to 
determine in advance what should happen. There is a turn from “foresight”, priority 
setting, target building, monitoring and control to facilitation, catalytic and reflexive 
activities of government. In fact, the accent here is less on government than on all 
actors that are involved in the managing and production of the resource knowledge. 
Government should have no dominant position in governance. 
The analysis should have made clear that today there is not one uniform and co-
herent governance frame that is instructing policy makers what to do. The mix of 
policy-instruments we find today is not based on a “grand design” but is nourished 
by different ideational sources. This must not be a problem as long as the different 
rationales are compatible with each other. The analysis demonstrated that we find 
indeed for the major part such compatibilities in the governance design during the 
“age of innovation”. The disturbing factor is the emergence of a new global gover-
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nance design in the form of the network state that is contesting above all the role and 
function of the state in the governance of innovation. The emergence of this new 
frame seems to be linked to the autonomous dynamic on the level of knowledge 
production that is stimulated by emulation, new innovation theories and the effi-
ciency state. New forms of knowledge production and diffusion emerge that seem to 
be in need of a different style of governance. As long as the efficiency state, in com-
bination with good governance and the steady state, prevails, one can expect a rising 
tension between the operational mode and the governance design. In the long run we 
may expect a critical juncture that helps to institutionalise the network state as the 
adequate answer to the proliferation of horizontal relations in innovation policies. 
This, however, is only possible if this kind of tension is developing in most policy 
areas. Global governance frames do not change according to sectoral policy devel-
opments. They are reflecting the overall government philosophy on how to organise 
political governance. Only if the steady and efficiency state and good governance 
produce similar tendencies to the prevalence of horizontal relations in other policy 
sectors, the rationale of the network state has a chance to become the dominant gov-
ernance model in innovation policy.  
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Introduction 
These are times of rapid change. “Globalization,” the “information age” and the 
“knowledge society” – our world is undergoing transformations that are often felt to 
be fundamental and new, yet at the same time seem unclear in their particular direc-
tion, quality, and outcome. The perceived changes have engaged both social scientists 
and the public. While distinctive, often catchy designations can help bring our atten-
tion to something new that otherwise might not be perceived, they also may overes-
timate the quality of the new, or neglect that it has already been there in one way or 
another. Critics have often claimed that these phenomena were not new at all. The 
fact that the terms pointing to “the new” could gain an overwhelming presence in 
scientific and public discourses does not indicate that they are simply right, but that 
they help chart these phenomena to a considerable extent. However, times of rapid 
or fundamental change render disputes about how best to qualify and understand 
them both unavoidable and necessary.  
This also holds true for the role of science and politics as subjects and agents of 
change. For example, the term “mode 2” has become the focus of debates about a 
new mode of production of scientific knowledge and the importance of political ro-
bustness; or the term “triple-helix” has efficiently communicated new arrangements 
between research, business, and government as crucial for current science-based in-
novations (Gibbons et al. 1994; Etzkowitz/Leydesdorff 1997). In this article, I do 
not want to engage in these debates particularly, but rather in the more general 
themes of changing regimes of science policy and the shifting boundaries between 
science and politics.1 Again, all these debates imply rather far-reaching changes in the 
configuration of science and politics, which requires further specification as to the 
extent to which a particularly new quality can be identified.  
                                                 
1 This paper was written based on methodological comments given at the conference “Shifting 
Boundaries between Science and Politics. New Research Perspectives in Science Studies” at the Wis-
senschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) on June 25-26, 2004. The research and writing 
for this article was made possible through a Habilitation grant by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) and through a research grant by the National Science Foundation (Grant No. 0425880). I 
would like to thank Clark Miller, Christina White, and Daniel Kleinman for their comments on an 
earlier draft. 
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In section one I will outline some elements of the presumed “old” configuration 
of science and politics. Hereby, science and politics become visible as separate from, 
but also as connected with each other in various ways. This portrayal will not be 
comprehensive, addressing primarily the post-World War II period. It will show that 
changes in the relationship between science and politics have taken shape for various 
reasons and at specific times in modern history. 
Next, in section two I will outline more recent changes in the configuration of 
science and politics that have had a mutual effect on each domain. I will show that 
the “vertical” differentiation of politics at the national, supranational, and interna-
tional levels affects not only social institutions, but also science. Then in section three 
I will demonstrate that the specific characteristics of particular sciences matter in 
respect to how they concern politics and social institutions at various levels. In these 
latter two sections I will focus on sciences that are closely related to the development 
of high-technologies. I suggest that the changing relationship between science and 
politics should be analyzed from the point of view of their interdependency and mu-
tual shaping. Finally, I will articulate this perspective – which has recently been put 
forth prominently in the contexts of “social shaping of technology” and “co-
production” (Sørensen/Williams 2002; Jasanoff 2004) – with a regime analytic 
framework. Such a framework suits the task of integrating the various scientific and 
technical, institutional and organizational, practical, discursive and normative dimen-
sions of social life in ways such that conventional conceptual oppositions between 
structure and agency, macro and micro, stability and change can be transcended. 
On this basis, the ultimate goal is to present elements of a framework for com-
parative analysis of science and politics. While an elaborate review of traditions of 
regime analysis cannot be undertaken here, in section four I will at least propose a 
generalized concept of regime that is able to integrate various contexts and traditions 
of regime analysis. It is important to note that to date there is no general regime the-
ory or framework of analysis that provides the appropriate references for integrating 
the various contexts and issues at stake. The main argument that I am going to make 
in this article is that the complexity and dynamics of recent regime changes require 
comparative as well as transnational perspectives. I will end with some conclusions 
for science and technology studies and respectively science policy studies, the two 
main science-related social science fields. 
 
 
1.  The post-World War II order of science and politics 
It has often been assumed that, up until the post-World War II era, there had been a 
clear boundary between science and politics (as well as, yet to a lesser extent, between 
engineering and industry). While it was considered the obligation of scientists and 
engineers to pursue true knowledge and efficient technologies, the application of 
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science and technology was seen as the responsibility of government and industry. 
This distribution of obligations and responsibilities found its expression in institu-
tionalized norms and codes of conduct (Price 1965). They were characteristic for 
both military and civil affairs: scientists and engineers would create new weapons but 
deny any responsibility for their application; and they would develop new products 
and processes but reject being held accountable for the consequences of their use. 
Two major events have challenged this constellation. First, the engagement of 
prominent physicists in the Nazi efforts to develop an atomic bomb (as well as other 
weapons), and the actual launch by the Americans of two atomic bombs on the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, led to fundamental ques-
tions about the role of physicists. Physicians also came into question because of their 
involvement in Nazi medical experiments, which inspired the reformulation of basic 
medical ethics in the Nuremberg Code of 1947 that followed the war-crimes trials. In 
the face of these horrible events, scientists themselves started debating their power 
and responsibilities (Schweber 2000; Annas/Grodin 1992). Second, the new social 
movements that emerged in many countries between the mid-1960s and mid-70s 
criticized – in addition to the continuing importance of military Research and Deve-
lopment (R&D) – the social, in particular the environmental and health, impacts of 
industrial production as often severely dangerous but neglected in public until proven 
significant (Brand 1985; Sale 1993). The positive reception of such criticisms by vari-
ous social groups led to a higher awareness of potentially unwanted impacts of in-
dustrial production, and/or the use of its products, on the part of those actors con-
cerned with technology development in engineering, industry, and government. Thus 
also scientists and engineers in industrial R&D were forced or encouraged to take 
into account an ever broader spectrum of concerns and responsibilities in their work, 
among them various risk, ethics and privacy concerns. In the end, fundamental 
changes in the relationship between science, politics, and industry occurred which led 
to increased accountability concerning issues that were previously most often consi-
dered outside the domain of scientists and engineers (Ravetz 1971; Wynne 1992; 
Lash et al. 1996; Weingart 2001). 
Before these exemplary events gained prominence in the 20th century and raised 
awareness of the political and societal impacts of science and technology, both sci-
ence and engineering had long become part of various domains of society. For in-
stance, they provided the knowledge and skill basis for an increasing number of sec-
tors of modern industry, i.e. its processes, forms of organization, and products. With 
the industrial revolution, science and engineering had themselves become an impor-
tant part of the enterprise of industrial capitalism, transforming the modes of pro-
duction together with the infrastructures of society (Landes 1969; Freeman/Soete 
1997). In consequence, governments developed more or less elaborate frameworks 
for funding research and for implementing science and technology policy. This led, 
among other things, to the founding of new institutions such as institutes of techno-
logy and polytechnics, the purpose of which was to carry out R&D and provide an 
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appropriately skilled workforce. Furthermore, science and engineering became inte-
grated into the procedures for regulating technological risks by providing measures 
and means for assessing them (Wynne 1989; Jasanoff 1995). An early example is the 
risks associated with the steam engine. However, connections between science, in-
dustry and politics that had emerged in the 19th century (and had even earlier roots) 
did not undermine the conventional notion of separate domains of human activity, 
their norms and values.  
The post-World War II order established stability in the world in an unprece-
dented way. A basic condition for this stability was the balance of power between the 
two world super powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. This power balance was 
fortified by a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Cold War divi-
sion. By virtue of its potential for mutual destruction, the cumulated weaponry en-
couraged the peaceful behaviour of the two dominant powers. This situation also 
ultimately encouraged both super powers to enter talks about limiting the nuclear 
arms race. This context of international politics was the first in which a concept of 
international regime was developed. The political science discipline of international 
relations has also been the prime context of regime theory so far. The notion of in-
ternational regime highlights the willingness of sovereign nation-states to shift power 
to a mutually agreed configuration of values and norms, rules and procedures – i.e. 
the core regime elements – in both the common interest and the nation-states’ own 
interest (Krasner 1983; Mayer et al. 1995; Hasenclever et al. 1997).  
In the decades after World War II, welfare state institutions flourished, enabling 
economic and societal prosperity in the most advanced countries of the West to a 
previously unknown extent. These fundamental changes inspired analyses of welfare 
state – as opposed to “laissez-fair” – regimes of capitalism. This context of regime 
analysis highlighted the relationship of politics and the economy at the national level, 
emphasizing that each historical phase provides a range of options for societal or-
ganization. While the political and economic configurations could be shaped de-
pending on national institutions and traditions, nation-state societies would face not 
only problems specific to their own historical development but also problems that 
were common to other countries. Thus transnational dynamics of how to success-
fully adapt to new situations were also considered important. As regards science and 
technology, they were analyzed, if at all, in terms of their economic importance, but 
mostly without reflection on their form and content (Gourevitch 1986; Lipietz 1985; 
Esping-Andersen 1990; Jessop 1995). 
The balance of power between the USA and the Soviet Union limited the range 
of options of societal and political change for both the main allied countries and the 
newly constituted “Third World” countries. The developing countries had success-
fully become independent through decolonization in the 1960s, a major process of 
political and social change in the 20th century. These countries would later become 
subject to modernization regimes, with science and technology considered funda-
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mental for economic growth. Such regimes were usually shaped not only by national 
actors, but also by one of the super powers, or by international organizations (Søren-
sen 1990; Haggard/Kaufmann 1992). 
At the international level, the stability of the world economy was supported by 
new international organizations, in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank – two core institutions of the “Bretton Woods” international 
economic regime (Schild 1995). The founding of these organizations was an answer 
to the economic crises of the 1920s and 30s on the one hand, and to the needs of 
reconstruction and development after 1945 (and after decolonization) on the other. 
The changes hereby represented were comprehended as “embedded liberalism,” 
which appropriately characterizes the post-World War II order (Ruggie 1983). The 
United Nations provided a new framework for efforts to master challenges to the 
international community with respect to, among other things, peace and security, 
development, human rights, health and the environment, and cultural exchange. 
These areas of international politics also became the subjects of international regime 
analysis. 
To sum up this brief sketch, I would like to draw three conclusions. First, the de-
velopment of modern industry led to closer ties between science and technology, 
respectively – starting with physics and chemistry in the 19th century – to science-
based technology and economic sectors. Second, the expansion of political functions, 
in particular in the form of welfare state and international institutions mainly after 
World War II, brought science – in particular economics, law, and political science – 
closer to politics. Thus the institutions of national and international politics were 
often associated with new bodies of scientific expertise that were to provide special 
knowledge for advising or legitimizing their policies. Third, both the engagement of 
scientists and engineers in bellicose projects of spectacular destruction – particularly 
in chemical warfare in World War I and, thirty years later, in nuclear warfare – and 
the environmental and health risks posed by industrial production and its products, 
generated claims for new forms of self-/regulation and accountability.  
Against this historical background of various layers of connections between sci-
ence and technology, politics and industry, the question becomes more pressing as to 
what has been changing in those relationships more recently. In the following, I will 
review recent changes in the configuration of science and politics. In modern socie-
ties, practices and institutions in both domains operate principally independent from 
each other, although they are often connected. I will first highlight changes in the 
configuration of politics at various levels, and then the changes in the configuration 
of science and science-based technologies.  
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2.  Recent changes in the configuration of politics 
At the international level – A historical event often presented to be a crucial starting 
point for recent international transformations is the suspension of the “Bretton 
Woods” regime in 1973 (Lipson 1983; Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996; Stubbs/Underhill 
2000). Increased international trade and a number of financial crises put pressure on 
the international currency relations so that they became unmanageable under the 
rules that had been successful for almost thirty years. In consequence, the fixation of 
both the US dollar to the gold standard and the value of the world currencies to each 
other were given up. From then on, the currency relations would be left to the mar-
kets and not be supervised and supported by the IMF. Thus the global financial mar-
kets gained power over national governments in the sense that a widespread interna-
tional disregard for a government’s economic policies could lead to the dramatic fall 
in value of a national currency. An example is the drop of the French franc under the 
Socialist-Communist government of President Mitterrand in the early 1980s, which 
provoked a policy U-turn.  
The IMF’s main role since the 1970s and 80s became to assist countries in finan-
cial crises particularly through the so-called structural adjustment programs. In order 
to receive loans for overcoming an acute financial crisis, governments were required 
to take steps such as lifting trade barriers, suspending price controls, and reducing 
public spending and the budget deficit. The norms and rules steadily promoted by 
the IMF – and the World Bank – became later known as the “Washington Consen-
sus” (Williamson 1990; 2000; Stiglitz 1998). While the IMF and the World Bank had 
initially been part of the UN system, they increasingly gained de facto primacy over 
the other UN organizations and programs, which is itself an indicator of fundamental 
change in the post-World War II era.  
Economic liberalization became further strengthened by the founding of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 that succeeded the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade of 1948 (GATT). Both institutions were based on the same 
values and norms of promoting free trade, but the WTO was granted more compe-
tence with respect to the realms in which free trade principles are valid and to the 
instruments by which these principles can be enforced (Hoekman/Kostecki 1995). 
Three agreements constituted the wide-reaching importance of the WTO: the up-
dated GATT, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). While 
GATT concerns the free trade in goods, the GATS requires the liberalization of the 
service sector, and the TRIPS agreement demands an extensive acknowledgment of 
intellectual property rights, among them patents to protect inventions. All member 
countries – as well as the countries wanting to become a member – are obliged to 
acknowledge the WTO agreements. In cases of conflict, the WTO possesses power-
ful institutional means for settling disputes and enforcing sanctions. 
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Put briefly, the consensus underlying the politics of globalization during the 
1990s assumed that the liberalization of world trade, which includes the deregulation 
and privatization of economic affairs within the nation-state, would create more 
beneficial effects than any form of so-called protective government policy. In other 
words, the fundamentally liberal idea proclaimed that granting power to the free 
markets was in the best interest of economic, technological and social development 
in both advanced industrial and developing countries (for competing perspectives see 
Bhagwati 2002; Stiglitz 2002). As long as the principles of the “Washington Consen-
sus” were not fundamentally challenged in the public, they were simply considered 
“good economic practice” and state-of-the-art economics. This changed after the 
violent protests at the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999. After this event, and simi-
lar events that would follow, fundamental criticisms of the predominant economic 
policies of globalization voiced by some developing countries, transnational NGOs, 
and non-mainstream economists have received much broader attention (MacEwan 
1999; Tabb 2001; Cavanagh/Mander 2004). 
In addition to the international economic regimes, international environmental 
regimes and international technology regimes have gained importance during the past 
decades not only as such, but also with regard to science. International environ-
mental regimes regulate, among other things, the protection and use of particular 
territories, natural resources or species such as the arctic, the ozone layer in the at-
mosphere or whales (Gehring/Oberthür 1997; Lansford et al. 2002). Science often 
plays an important role in the decision-making process of whether and how to im-
plement an internationally binding agreement. For example, science is to provide the 
knowledge about the characteristics and causes of environmental problems as well as, 
if possible, sound solutions. International technology regimes concern particularly 
security and safety issues related to the development or application of technologies 
such as military uses of nuclear, chemical and biological technologies on the one 
hand, or risks related to the trans-boundary movement of products or technologies 
on the other. Economic regimes, for example the WTO, may contain regulations on 
the environment and on technologies. At the same time, environmental and techno-
logy regimes are of economic importance by setting limiting or enabling conditions 
for economic activities (Barben/Behrens 2001). Similar to the configuration of poli-
tics at the national level, international regimes have to balance the highly valued 
norms of economic and scientific freedom with the protection of health and the en-
vironment across borders.  
At the national level – Liberalization policies as well as environmental or technology 
policies at the international level were promoted by national governments, who also 
constitute the members of internationally binding agreements. Often domestic policy 
priorities shape national agendas in international politics. On the other hand, priori-
ties set in international politics can help governments change, or circumvent, national 
policy agendas. For example, after the election victories of the conservative govern-
ments presided over by Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA 
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in 1979 and 1980, “free market” policies experienced a general upturn (King/Wood 
1999). On the other hand, “globalization” was often referred to as a process that 
leaves no alternatives for national policies than adaptation to global economic deve-
lopments. In this view, national policies are basically seen as forced to comply with 
the “free market” goals of deregulation and privatization. It has been a long-standing 
dispute in the public as well as in the social sciences as to what extent national gov-
ernments are still able to exert sovereign power as set out in their constitutions. The 
extreme positions have been that national governments lost their ability to design 
policies according to a deliberate democratic will completely, or that they have not 
lost this ability at all. The policy areas considered particularly sensitive in this regard 
are those that concern economic competitiveness (Cerny 1997; Scharpf 1998; Rhodes 
1998; Evans 1998). Competitiveness is usually evaluated in relation to national 
economies, particular economic sectors, or individual companies. Since the perform-
ance of economic sectors as well as of companies is also affected by conditions set by 
national regulatory frameworks and national infrastructures, business interest organi-
zations and companies tend to exert power on governments in order to achieve more 
favourable conditions. 
It had always been important to governments of capitalist democracies to sup-
port the “national industry,” not least in order to improve the prospects of electoral 
success thanks to a prospering economy. Recently the tasks of national economic 
growth and employment have changed in meaning, though remaining as important as 
ever. A more liberal international framework and increasing transnational economic 
activities such as foreign investments by transnational companies brought about a 
power shift on behalf of these companies against the national governments (Crotty et 
al. 1998). Since transnational companies can always threaten to dislocate their activi-
ties or to leave a country completely, governments are pressured to improve the con-
ditions for these companies that are the most powerful economic actors. Due to the 
increased significance of international competition in the global economy, govern-
ments as well as a variety of other actors stress the importance of various policy 
fields for improving or sustaining competitiveness (Cerny 2000; Mudambi 2003; 
Gamble/Wright 2004). Areas in which governments started competing against each 
other more and more have been taxation, labor market, welfare, infrastructure, envi-
ronment, and science and technology policies. Often de- or re-regulation in favor of 
large corporations or start-up companies was a widespread response considered most 
promising for enhancing the economic performance of a nation, combined with ef-
forts to strengthen the capabilities for market-oriented innovations and behavior. 
The policy instruments that were available to individual governments, and the signifi-
cance and effects they would have, differed in principle depending on the type of 
political economic regime a particular country belongs to (Crouch/Streeck 1997; 
Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Hall/Soskice 2001). For example, 
the debate on “varieties of capitalism” suggests that the “liberal market” and the 
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“corporatist market” regimes differ with regard to the institutional degree to which 
associations or government agencies are regulating the markets. 
As regards science and technology policy in particular, governments developed 
and combined a broad range of policy instruments in order to meet the overall goal. 
Of course, not all policy instruments were new, but even if not they were often given 
a particular emphasis. For example, governments continued to provide funding for 
basic research, but they were increasingly looking out for those areas that might be 
most up-and-coming and likely to have a broad economic impact. Since decisions 
about which areas should be granted funding were characterized by high degrees of 
uncertainty, governments would not only rely on the advice of science and engineer-
ing experts, but often follow the decisions made by the governments of the main 
competitors. The most significant policy changes took shape since the 1980s with 
respect to new modes of linking research to commercialization. To this end, institu-
tional mechanisms have been created that would allow, encourage, or oblige re-
searchers to engage in private commercial ventures or in market-oriented science and 
technology transfer. In addition, governments worked on improving the conditions 
for start-up companies or innovative small and medium-sized businesses. Generally, 
governments reorganized, and partly extended, their efforts in science and techno-
logy policy, although to a varying degree. For example, in the USA the Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 (Public Law 69-517), the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act 
of 1980 (Public Law 96-480), the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act of 
1980 (Public Law 106-144), the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-
620), the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502), the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-418), and the National 
Competitiveness and Technology Transfer Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-189) were 
landmark legislations that were to set standards for systematic commercially oriented 
science and technology policies in other countries. As a consequence, traditional in-
stitutional boundaries between the private and the public realms were shifted on be-
half of the former, i.e. for example, by enabling and promoting private exploitation 
of publicly funded research. The debate about science and technology policy that has 
particularly been concerned with competitiveness (thus also touching on the impor-
tance of other policy fields) forms the context of innovation regime analysis (Nelson 
1993; Lundvall 1992). So we find a partial overlap between the research on innova-
tion regimes and that on “varieties of capitalism.” 
At the supranational level – Within the last fifty years, the process of European inte-
gration has brought increasingly fundamental changes for all member countries of 
the European Union (EU). Starting out with the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the European Community has been functionally 
expanded to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Community (Euratom) in 1957, to the Merger Treaty establishing a single Council, a 
single Commission, and a single operative budget in 1965, to the Single European 
Act as the first major reform of the Treaties in 1986, to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
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that institutionalized cooperation in the fields of foreign policy, defence, police and 
justice under one umbrella, the EU. This treaty also created the economic and mone-
tary union, put in place new Community policies in the areas of education and cul-
ture, and increased the powers of the European Parliament. Since the mid-1980s, the 
goal of establishing the common market has served as the prime task for mod-
ernizing the European Community by eliminating internal barriers for the transfer of 
capital, goods, and work force. Although the common market has served as a driving 
force in the process of European integration by enhancing overall economic com-
petitiveness, this process cannot be reduced to a mere free trade project. A number 
of policy areas the EU has increasingly engaged in, including environmental, social 
and employment policies, make it clear that the EU is much more than a common 
market enterprise. The rising number of policy areas, together with the strengthening 
of Community institutions as agreed upon in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice in 
1997 and 2001, are indicative of a fundamental supranational transformation and 
reorganization of European politics. In consequence, government in the EU has 
become a complex multi-level configuration at the national and supranational levels 
(Grande/Jachtenfuchs 2000; Crouch 2000). 
 Science and technology policy already played a role in the treaties of the 1950s – 
with regard to the old industries of coal and steel and the new industry of nuclear 
energy – , although it was not a designated area of Community politics in the EEC 
treaty. The goal of the common market, in particular, brought up the idea of a Euro-
pean technological community. Since the late 1980s and early 90s, research and tech-
nology policy became part of legal agreements that were mainly intended to 
strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry (Sharp 1985; 
Peterson/Sharp 1998). Hereby, Research Framework Programmes have been of ma-
jor importance for outlining and pursuing research and development priorities to-
gether with a broad variety of instruments. The current Sixth Framework Programme 
is oriented towards the creation of a “European research area.” In addition to fund-
ing research and technology across Europe, Community activities are also involved in 
regulating environmental and health risks, patenting, and ethical issues. Thus science 
and technology policy became an integral part of the multi-level configuration of 
politics in the EU (Grande 2001; Dresner/Gilbert 2001). 
In sum, I would like to draw three conclusions here. First, politics has become 
increasingly differentiated between the national, international, and supranational lev-
els (and, not to forget, the regional and local levels) such that a complex multi-level 
configuration of politics has emerged. At the same time, the design, coordination, 
and implementation of policies at all levels has been confronted with a broad variety 
of problems and conflicts (see for example Sakamoto 1994). Second, within this con-
figuration, international regimes – and, especially as regards Europe, supranational 
regimes – have gained importance against the nation-states. Because of the signifi-
cance of “free market”-oriented international economic regimes, there has been a 
power shift to large transnational companies, and also an increasing transnational 
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competition among nation-states in various policy fields, in particular in those policy 
fields that are considered important for economic competitiveness such as economic, 
financial and fiscal policies. However, the market-oriented transformations since the 
1970s, including the dynamics of globalization since the 1990s, have not left national 
governments without any room for manoeuvre. Divergent options for government 
action have remained available – although in the different policy areas only to a 
greater or lesser extent. In addition, the nation-state is still the prime frame of refer-
ence for shaping political, social, and cultural identities and actions. Third, changing 
regimes of politics within the evolving global economy have rendered science and 
technology important not only for enhancing competitiveness, but also for assessing 
a broad variety of problems and for creating solutions in the policy areas concerned.  
 
 
3.  Recent changes in the configuration of science 
The second half of the 20th century was characterized by an increasing number, and 
dynamic, of high-technology developments. As political change has influenced par-
ticular developments in science and technology, these developments have had an 
influence on the configuration of politics and policies. For example: 
Nuclear technology – At the end of World War II nuclear technology was not only 
proven to be an immensely destructive technology for military purposes but was 
initially also considered a technology able to produce unlimited amounts of cheap 
and clean energy. Thus it would fulfil the constantly growing demand for electrical 
power in industry and – with a whole new set of appliances becoming available – in 
households. However, the development of nuclear energy turned out to be much 
more expensive than initially expected. It also demanded the active support and co-
ordination of the state, without which nuclear energy would not have been developed 
– although, in later stages, the development of nuclear energy took different forms in 
different countries as regards the relationships between state and industry (Campbell 
1988). In addition to government funding, government agencies also faced a variety 
of possibly serious hazards that required new institutional efforts in the area of safety 
and risk regulation. Safety and risk issues were in particular related to the construc-
tion of nuclear power plants, the operating procedures and the training of the work 
force, the nuclear fuel reprocessing, and the final storage of nuclear waste that would 
remain active in the environment for a very long time because of the particular half-
time of nuclear material (OTA 1984b; Perrow 1984). The basic characteristics of 
nuclear energy, including its state-centred structure, made nuclear energy a prominent 
subject of long-lasting conflicts in many countries. While nation-state agencies have 
mainly been responsible for regulating nuclear energy, safety and risk management 
also required establishing an international regime. Due to the risks inherent to nu-
clear technology, safety standards for nuclear power plants had to be set and moni-
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tored. However, the worst-case accident of Chernobyl in 1986 could not be pre-
vented, and its consequences would cross many national borders and affect many 
generations to come. Since nuclear material and technology could be used for mili-
tary purposes, it was also an important, and internationally widely acknowledged, 
goal to prevent more and more nation-states from achieving the capacity to produce 
nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 
1957 as part of the United Nations, serves as the world’s most important intergov-
ernmental organization in the area of nuclear technology. After the collapse of the 
Soviet regime in the late 1980s, nuclear proliferation became an even more danger-
ous issue. Now not only nation-states, but also criminal or terrorist groups could 
potentially try to sell or acquire nuclear material, making the monitoring and control-
ling of such unwanted activities much more difficult than before, if at all possible. 
Information and communication technology – Microelectronics brought about a revolu-
tion in information and communication technologies. Though started already in the 
1940s, it came to full fruition in the 1980s. Since then, hardly any area of modern life 
has been left untouched by microelectronics. It thus became a model for a most 
powerful key technology with the potential to become part of almost all economic 
sectors, and by virtue of innovation to open up and gain immense markets (OTA 
1985; Nelson 1984; Brock 2003). Due to the overall decentralized, yet increasingly 
international, structure of information and communication technologies, the political 
challenges associated with them depend on the areas of application and modes of 
use, and on the institutions and actors involved (Rosenau/Singh 2002). For instance, 
the widespread electronic storage and use of personal information brings up privacy 
issues – as regards both corporate and government demand for, and use of, sensitive 
data. Or the extensive production and use of electronic devices such as microchips, 
computer monitors, or mobile phones may cause safety problems for human health 
in one way or another. An issue related to the particular “immaterial” quality of in-
formation technology has gained overall prominence and become subject of contro-
versy and regime building, namely intellectual property rights (OTA 1986).  
Since a great number of information and communication technology products 
can be easily copied and multiplied, inventors and innovators have feared the in-
fringement of property rights. Industrial property rights, in particular patenting, had 
been created as an institutional form of protecting private inventions in the course of 
the industrial revolution in the mid and late 19th and early 20th centuries. At the 
same time, patenting required the publication of inventions so as to expose them to 
public scrutiny, and to make them available to further innovative activities by actors 
other than the initial inventors. It was the widespread diffusion of electronic infor-
mation technology that inspired the conceptual extension of industrial property 
rights to intellectual property rights (Boyle 1996; Halbert 1999). Since information 
and communication technology had become a driving force of the rapidly globalizing 
economy as well as a significant element of everyday life around the world, the actual 
acknowledgment and protection of intellectual property rights became a crucial issue 
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to those producing computer software, music or films, among other things. It is the 
agreement on TRIPS of the WTO that pays particular attention to this technological 
change in the international economy. The regime constituted by the TRIPS agree-
ment provides powerful means for demanding from nation-states that they respect, 
and enforce, intellectual property rights (TRIPS 1994; Matthews 2002). For example, 
as a precondition of membership in the WTO, China was required to officially ac-
knowledge and protect intellectual property rights both in international trade and at 
home. The underlying reason for this kind of international conflict is the disadvan-
taged position of developing and threshold countries in the global economy. While 
these countries often have strong aspirations to catch up and close technological (and 
thus economic) gaps, they usually lack the technological and financial capabilities to 
either produce or acquire high-technology in a legal manner. As the global economy 
is characterized by fundamental disparities of wealth and power, the issue of intel-
lectual property rights has also an ethical dimension. This applies for the issue of the 
“digital divide” between the global North and South (an issue that goes beyond prob-
lems of intellectual property rights, and concerns also the people of developed coun-
tries, see Warschauer 2003) as well as, more specifically, for health care related phar-
maceutical industry issues (see below). But intellectual property protection has also 
become a legal issue in the advanced industrial countries (including the EU). The 
Internet, for example, enabled people to easily exchange or download electronic in-
formation. Since this affects the interests of the software, music, and film industries, 
these branches lobbied for a strict enforcement of intellectual property rights against 
what they consider illegitimate commercial and private users. This issue has been 
controversial for quite some time not least because the position taken by industry 
denied a right that had been previously taken for granted, i.e., the right to make cop-
ies for non-commercial private use.  
Biotechnology – With the advent of genetic engineering in the early 1970s, biotech-
nology started emerging as a new powerful key technology of the future. Based on 
the scientific breakthroughs and findings of a broad variety of disciplines, in particu-
lar molecular biology, which revolutionized both the scientific and popular under-
standing of life, biotechnology was to open up new horizons of technological inno-
vation in a broad variety of economic sectors (Bull et al. 1982; OTA 1984a). While 
biotechnology was established as a new integrative field that extends our under-
standing of life and the potential to manipulate it according to an unlimited variety of 
purposes, the development of biotechnology took place in an uneven way and speed 
due to its nature as a cross-sectoral technology. Accordingly, the interests of public 
and private actors and the given or prospected markets have differed significantly in 
the sectors of medicine, agriculture and foods, environment, energy and raw materi-
als production, among others. Although the multiple scientific and engineering disci-
plines that constitute biotechnology have contributed to an ever more sophisticated 
understanding of the unity of life, transfers of knowledge or methods between the 
different sectors often faced more difficulties than initially expected, as did the suc-
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cessful development of new products in general. In addition to intra-technological 
differences, differences between countries played a significant role in the develop-
ment of biotechnology. Certain countries, in particular the USA and Great Britain, 
were better able to build the scientific and technological basis for biotechnology as 
well as to commercialize it than others, for example Germany. Various reasons con-
tributed to this fact; however, they can be mainly attributed to the diverging per-
formance of national innovation regimes (Jasanoff 1985; Casper 1999). Biotechno-
logy had become a prime example for the crucial importance of close collaboration 
between academic research and corporate actors, in particular venture capital and 
transnational companies (Kenney 1986). This characteristic requirement of innova-
tion in biotechnology could be better met by countries whose political, institutional, 
and cultural traditions belonged to the “liberal,” as opposed to the “corporatist or 
negotiated” type of capitalist regime.  
The notion of national innovation regime refers to the capability of academic or-
ganizations, companies, and government agencies of a country to generate innova-
tions. Since the successful implementation and appropriation of innovations also 
depends on further societal factors, innovation regimes intersect with the institutions 
and practices regarding risk management, patenting, ethics, and acceptance politics. 
All these areas have contributed to the social configuration of biotechnology at the 
national level. Due to the broad resonance of biotechnology issues in society, claims 
for new forms of social accountability and consultation in science and technology 
affairs were raised. This led to the programmatic integration of research on ethical, 
legal, and social issues (ELSI) into the Human Genome Project. Actors related to 
new social movements or to a variety of NGOs often successfully argued for the 
implementation of participatory technology assessment procedures such as consen-
sus conferences (Joss/Durant 1995; Abels/Bora 2004). 
The issue areas of risk management, patenting, and ethics have also been impor-
tant at the supranational and international levels (Barben/Abels 2000). For example, 
after risk management had been an intensely debated issue at the national and local 
levels, it also became part of supranational and international arenas. Safety and risk 
management have been integrated into the regulatory set-up of the EU dealing with 
the same issues as at the national level, but often in conflict with differences among 
the member states (Levidow et al. 1996). At the international level, risk management 
of biotechnology attained particular consideration with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety that had been negotiated as a multilateral environmental agreement under 
the Convention of Biological Diversity (Schomberg 2000). Since the Biosafety Proto-
col pays particular attention to the precautionary principle with reference to envi-
ronmental and health risks, there is some tension with the WTO agreements, in par-
ticular the Agreement on SPS (Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) 
and the Agreement on TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade), which state the clear pri-
ority of free trade and thus acknowledge risk issues only to the extent of definite 
scientific proof (Murphy/Chataway 2003). Within the EU biological patenting has 
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proved a deeply contested issue both at the supranational level and between the 
European and the member state levels. While some areas of biotechnology had be-
come subject to industrial property protection at the international level in accordance 
with the industrial development of microbiology or plant breeding earlier in the 20th 
century, the agreement on TRIPS enhanced the intellectual property protection in all 
areas of biotechnology. Despite the overall high importance of intellectual property 
protection for the WTO – expressing hereby the dominant position of the most ad-
vanced countries and industries – the agreement on TRIPS also embodies significant 
compromises negotiated between the fundamentally unequal WTO members. Dra-
matic health crises such as the one caused by AIDS in several countries helped de-
veloping and threshold countries like Brazil in their struggle to obtain exemptions 
from patent right protection at least with respect to the production and use of ge-
neric drugs (Art. 31 (b) TRIPS). However, such compromises help legitimate both 
the WTO and intellectual property rights. In all cases of conflict – biological safety, 
intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals (and, very importantly, also for plants, 
animals, and genetic information) – transnational NGOs have played an important 
role. Ethics, unlike the other areas, has remained rather weakly institutionalized. The 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe, which 
comprises more member states than the EU, has been widely considered very prob-
lematic, with the consequence that several countries, for example Germany, have 
been unwilling to sign it (COE 1997). The Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights of UNESCO is not legally binding at all, yet it provides a basis for 
normative accountability (UNESCO 1997). Finally, attempts within the UN to reach 
agreement on an international ban against human cloning failed in 2005, mainly be-
cause of national differences about how to deal with the so-called therapeutic or re-
search cloning. 
Nanotechnology – Nanotechnology is still in a very early stage of its development. 
The term nanotechnology generally refers to technologies at the nanometre scale 
(one nanometre equals one millionth of a millimetre), which implies fundamentally 
new prospects in the exploration of matter. The potentials of nanotechnology apply 
to a broad range of scientific and technological fields, which through the advent of 
nanotechnology will themselves become re-conceptualized and reorganized, at least 
to some extent. Nanotechnology, too, is a cross-sectoral technology relevant for ma-
terials science, manufacturing, energy production and storage, medicine, food, water 
and the environment, and the military, among others. Nanotechnology is expected to 
be particularly powerful because it will come along with what is called “converging 
technologies.” Thus nanotechnology is not just the latest, in this case physical and 
chemical high-technology development, but it is also becoming increasingly con-
nected to biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. Accordingly, 
nanotechnology has faced, or will face, issues relating to health and environmental 
safety, security and privacy, intellectual property rights, and ethics (National Science 
Foundation 2001). But it is too early to tell what kind of regimes will actually emerge. 
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To sum up, first, the major developments of science and technology within the 
last decades have led to ever closer connections between them; in other words, the 
recent high-technology developments have established the phenomenon of techno-
sciences and science-based industries. The emergence and embedding of complex 
technologies in economic sectors as well as in society builds the context for techno-
logical regime analysis, i.e., put in slightly different terms, the analysis of the interde-
pendency between the social shaping of technology and the technological shaping of 
society (Freeman 1993; Williams/Edge 1996). Second, those high-technologies that 
have emerged, or have experienced a breakthrough, in the 1970s and after, have been 
increasingly generated within regimes of innovation that incorporated extended or 
substantially new structures and practices oriented towards commercial applications. 
Transnational dynamics have not only been characteristic for competitive technology 
developments, but also for the controversies on environmental and health risks, in-
tellectual property rights, and ethics. Not least important among the transnational 
repercussions have been claims for increased accountability of the science and engi-
neering and business and science policy communities, together with claims for insti-
tutional, social and technological change toward sustainable development. Third, the 
particular qualities of the sciences and technologies concerned have brought about a 
broad spectrum of challenges to social institutions and politics (including policy 
fields and at times even polities) at various levels – often leading to institutional, po-
litical or, more generally, societal change (Jasanoff 1997; Sørensen/Williams 2002). 
Because of the perceived strategic importance of science and technology for eco-
nomic competitiveness in the transformation process toward “knowledge societies,” 
it is no surprise that universities have become increasingly subject to at times far-
reaching organizational change. Consequently, universities are not only asked to pay 
more attention to marketable research, but also to become themselves more efficient 
organizations or to reorganize the traditional disciplinary structures into more prob-
lem-oriented research and teaching networks. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions and outlook: regime analysis of science and politics 
The overview presented should not only broadly illustrate recent regime changes of 
science and politics, but also provide us with some insights about forms and factors 
of change in both domains and in their mutual relationship. As pointed out, regime 
analysis has contributed to the investigation and understanding of institutionalized 
structures and practices in various contexts – international regimes, national regimes 
of government, regimes of supranational integration, innovation regimes, technologi-
cal regimes, etc. While regime analysis is often related to particular social science dis-
ciplines, there is no common understanding of regime analysis. Even more, the vari-
ous approaches of regime analysis usually operate independently from each other, i.e. 
without discussion or without taking the concepts and methodologies developed in 
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the neighbouring fields into account. On the one hand, this is due to the self-evident 
specialization of research topics and traditions, but on the other, it is also due to a 
certain ignorance that often comes along with disciplinary specialization. In substan-
tive terms, the various approaches to regime analysis are limited by a confinement to 
a particular subject area or level of analysis. For example, the concepts of interna-
tional regime analysis have been shaped by typical institutional and normative con-
cerns of international relations, without connecting to other levels of politics. Or 
innovation regime analysis has mainly paid attention to those organizational and 
practical concerns that are more or less directly affecting innovativeness. In both 
cases the situatedness of international politics or of innovation are not framed as part 
of complex processes of social and technological change. In my view, it is not a use-
ful task to try to develop a general regime theory (as a supposedly fancy update or 
modification of general social systems theory), but it would be helpful to achieve a 
framework of regime analysis that allows for theoretical generalizations. Not least, 
because there are various connections in reality between regimes of politics and those 
of science and technology – as demonstrated above.  
Here, I cannot delve into a discussion of the various fields and traditions of re-
gime analysis. Instead, I would like to translate the above overview into a set of 
comparative perspectives which, taken together, might help put together an integral 
framework for analyzing regimes of science and politics: 
- Comparative analysis of the configuration of politics: politics at the national, lo-
cal, regional, supranational, and international levels; actors, institutions, practices, 
and meanings of politics; politics, policies, and polities as dimensions of politics; 
politics and its relationship to science and technology, the economy, law, culture, 
and the environment. 
- Comparative analysis of the configuration of cross-sectoral technologies: science 
and engineering disciplines, and fields of application, constituting cross-sectoral 
technologies; actors, institutions, practices, and meanings of science and technol-
ogy; high-technology related innovation, property rights, risk management, and 
ethics; economic, political, legal, cultural, and environmental dimensions of sci-
ence and technology. 
The dimensions and aspects listed to specify the comparative perspectives of a 
regime analysis of politics and science are intended to outline ways of mapping and 
comprehending basic features of the configuration of politics and science. In addi-
tion, these perspectives are meant to support two methodological conclusions. First, 
the configuration of politics and science in today’s world of rapid transition requires 
comparative perspectives because otherwise the social science investigation falls 
short of the complexity and empirical variety of reality. It also helps achieve more 
appropriate evaluations of hypotheses about new social phenomena. Second, trans-
national perspectives are needed because today’s configuration of politics and science 
extends across various institutional levels that are not just differentiated but also 
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connected with each other in multiple ways. Despite the prevalence of perspectives 
rooted in the nation-state, there have always been transnational perspectives in soci-
ology, for example in the work of Max Weber. But now there is a clear demand for, 
and shift towards, such perspectives as the debates on globalization, world society, or 
“methodological nationalism” (Beck/Lau 2004; Zürn 2001) indicate. In other words, 
investigations focusing on changing regimes or shifting boundaries between science 
and politics are clearly limited if they do not take into account comparative or trans-
national perspectives (Jasanoff 2003). While I have tried to make clear that both per-
spectives are fundamentally important, two basic issues need further elaboration: 
first, the design of comparative analysis depending on the research subject and the 
questions asked; and second, the definition of transnationality as regards the forms of 
interdependency between the various levels and areas in the configuration of politics 
and science. At the same time, further clarification is needed of how to distinguish 
between transnationality, internationality, and globality. However, it would be mis-
leading to neglect the importance of cross-national comparisons. Not only does 
transnationality presuppose “nationality,” but diverging political, social and cultural 
institutions and traditions also account for different understandings of and responses 
to transnationality.  
Given the numerous research topics and analytic traditions that require consid-
eration, a common terminology is needed in order to better achieve epistemological 
coherence and communication. To this end, I would like to propose a generalized 
notion of regime that might contribute to a theoretical language and, ultimately, to an 
integral frame of regime analysis. First, it refers to the basic idea that social structures 
are the result of human actions as well as their precondition. It is the aspect of a two-
way structuring that is basic in various accounts of both sociology and STS. Second, 
regimes are social structures mediated by practices that extend in time, i.e. are some-
what stable, though never fixed. Third, regimes are often characterized by relations 
of power, which may be hierarchical, or may take other forms. Fourth, regimes can 
be specified by particular institutional and organizational forms and elements, such as 
principles and norms, rules and procedures as they pertain to the various domains of 
society. Put briefly, instead of being a given or fixed structure, a regime is more or 
less constantly under construction – being built and stabilized, modified and reor-
ganized, upheld or abolished. Since regime analysis is interested in the emergence, 
functioning, and transformation of social phenomena, distinguishing between the 
following dimensions seems essential in the context of science and politics: science 
and technology, institutions and organizations, discourses, and practices.2 
                                                 
2 I indicated these dimensions as part of the two comparative perspectives above, but would now like 
to name a few reasons. Science and technology are of a specific nature themselves, but their particular 
social quality depends on the organizations and institutions that are in many ways concerned with 
their development and application; discourses work as a main form of shaping social meaning; and 
practices are not only indispensable for anything social to happen, but can also follow a logic of their 
own, since practices are not simply dictated by technologies or discourses, for instance. 
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What conclusions can be drawn from this overview for science and technology 
studies and science policy studies? All in all, both research traditions appear in the 
light of a clear epistemological deficit that needs to be overcome in each. Science and 
technology studies, by and large, need to fill the gaps in their analysis of institutions. 
Science policy studies, on the other hand, need to fill the gaps in their analysis of 
science and technology. While science and technology studies have mainly focused 
on the laboratory, they also need to acknowledge that other locations may be crucial 
for the generation and shaping of science and technology – for example international 
organizations. And while science policy studies have mainly concentrated on gov-
ernment institutions, they need to apprehend that science and technology are sub-
jects of political significance, and that their particular qualities matter.  
To come back to the beginning, to the question of what is new in the relationship 
between science and politics: As the brief above review of a few spotlights of mod-
ern history up to the post-World War II order has shown, it is not the connectivity of 
science and politics as such which has undergone change (these connections have 
long undermined the supposedly clear boundaries between them). The changes are 
more limited and concern, put briefly, the “vertical” differentiation and transnational 
extension and pervasion of politics and science, and the increasing significance of 
market-orientations as well as of social accountability in the relationship between 
science and politics. Since these trends do not account for a uniform mode of 
change, they rather point at tensions and contradictions. In consequence, this situa-
tion reconfirms the basic open-ended nature of social change, as well as the chal-
lenges to analyzing and understanding it. 
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Meta-Innovation: The Optimum Role of the State in the 
Triple Helix  
 
Henry Etzkowitz  
 
 
Introduction 
A new role for government has arisen in increasingly knowledge-based societies, 
transcending procurement of individual technologies and support of the science and 
technology base. Innovation is considered here as the process of developing an in-
stitutional infrastructure that helps create new industries and growth firms. Such “in-
novation in innovation” guides the specific process of generating new products or 
processes that traditionally goes under the heading of innovation. The state increas-
ingly undertakes these tasks together with industry and university. We call this higher 
order of innovation, comprising bottom up, top down and lateral initiatives, from 
university, industry and government, individually and collectively, “meta-innovation,” 
and inquire into the conditions under which it is produced.  
The role of government in innovation in the classic sense is long-standing: to 
carry out traditional state functions, such as defence and enumeration of the popula-
tion, as well as new tasks such as cure of diseases and industrial advance. Govern-
ment has employed various means to induce innovation such as offering prizes for 
results, for example, a method to calculate longitude to improve navigation of ships 
and reduce the risk of shipwreck in 18th century Britain (Sobel, Dawa Longitude 
Penguin). Government has also established laboratories to achieve specific objectives 
such as improvement in weapons, sanitation and farming practices in 19th century 
U.S. (M. Rossiter, 1976). It has purchased equipment such as the Hollerith card 
sorter to speed analysis of census data in the early 20th century and, especially since 
the 2nd half of the 20th century, granted funds on a large scale to support basic re-
search that scientists predict will have both theoretical and practical significance.  
Different trajectories of meta-innovation can be identified depending upon the 
configuration of the triple helix and of governmental levels in relation to each other. 
The interaction between national and regional levels of government is a strategic 
research site to examine the emergence of meta- innovation. Conflict, as well as co-
ordination, among the levels of government may be identified as a driving force of 
meta-innovation. A meta-innovation system has been created in the US, since the 
2nd World War, and in Brazil since the downfall of the military regime in the 1980’s. 
Welfare state societies, such as Sweden, and post -Socialist societies, such as Hun-
gary, are moving in this direction. This paper analyzes the emergence of meta-inno-
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vation in societies moving toward a triple helix framework from various starting 
points. 
 
 
1. The Triple Helix and Emergence of the Innovation State 
The Innovation State attempts to regenerate the sources of productivity, through 
investments in science and technology, and by changing the rules of the game. Legal 
frameworks and administrative procedures may be changed to encourage the creation 
and growth of new firms. Government may partner with private capital to jump start 
a venture capital industry. Through these and other measures, government attempts 
to fill gaps in the innovation environment. 
The Innovation State is the successor to the Capitalist, Keynsian and Welfare 
States, with their respective foci of assisting existing industry, promoting general 
economic advance and securing the basic conditions of a good life for all the popu-
lation (B. Jessop, 2002). The Innovation State builds upon these various bases, in-
corporating elements of each of these models into a broader framework to support 
their realization under changed conditions of global competition. In the laissez faire 
model of separate institutional spheres, moving beyond Keynesian macro-economic 
policies arising from the 1930s depression, such as central bank adjustments of inter-
est rates or money supply, was also a difficult transition.  
The triple helix of innovation is emerging in widely different societies, with pre-
vious traditions of strong and weak levels of state activity. In statist societies, the 
relaxation of the total state, based upon central planning, to a more modest role of 
incentivizing innovation, without going all the way to inaction, was also a difficult 
transition. A triple helix coordinated entirely by the state only provides a limited 
source of ideas and initiatives. Under these circumstances government may take ini-
tiatives without consulting others; indeed it may subsume the other institutional 
spheres and direct their activities. Although large projects may be accomplished it is 
not the most productive form of triple helix relationships since ideas are coming only 
one source, the central government. 
Of course, top-down models have been highly successful in organizing large mili-
tary and space projects in both socialist and capitalist regimes and in promoting eco-
nomic development in authoritarian regimes. The Singapore government organized 
the transition to high-tech manufacturing and then to knowledge based economic 
development. However, too strong human capital focus on formation of employees 
for manufacturing enterprises left a relatively narrow base to draw upon when it be-
came apparent that transition to a knowledge economy was indicated. 
Conceptualizing the role of the state in innovation thus should take into account 
multiple levels of state activity, from the local to the multi-national. If the role of the 
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state in innovation is presumed to be primarily at the national level, policies may be 
to broad to deal with local or regional needs. Too great focus on the national level 
also may result in policies and practices targeted at large national firms rather than 
start-ups which typically have local origins. Most importantly, encouraging different 
levels of state activity has the advantage of allowing various sources of program ex-
perimentation to arise. 
Interaction among university-industry-government, as relatively independent, yet 
inter-dependent, institutional spheres is the key to improving the conditions for in-
novation in a knowledge-based society. The change in the role of the state from pub-
lic partner in dual relationships, with either industry or university, to one of three 
participants in triple helix relationships increases government involvement in inno-
vation issues, irrespective of political system or development level. For the triple 
helix to operate fully there must also be initiatives arising bottom up and from the 
other institutional spheres. 
 
 
2. Statist transition 
In countries with a planning system, people from research and production units who 
knew each other sometimes made informal exceptions to the rule of centralized con-
trol. Although research and production were formally linked by intermediary organi-
zations, industry’s focus was on quantity production, not qualitative innovation and 
local technology transfer. Bureaucratic controls were an obstacle to introduction of 
inventions but the more fundamental barrier to innovation was the disincentive to 
systemic change. 
In the post-socialist era, in countries such as` Hungry, top down co-ordination 
was removed and each element in the former system was left to fend for itself, with 
sharply reduced funds from the state. Some research institutes obtained contracts 
from abroad; others tried to transform themselves into incubators and science parks. 
Many scientists and technologists left the country for positions abroad or stayed and 
tried their hand at new tasks, often in unrelated business areas to their former em-
ployment.  
A few tried to start high-tech firms based on their knowledge and competency, 
often with the support of their Institutes. Occasionally, multi-nationals, like General 
Electric that invested in former state firms such as Tungsram, to take advantage of 
skilled labor, also found pools of un-utilized innovation that they could build upon. 
Nevertheless, the abrupt re-configuration from a statist to laissez-faire regime left a 
gap where the state had formerly played a leading role. 
Science and technology policy had formerly been the centerpiece of regimes le-
gitimated by a thesis of a ‘scientific-technological revolution.’ Given the discrediting 
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of government it was difficult to justify more than a minimalist state, confined to 
basic security and welfare activities. Science and technology policy was barely a le-
gitimate activity, no longer a priority. If the state is absent from the innovation pic-
ture: coordination, regulation and funding necessary to encourage improvements may 
be insufficient. There is a need to bring the state back into the innovation picture but 
in a more modest role than in previous regimes. Such a re-transition is currently un-
der way across the former socialist bloc, often coupled with participation in EU in-
novation programs. 
 
 
3. Devolution of the Center 
The changing role of the state in innovation is most clearly apparent in countries 
such as Mexico, where state sponsored industry sector associations and university 
consultative councils coordinate these spheres. However, the predominance of na-
tional government centralized research resources in the capital, leaving other parts of 
the country bereft. In recent years, this problem of over-centralization has been ad-
dressed by relocating some national research institutes outside of the capital and by 
state governments becoming active in promotion of innovation. 
There has also been a significant devolution of powers in recent years in coun-
tries, such as Great Britain, France and Sweden, lacking a strong regional level of 
governance (L. Greyson, 2002). Formerly central government operated through re-
gional levels that mandated common polices and was a mechanism for carrying out 
these polices. Increasingly it is seen that it is necessary to have policies specific to the 
competencies and capacities of different areas. Moreover, it is difficult for a central 
government to mandate appropriate strategies from a distance. In Sweden some re-
gions have been given a broader authority to develop their own regional develop-
ment initiatives as an experiment.  
Sweden is ambiguous case of conflicting policies in the context of relatively high 
R&D budgets. There was a substitution effect when a series of foundations, estab-
lished with the proceeds from the “Wage Earners Funds” to promote innovation, 
replaced funds cut from Research Council budgets. Sweden already had a high level 
of research funding and there was a feeling that there was inadequate take-up from 
existing research resources, so why spend more money?  
Even though more money wasn’t made available, there was a change in the way it 
was spent. The foundations encouraged a shift from disciplinary to interdisciplinary 
research; from small research groups to larger research teams, and to collaborative 
university-industry projects. There was also a dual dynamic of centralization and de-
centralization: concentrating resources at leading universities and spreading funds 
around to build up research at the regional colleges and new universities.  
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Sweden uses the triple helix framework to knit together different initiatives at the 
national, regional and local levels that might otherwise be at odds with each other. 
The model provides a rationale to cooperate and aggregate resources to a common 
end and reduce friction among what otherwise might be a set of small competitive 
initiatives. Different government agencies and foundations have established many 
innovation initiatives such as “university holding companies” and regional founda-
tions to assist technology transfer.  
The central question in Swedish innovation policy is how to moderate the effect 
of centrifugal forces and increase the strength of centripetal forces.1 One clue to the 
trajectory for the emergence of the Swedish triple helix can be seen in the transfer of 
CONNECT, a local level networking format from San Diego to Sweden (M. Wal-
shok, 1995). An initial attempt made by members of the local biotechnology associa-
tion in Skane did not succeed, lacking sufficient support from the region and the 
university. A later effort undertaken by the prestigious Academy of Engineering in 
Stockholm attracted support from regional officials and universities across Sweden 
and several CONNECT networks, linking entrepreneurs, business advice providers, 
patent lawyers, accountants and angels, were successfully established. The cultural 
carryover of a top down tradition of initiative was decisive. 
 
 
4. Direct Innovation Policy 
Perhaps ironically, the state was assuming a greater role in innovation in other coun-
tries at virtually the same time as it withdrew from the scene in the former Socialist 
countries. Concurrent with the Nokia success, which gave Finland appearance of a 
country as an appendage of a corporation; government increased its role in innova-
tion, making it a direct responsibility of the Prime Minister’s office. Finland was a 
much less technologically developed country in the early 1990’s than most of its 
Nordic peers when the decision was taken to concentrate resources on science and 
technology in a few selected fields of IT and biotechnology (M. Benner, 2003).  
The monies gained from the privatization of public enterprises were utilized to 
sharply raise the level of public R&D funding. In a relatively few years, the Helsinki 
region has become second only to Stockholm as a center of biomedical research in 
Scandinavia. Tampere which had at most a few dozen IT researchers in the early 90’s 
is now home to 3,000. The Finnish case suggests that the original premise of the lin-
ear model, concentrated R&D pump priming, is still valid. In statist societies direct 
                                                 
1 Region Skane is an example of a regional authority utilizing the triple helix model to stimulate 
collaborative projects. VINNOVA, the National Agency for Innovation, uses the triple helix model, 
coupled with financial incentives, to encourage collaboration but is itself only a relatively modestly 
funded agency. Its resources appear to be sufficient for the purpose in smaller regions but centrifugal 
forces can still inhibit collaborations in larger regions. See VINNOVA 2001. Forskning och 
innovation for hallbar tillvaxt. 
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intervention is expected while, under laissez-faire conditions, only indirect ap-
proaches may be possible. 
 
 
5. Indirect Innovation Policy 
An assisted linear model of organizational mechanisms to assist technology transfer 
and development, based on intellectual property protection has replaced the passive 
linear model of simply relying on dissemination of research through publication. 
Nevertheless, given strenuous opposition, there is reluctance to recognize that a 
plethora of specific policies and programs accumulated over more than a century 
constitutes a U.S. innovation policy. Given the resistance to government action at the 
federal level, when intervention is decided upon it is typically occurs as a joint initia-
tive of the federal and state governments, utilizing universities as an interface be-
tween government and industry. In response to ideological constraints, the trajectory 
of immanent industrial policy formation creates networks and initiatives that cut 
across the institutional spheres. 
Given the resistance to an enhanced role for the federal government, when inter-
vention is decided upon it is typically carried out indirectly. The university was the 
institution of choice in three key instances: agriculture (mid 19th century), the mili-
tary (World War II) and industry (1970's).Higher education is not a direct federal 
responsibility in the US with a few notable exceptions of the military academies, Gal-
laudet University for the Deaf and Howard University in Washington D.C, an his-
torically black university. Nevertheless, the federal government has had a significant 
influence on university development by supporting the so-called Agricultural and 
Mechanical Universities, the “land grant” schools oriented to practical subjects, with 
one-time subventions of federal lands as an endowment.  
The funds provided for research pre-dated the Second World War but since they 
were primarily for agricultural they only affected a special sector of academia. Broad-
based government funding of the universities was institutionalized in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, a conflict that had demonstrated the utility of universities 
as research providers and coordinators. Whereas the academic contribution during 
the First World War had been largely limited to turning campuses into training facili-
ties and providing researchers to work in government laboratories, the Second World 
War involved the universities more directly with the state. 
 
 
6. The War-time Triple Helix 
Despite barriers, a de facto innovation policy is created through pressures on gov-
ernment to act in crises. The World War II Office of Scientific Research and Devel-
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opment (OSRD), originated at the initiative of academic scientists, was active across 
the spectrum of research areas of potential military use. Under wartime conditions 
R&D, testing, manufacturing and customer demand were integrated into “a seamless 
web,” ignoring traditional boundaries.  
During the 2nd World War the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment (OSRD) spent significant sums at universities to support advanced weapons 
development, often on projects proposed by academics. Government negotiated 
R&D contracts with universities, accepting their argument that it should contribute 
to the infrastructural costs of the project. In the post war, practices of academic ini-
tiative and subsidization of the university were generalized into a metaphorical “Con-
tract” in which government assumed responsibility for support of science with public 
funds.  
The linear model of an automatic transmission belt from science to society was 
thus invented. Although, a quid pro quo of public benefit was part of the “contract;” 
few research results were actually translated into useful innovations, even given an 
extended time-frame. Two evaluation studies, carried out in the late 1960’s, produced 
contradictory findings but the overall assessment was that a more structured ap-
proach would produce greater outcomes.  
Direct links among university, industry and government, helped produce weap-
ons from science during the 2nd World war. Moreover, academics having put aside 
their basic research interest to work as engineers on military projects soon found that 
they had ideas for basic research that they would pursue after the war. This rediscov-
ery of the interconnection between the practical and theoretical, and the experience 
of working with virtually unlimited resources at their disposal, transformed academic 
scientists’ anti-government attitudes that had led them to refuse support in the depth 
of the depression.  
  
 
7. The Emergence of a Peace-time Triple Helix 
The wartime experience of working closely with industry and government through 
innovative linkages also brought basic scientists out of the self imposed isolation in 
which they had placed themselves from the late 19th century in order to assure the 
autonomy of science. With the return of peace, universities and companies returned 
to their previous boundaries, with an important difference, the heritage of their war-
time experience of cooperation. Pre-war opposition to government funding of re-
search at the universities was reversed as universities sought government funds. In 
addition to the precedent of ad-hoc appropriations, a more systematic approach was 
sought. 
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The question of how to access externally supported projects to meet govern-
ment’s needs, maintained their own research programs, thereby solving the knowl-
edge flow problem through internal capacities. The military also solved the problem 
of obtaining useful results through close monitoring of projects supported in acade-
mia, while maintaining a long-term perspective of what might be useful to the mili-
tary in supporting research on computers and artificial intelligence. Although practi-
cal results from basic research were only expected in the long term; such results were 
the premise for the funding flow.  
 
 
8. Government-Industry Relations Via the University 
A change in economic circumstances called for renewed attention to innovation. 
During the economic downturn of the 1970’s, there were proposals for government 
to become directly involved in aiding existing industries and building up new ones, 
but these were quickly defeated. Instead, government went through the universities 
to reach industry. The patent system was reorganized to give intellectual property 
rights from federally funded research to the universities, with the condition that they 
had to take steps to put them to use. After 1980 technology transfer mechanisms, 
that had only been utilized by a relatively few universities, were diffused throughout 
the research university system (H. Etzkowitz, 2002).  
Relatively little of the expenditures put into research were actually being trans-
lated into products, even given an extended time-frame. To resolve this problem, the 
US created a public venture capital system as an extension of basic research at that 
time (H. Etzkowitz, M. Gulbrandsen and J. Levitt, 2001). It could not be called pub-
lic venture capital but the NSF program officers who founded the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program recognized that a neutral terminology of stages 
and phases had to be utilized.  
Reinterpretation of the missions of these and other research agencies has allowed 
an assisted linear model to be partially re-constructed in recent decades, in response 
to increased international economic competition. In addition to creative extensions 
of the basic research model at the federal level e.g. the Small Business Innovation Re-
search Program (SBIR) that serves as public venture capital, the most far reaching 
developments have occurred, bottom-up at the state and local levels through policies 
typically developed as the outcome of triple helix interactions. 
 
 
9. Transforming the Role of Government in Innovation 
Technology transfer from academia developed in several stages in the U.S. Founded 
in 1912 as an external linkage mechanism, the Research Corporation provided tech-
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nology transfer services to a range of universities. Alternatively, the University of 
Wisconsin developed its own technology transfer office through a foundation con-
trolled by the university. As research expanded during the post-war additional uni-
versities established their own offices. A permanent presence on campus allowed 
closer interaction with the faculty and also encouraged attention to the local region. 
Perhaps the most important event, and the necessary bases for subsequent de-
velopments, was the creation of a well-funded system of federally supported research 
in the universities. During the post-war period, high overhead payments became a 
method of funding the major research universities directly from the federal govern-
ment, without explicitly accepting it as an explicit policy as is commonplace in 
Europe. These universities clustered in a relatively few parts of the country, on the 
east and west coasts, with a few in the mid-west. This was not a major issue as long 
as academic institutions were primarily seen in their traditional role as educational 
and research institutions. 
As new industrial areas arose from an academic research base in molecular biol-
ogy and computer science in a few locations, other parts of the country became 
aware of the significance of universities as engines of economic development and 
wished to follow this model; first in North Carolina in the 1950’s. In addition to cre-
ating their own S&T programs, states have become active proponents, along with 
their universities for increases in federal R&D budgets. Indeed the salience of R&D 
spending to future economic development has spilled over from the budgets of the 
research agencies to so-called “porkbarell” methods for funding local improvements 
through attachments made to other bills. 
Given the realization of the connection between the location of research and the 
future location of industry arising from that research; pressure has increased on the 
federal government to increase research spending and to distribute it more broadly, 
eschewing peer review mechanisms instituted in the early post war to focus federally 
funded research at a relatively small group of schools. Now that the connection of 
science and technology to economic growth is apparent, regions with low levels of 
federal R&D spending are unwilling to depend upon modest set asides, instituted to 
reduce pressures for equalization, or slowly building up their capabilities with local 
funds.  
A science and technology policy has been developed that works the same way as 
appropriations for roads or bridges or any local improvement that a Senator or Con-
gressperson wants for their district or state. A legislator typically attaches a provision 
for a research center for a local university to a funding bill for an agency with a re-
lated purpose, the so-called “earmark.” The regular level of funding of these special 
bills is such that earmarks should be considered as a regular feature of S&T policy, 
despite objections to the method. 
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Universities that have been outside of the research system but want to increase 
their research strength have also been active in seeking these funds. Typically as this 
new group of research universities enhances their capabilities, through such targeted 
measures, they then begin to compete successfully for peer reviewed funds through 
the normal research funding channels. It is this increase in competition from univer-
sities across the country that have given the older research universities the feeling, 
indeed it is a reality, that competition for research funds has increased even as federal 
research budgets have risen significantly, especially in health and security.  
 
 
10. Science Policy and States Rights 
As an alternative to traditional programs to attract existing industries and firms to 
relocate, knowledge-based development focuses on creating new industries and firms 
represents a new departure for most for state governments, beyond a relative few like 
Massachusetts that have been active for some decades. Virtually every state now has 
an S&T agency and at least one, and usually more than one, program that attempts to 
raise the level of S&T in the state and attract researchers from elsewhere. Taken to-
gether, these programs represent approximately 3 billion dollars of spending per an-
num (H. Etzkowitz, 1998).  
State S&T policy is typically tailored to the industrial background and research in-
tensity of the state. States with technology industries attempt to upgrade these in-
dustries by supporting local universities to work more closely with key firms, typically 
by supporting a research center that address some of the longer range problems of 
these firms. Conversely, states without significant technology industries, attempt to 
build research capacities related to a local natural resource in order to create a know-
ledge base that will enable them to take the next steps in firm formation. Such a 
strategy may involve luring scholars with significant relevant research activity in these 
areas to the state by providing them with research funds and other resources. 
Enhancing an academic focus at a local university with possible future relevance 
to local economic development is now viewed as similar to traditional physical infra-
structure development. States view these intellectual capacity building efforts as akin 
to building highway and bridges to improve transportation and encourage business. 
In the past state S&T efforts were typically funded through regular legislative appro-
priations, making them subject to cuts and even closure in an economic downturn. 
This is especially the case due to requirements that states, in contrast to the federal 
government, maintain a balanced budget. 
On the premise that intellectual infrastructure is now as secure an investment as 
physical infrastructure, California has taken a new departure in state S&T policy with 
proposition 71, an initiative placed on the ballot and passed in the 2004 election. The 
measure will provide 3 billion in debt financing through a bond issue. The funds will 
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go to support stem cell research at the state’s public and private universities and to 
investments in biotechnology firms that are expected to realize the fruits of that re-
search as marketable products. 
Federal opposition making stem cell research extremely difficult to carry out led 
to the state initiative in California. A coalition of patient support groups focused on a 
cure for diabetes, joined with scientists who wished to pursue stem cell research and 
venture capitalists interested in the next wave of commericiable technology. The sci-
entists also wanted to find solutions to the gaps in transnational research that made it 
difficult to move findings “from the lab to the patient.” An attorney, whose child 
suffered from diabetes and whose previous career involved the innovative use of 
public bonds to support the development of low cost housing, led the campaign.  
The campaign utilized the method of direct democracy introduced into the Con-
stitution of the state of California by radical groups in the early twentieth century to 
enable a law to be passed by a vote of the electorate rather than going through the 
processes of representative democracy. In recent years, however, conservative politi-
cal groups had largely used the proposition mechanism to reduce taxes as in the 
proposition 13 that put a limit on school taxes, emasculating public education in Cali-
fornia. Proposition 71 took the proposition mechanism back to the intentions of its 
founders, to introduce path breaking measures that legislatures might not consider.  
The California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, currently in formation, will 
distribute funds to academic researchers, for research projects to universities to build 
laboratories to house stem cell research separately from federally funded grants and 
may also make investments in firms to commercialize the research results. The 
proposition is still controversial. Conservative groups intend to challenge it in Court 
and some politicians even seek to change the state Constitution in order to stop the 
Institute. Nevertheless, the project is expected to proceed in the interim, while court 
challenges are addressed through philanthropic donations. 
It is expected that the borrowed monies will be paid back in the future out of the 
proceeds from intellectual property created from academic research and the equity 
generated in biotechnology firms. Federal programs that provide money to research-
ers and firms expect payback to government, only indirectly and in the long term 
through increased tax revenues and job creation. The California initiative creates a 
direct link and feedback loop between university, industry and government, seeking 
to create a virtuous circle of science-based economic development-- Silicon Valley’s 
next wave-- based on public credit.  
 Returns from Intellectual Property are expected to creating a self generating 
model of S&T infrastructure support derived from procedures to build public infra-
structure such as roads and bridges. This initiative is the latest in a series of efforts to 
address downturns in Silicon Valley and other technology conurbations that appear 
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to be solely “private” entities in the upturn but whose concomitant “public” charac-
ter is revealed in the downturn when laissez-faire models are deemed inadequate.2  
 
 
11. Implications for the Federal Science “Contract” 
The Bush administration‘s limit on stem cell research to stem cells created before 
August 9 2001, created a crisis in the collaborative relationship with science estab-
lished at the advent of the Second World War. At that time leading academic scien-
tists, such as Presidents Conant of Harvard and Compton of MIT convinced Presi-
dent Roosevelt to create an agency to support research for the war effort in which 
scientists would define the terms of the research taking military needs into account. 
This relationship in which scientists had control of their own agency allowed them to 
put forward advanced ideas, drawing upon basic research. The origins of the Man-
hattan bomb project, drawing upon the fission findings that been arrived at only a 
few years earlier by Meitner and Hahn in the Institute of Physical Chemistry in Ber-
lin, extrapolated by Leo Szilard and communicated by Albert Einstein in a letter de-
livered to the President by a Wall Street friend, exemplified the new influential rela-
tionship of scientists to the state. This relationship was basically continued during the 
post war.  
The rejection of the superconducting supercollider physics project was an early 
warning of change in the relationship. However, the reason for cancellation did not 
go into the scientific content of the project. The reasons for rejection rested on the 
escalating costs of this basic research project. In the case of stem cells, objections 
from religious and conservative political groups go to the heart of the scientific con-
tent of the project, arguing that “human life” is destroyed when cells at the earliest 
developmental stages are experimented on. One bill before Congress would make 
such research punishable by a one million dollar fine plus a jail term.  
A proposed federal law would go well beyond simply not funding stem cell re-
search by making its conduct punishable by a one million dollar fine plus jail term. At 
present the law has passed the House but is bottled up in the Senate. However, if 
anti- filibustering legislation is passed, a simple majority would likely allow its pas-
sage. At this point, if it occurred a confrontation between states rights and federal 
prerogatives could ensue on a scale not seen in the us since just prior to the Civil war 
when issues of what was reserved to the states as a field of action eventuated in that 
confrontation. Science is once again at the center of national politics in a way it has 
not been since the Second World War when it became a central part of the war ef-
fort. 
                                                 
2 See www.jointventure.org/ for the 1990’s response: Joint Venture Silicon Valley. 
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However, whereas science was viewed positively by virtually everyone in that era; 
in the current situation with respect to stem cells, opinion is sharply divided. Some 
would shut an area of science down, prompting some scientists to recall Stalin’s pro-
hibition of genetics research in the Soviet Union when he supported Lamarckism, 
the theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics. In that case the dispute was be-
tween two scientific theories, with the power of the state put behind one to the dis-
service of the other. The current situation if it escalates to stage of criminal legal ac-
tion against scientists could reprise of the Church’s confrontation with Galileo. 
The metaphor of a science contract could well be replaced by one of “science 
wrangle”, in the case of stem cells, denoting a dispute that is increasingly irreconcil-
able as it becomes subsumed in the controversy over abortion. Nevertheless, the 
California initiative has inspired other states, such as New Jersey, to begin their own 
stem cell programs through the more traditional routes of legislative appropriations. 
When government initiatives have not been forthcoming, philanthropic foundations 
have taken the lead in supporting stem cell research in New York City. The contro-
versy over stem cells has arguably led to more initiatives and a higher level of re-
sources fm a greater variety of sources, than if the normal NIH funding process had 
prevailed.  
A similar result can be seen with the Human Genome initiative, which was the 
outcome of a conflict between government agencies, the Department of Energy and 
NIH over leadership of the program. This was followed by conflict between the gov-
ernment program and a private firm that was established to compete with the gov-
ernment initiative. Competition speeded the genome mapping process. In a similar 
manner competition among different internal projects to purify uranium in the Man-
hattan project speeded the development process. Different paths could be interca-
lated with each other even as the public and private genome efforts eventually nego-
tiated a cooperative arrangement. 
Given the intersection of science-based economic development with other politi-
cal issues, as in the stem cell instance, the path is not expected to be smooth. Con-
flicts and coalitions in welfare state, post socialist and laissez faire societies over the 
role of science in society are an indicator that science is no longer a minor area re-
quiring special protection but well able to fend for itself in the political arena. 
 
 
12. Civil Society and the Triple Helix 
Beyond the question of activation of multiple levels of government is the issue of the 
societal base to support innovation. Civil society is the foundation stone of the triple 
helix and the relationship between science policy and democracy. Although a limited 
triple helix can exist under authoritarian conditions, a full triple helix occurs in a de-
mocratic society where initiatives can be freely formulated. 
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As the state incentivizes university and industry to enhance their technology 
transfer and firm formation capabilities, it does not necessarily imply that the gov-
ernment increases its control over these spheres. Indeed precisely the opposite 
course of action may be indicated in societies where government has dominated the 
industrial and academic spheres. On the other hand, in societies where government 
has been relatively inactive; it may mean playing a greater role in society. The ideal 
triple helix configuration is one in which the three spheres interact and take the role 
of the other, with initiatives arising sideways as well as bottom up and top down. 
A flourishing civil society of individuals and groups freely organizing, debating 
and taking initiatives, encourages diverse sources of innovation. The basis for a triple 
helix including bottom up as well as top down initiatives can be seen most clearly in 
countries that are just emerging from military dictatorships. The first academic revo-
lution, the incorporation of research as a broad university mission, took place in Bra-
zil in the 1970’s, expanding the role of the university in society from a traditional 
support structure to one directly linked to national priorities. This transformation 
took place under a military regime where the university had relative autonomy. Uni-
versity discussion groups became a place where some internal opposition was toler-
ated even as many other academics were removed from their jobs and forced out of 
the country. 
When the military gave up control in the early 1980’s, a space opened up for uni-
versity science and technology researchers to introduce the concept of the incubator 
from the U.S. At the same time a financial crisis led large scale technology programs 
to be downsized, making smaller scale initiatives, such as incubators to encourage the 
creation of start-ups, a necessity. At a later point, the national government built upon 
these programs and made them national policy. However, it was not until the re-
creation of civil society that these local initiatives became possible. In succeeding 
years, various levels of government as well as industry and civil associations took up 
the incubator concept and spread it throughout Brazilian society, applying to a vari-
ety of problems from raising the level of low tech industry to creating jobs for the 
poor (H. Etzkowitz, J. Mello and M. Almeida, 2005).  
  
 
13. Conclusion: Towards a Meta-Innovation System 
What is the optimum role of government in innovation? The triple helix is an analyti-
cal and normative concept derived from the changing role of government in different 
societies in relation to academia and industry. There is no single answer to finding an 
appropriate balance between intervention and non-intervention. However, the previ-
ous history of the role of the state in society will set some bounds and also determine 
whether it is most useful for the state to intervene directly or indirectly, acting 
through other institutional spheres.  
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The linear model of translating university-based science into weapons systems 
and medical advances during the 2nd World War relied heavily on university, indus-
try and government cooperation. However, the “mixed public/private innovation 
system,” instituted by conservatives like Vannevar Bush in wartime, was anathema to 
these same persons in peacetime. Thus, they deconstructed the triple helix model 
constructed in wartime during the immediate post-war. The Office of Scientific Re-
search and Development was closed in 1945 and the US does not have a Department 
of Science and Technology to this date. However, a National Science Foundation 
was founded in 1952 and the National Institutes of Health greatly expanded. Never-
theless, an assisted linear model, utilizing the university as an interface, was invented 
to spur innovation. 
The development of university technology transfer capability served as an indi-
rect industrial policy in a country precluded by laissez faire ideology from taking an 
activist stance, in contrast to more direct approaches taken in Japan and Europe. 
However, the added value of bringing academia into closer contiguity to industry, 
through the creation of new firms from academic research, has drawn increased at-
tention to this unintended consequence of academic technology transfer. Indeed, 
Europe and Japan, Latin America and Eastern Europe, increasingly hope to attain 
similar results from their universities by changing the rules of academic practice and 
offering incentives to academics to engage in activities that formerly would have 
been beyond the scope of the professor as “civil servant”.  
Thus, one path to the Innovation State is from a top down model of bureaucratic 
control, with the state devolving its authority to various degrees. The other is from a 
standpoint of modest participation by central government in which case the pathway 
is to increased activity. The two different starting points intersect at some mid-point, 
where government, industry and university assume relatively equal status as interde-
pendent institutional spheres. 
Government is either taking a more or less active role in knowledge-based eco-
nomic development, as the case may be. Direct and indirect innovation polices are 
formulated in former statist and laissez-faire regimes, utilizing the university as an 
intermediary between government and industry. In countries that followed a linear 
model, there has been a shift to an assisted linear model, with intermediate mecha-
nisms introduced to move research into use. An indirect and decentralized innova-
tion policy, across the institutional spheres, may be more effective than traditional 
direct approaches since it is better able to take regional differences into account and 
incorporate bottom up initiatives. 
If the regional and local levels are active and with input from universities and in-
dustry as well, there is a much broader base to develop creative ideas for innovation 
as well as better base for implementation, especially at the regional and local level. 
The resulting dynamic of initiatives from different levels of government and from 
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joint initiatives among the institutional spheres is the hallmark of an innovative  
society. 
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Das Ritual der Evaluierung und die Verführung der  
Zahlen1 
 
Peter Weingart 
 
 
1. Rituale der Selbstgeißelung 
Als sei die Gesellschaft von einer kollektiven Psychose befallen: ein allgemeiner Ver-
trauensverlust in die großen gesellschaftlichen Institutionen hat sie erfasst. Das poli-
tische System mit den Organisationen der Regierung, den Parteien, und den Politi-
kern, die Medien, und schließlich auch die Wissenschaft. Allenthalben hat sich eine 
Sprache der Kontrolle und der Rechenschaftslegung gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit 
etabliert. Die neoliberale Semantik hat in der Wirtschaft ihren Anfang genommen. 
Transparenz, Konkurrenz, Effizienz, Exzellenz, Gerechtigkeit durch die Herstellung 
von Märkten, Freiheit durch selbstbestimmte Leistung sind die markanten Werte 
dieser neuen Verheißung. Sie postuliert u.a. die präzise Zuschreibung von Kosten 
und Ertrag auf die Aktivitäten, auf die zumindest in erster Näherung eine solche Zu-
schreibung möglich ist. Ziel ist die Identifizierung von Leistung und individueller 
Verantwortlichkeit, die Fokussierung von Anreizen, die Steigerung von Effizienz. 
Nach der untergegangenen Tristesse der kollektiven Solidarität des letzten Reichs der 
Freiheit erscheint die Eigenverantwortlichkeit als heller Leitstern, der den Weg in das 
neue Reich der Freiheit weist. So muss man sich wohl erklären, wie es zu dem na-
hezu totalen Erfolg einer Ideologie gekommen ist, die eine moderne Form der 
Selbstgeißelungen darstellt, wie sie sonst eher religiösen Sekten zugeschrieben wird.  
In der Politik geht es um die Kontrolle der gewählten Repräsentanten. Sie reagie-
ren auf das allgemeine Misstrauen in ihre Fähigkeit, eine komplexe Gesellschaft noch 
angemessen zu steuern, indem sie fortlaufend von allen anderen öffentliche Rechen-
schaft einklagen. Die Forderung, gegenüber dem Souverän über die Verwendung 
öffentlicher Ressourcen der Berichtspflicht nachzukommen, entspricht guter alter 
demokratischer Tradition. Sie droht jedoch zu einer rein symbolischen rituellen 
Handlung zu degenerieren, wenn die Rechenschaftslegung zum Selbstzweck entartet 
oder gar für andere politische Interessen instrumentalisiert wird. Wenn die Erfüllung 
der Berichtspflicht mehr materiellen Aufwand erfordert und höhere symbolische 
                                                 
1 Dieser Text entspricht einem Kapitel aus: Peter Weingart, Die Wissenschaft der Öffentlichkeit. 
Essays zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft, Medien und Öffentlichkeit, 206 Seiten, broschiert, EUR (D) 
22,00 / sFr 39,60, ISBN 3-934730-03-5; © Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist 2005; www.velbrueck-
wissenschaft.de. Für eine veränderte, englische Fassung des Beitrags vgl.: Impact of bibliometrics 
upon the science system: Inadvertent consequences? In: Scientometrics, vol 62/1 (2005), S. 117-131. 
Besten Dank an Velbrück Wissenschaft für die Erlaubnis zum Wiederabdruck des Beitrags. 
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Kosten erzeugt, als sich durch die Bewertungs- und Kontrollübungen erwirtschaften 
lässt, ist die Grenze zum bloßen Ritual überschritten.  
Die Wissenschaft ist eines der Hauptziele des politischen Rechenschaftsrituals. 
Obgleich sie als Institution das vergleichsweise höchste Vertrauen in der Gesellschaft 
genießt, obgleich ihr in den Sonntagsreden der Politiker die größte Bedeutung für 
den Wohlstand und die Entwicklung der Gesellschaft zuerkannt wird, wird keine 
andere Institution derartig der Pflicht zur Rechtfertigung ihrer Leistungen unterwor-
fen. Das mag ein Reflex darauf sein, dass sie – ebenfalls wie keine andere Institution 
– Vertrauen in ihre Operationen verlangt. Sie verschließt sich notgedrungen dem 
Einblick von außen. Ihre Sprache und ihre Methoden sind für die Öffentlichkeit un-
verständlich. Ihre Ergebnisse lassen oft keinen unmittelbaren Nutzen erkennen. Die 
Beziehung zwischen Aufwendungen und Erträgen sind zumeist indirekt, und vor 
allem liegen in den meisten Forschungsbereichen lange Zeiträume zwischen ihnen. 
Die in politische Kalküle übersetzten Orientierungen des ‚shareholder value’ lassen 
sich in der Wissenschaftspolitik eben nicht bruchlos umsetzen. Es wirkt deshalb auch 
nachgerade komisch, wenn sich Politiker den Nobelpreis zurechnen, den der Geehrte 
angeblich aufgrund großzügiger Förderung während der laufenden Legislaturperiode 
errungen hat. 
Die neoliberale Manie hat schließlich auch den Widerstand der Wissenschaft 
gebrochen. Über lange Zeit hat sie sich den simplifizierenden Maßen widersetzt. Als 
Anfang der 1980er Jahre die ersten Bibliometrie basierten Evaluierungen von For-
schungseinrichtungen durchgeführt wurden, bestritten die betroffenen Wissen-
schaftler die Möglichkeit eines solchen Unterfangens aus methodologischen Grün-
den. Sie drohten damit, die Urheber der Untersuchungen vor ein Gericht zu bringen, 
weil sie fürchteten, dass die Ergebnisse dem Ruf ihrer Institution schaden würden 
(Weingart 2001, 316). Diese Reaktion war vorhersehbar, weil bereits der bloße Ver-
such, die Forschungsleistung durch ‚Außenseiter’, d.h. Laien in dem entsprechenden 
Gebiet, messen zu lassen, der vorherrschenden Überzeugung widersprach, dass nur 
die Experten selbst in der Lage seien, die Qualität und die Relevanz der Forschung 
zu beurteilen und dass der geeignete Mechanismus, dies zu erreichen, nämlich die 
‚peer review’, zufriedenstellend funktioniere. Ein zweiter Grund für ihre Skepsis 
wenn nicht gar vollständige Ablehnung war die Methode der Evaluierung. Biblio-
metrische Maße, obgleich quantitativ und daher anscheinend objektiv, erschienen 
theoretisch unbegründet, empirisch krude und abhängig von Daten, die bekanntlich 
ungenau waren. Die Ablehnung bibliometrischer Indikatoren seitens der Wissen-
schaftler wurde zu jener Zeit von den (Wissenschafts-) Politikern und Verwaltungs-
beamten in den einschlägigen Ministerien sogar noch unterstützt, wenngleich zumeist 
aus Desinteresse.  
 
Seither haben sich die Zeiten in verschiedener Hinsicht geändert. Da die Budgets 
für die Forschung nicht mehr die gewohnten Zuwachsraten zu verzeichnen haben 
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und Prioritätenentscheidungen über die Umverteilung vorhandener Mittel statt über 
die Verteilung zusätzlicher Mittel befinden, hat der Druck, diese Entscheidungen zu 
legitimieren, das Interesse auf Maße gelenkt, die die Politiker nicht mehr in Argu-
mente mit den Wissenschaftlern verwickeln, denen sie nicht gewachsen sind.2 Ob-
gleich die Forschungsindikatoren seit Beginn der 1970er Jahre entwickelt wurden, 
dauerte ihre Implementierung bis zu dem Zeitpunkt, da die Bewertung von Depart-
ments bzw. Fakultäten, einzelner Wissenschaftler und das ‚Ranking’ von Universi-
täten ein wichtiges Instrument für die kompetitive Verteilung von Mitteln wurde, die 
an die Stelle der wegen ihrer angeblichen Ineffizienz in Verruf geratenen institutio-
nellen Förderung getreten ist. 
Indikatoren der Forschungsqualität sind noch nicht allgemein akzeptiert. Die a-
merikanische Regierung verwendet sie trotz ihrer Neigung zu Leistungsindikatoren 
für die Rationalisierung von Budgetentscheidungen noch nicht (Roessner 2002; Fel-
ler 2002).3 In der EU ist die Situation uneinheitlich. Unter den unterschiedlichen 
Formen der Institutionalisierung von bibliometrischen Indikatoren bildet Finnland 
wahrscheinlich das Extrem. Es ist das einzige Land, in dem der ‚Impact – Faktor’ für 
wissenschaftliche Fachzeitschriften zum Gesetz eines Landes kanonisiert wurde. Das 
impliziert dort, dass die Veröffentlichung nur eines Artikels in einer Zeitschrift mit 
hohem ‚Impact – Faktor’ das Budget einer Universitätsklinik um ungefähr 7000$ 
erhöhen kann (Adam 2002, 727).  
Die Verführungskraft der quantitativen Maße scheint zunehmend auch auf an-
dere Regierungen zu wirken. Sei es durch das Kopieren anderer Beispiele, sei es 
durch äußeren Druck durch die sich ausbreitende Kultur der Rechenschaftslegung 
und durch die wechselseitige Beobachtung anderer Akteure kann man inzwischen 
eine geradezu enthusiastische Übernahme bibliometrischer Zahlen beobachten. Die-
ser Sinneswandel beschränkt sich nicht etwa auf Politiker und Verwalter, sondern er 
hat inzwischen die Dekane und ‚Chairs’ von Departments, Universitätspräsidenten, 
die Referenten in Förderorganisationen sowie schließlich auch die Wissenschaftler 
selbst erfasst, die ursprünglich die schärfsten Gegner der Forschungsevaluierung von 
außen waren. Sie haben sich den Zwängen der ‚accounting society’ mit ihren Leis-
tungsindikatoren ergeben und nehmen nun bereitwillig an den durch sie bewirkten 
Ritualen der Selbstgeißelung teil. Der Logik dieser Rituale folgend begeben sie sich in 
                                                 
2 Ein Vorläufer dieser Entwicklung in der deutschen Diskussion über den tertiären Bildungssektor war 
die Regulierung der Lehrbelastungen und der Studentenströme durch numerische Formeln, die in den 
1970er Jahren implementiert wurden. Dieser Fall ist hier nicht von Interesse außer als historisches 
Beispiel dafür, dass damit zum ersten Mal demonstriert wurde, dass die scheinbar komplexe Welt der 
Lehre mit ihren unterschiedlichen Gegenstandsbereichen, Unterrichtstypen und Qualifizierungs-
ebenen durch die Anwendung einiger weniger kruder Zahlen reguliert werden konnte. In diesem Fall 
war das Ziel, die durch die Demokratisierung der Universitätsausbildung stark steigende Zahl der 
Studenten mit den Lehrkapazitäten abzustimmen und damit die Kontrolle über die Kosten des Lehr-
personals zu erlangen. 
3 Private Einschätzung von S. Cozzens. Roessners und Fellers Artikel geben einen Überblick der Indi-
katoren für die Evaluation von S&T Programmen in den USA. 
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eine sich ständig selbst steigernde Konkurrenz, und wo es ihnen möglich ist, umge-
hen oder unterlaufen sie die Erfolgskontrollen mit dem Erfolg, dass deren ursprüng-
liche Ziele in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt werden. 
 
 
2.  Wer kontrolliert die Kontrolleure?   
Die neue Nachfrage nach Zahlen verdankt sich der Verheißung, dass sie die Ge-
heimnisse der Welt der Forschung und der internen Verteilung von Reputation und 
Belohnungen lüften und es Außenseitern erlauben, einen direkten Blick auf die inter-
nationale Stellung oder die provinzielle Isolierung ihrer lokalen Wissenschaftler zu 
werfen und ihnen so die Macht geben, unberechtigte Ansprüche auf Ruhm zu entlar-
ven. Plötzlich werden viele Spieler auf diesen rapide wachsenden Markt der For-
schungsevaluierung und speziell der bibliometrischen Analysen gelockt. Verschie-
dene Länder haben eigene Organisationen gegründet, die mit der Sammlung und 
Verarbeitung von Daten über die Forschungsleistung ihrer eigenen Forschungsein-
richtungen befasst sind. Andere bedienen sich einer der unabhängigen, entweder 
universitären oder kommerziellen Institute und Forschungsgruppen, die auf biblio-
metrische Analysen spezialisiert sind, um besondere Untersuchungen für sie durch-
zuführen. In den USA veröffentlicht die National Science Board der National Scien-
ce Foundation seit den 1970er Jahren ihren ‚Science Indicators Report’. Frankreich 
hat sein ‚Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques’ (OST) und ähnlich die Nie-
derlande (NOWT). Der Schweizerische und der Deutsche Wissenschaftsrat ver-
wenden bibliometrische Indikatoren in ihren Analysen. Der Fokus der Berichte die-
ser Organisationen sind primär die jeweiligen nationalen Wissenschaftssysteme. So-
weit ist folgerichtig, dass die Bewertung und Kontrolle der mit öffentlichen Mitteln 
geförderten Wissenschaft durch Einrichtungen erfolgt, die ihrerseits öffentlich legi-
timierte (und finanzierte) Einrichtungen sind, von denen unterstellt werden kann, 
dass sie nach dem Stand des Wissens operieren.  
Die Sache hat jedoch einen Haken. Alle diese Organisationen sind nämlich bis 
jetzt und in absehbare Zukunft von einem einzigen Datenlieferanten abhängig, dem 
Institute of Scientific Information (ISI), dem Produzenten der einzigen multidis-
ziplinären Datenbank wissenschaftlicher Literatur, die Zitationen enthält und folglich 
die Erstellung von Zitationsanalysen und Impact – Faktoren für wissenschaftliche 
Zeitschriften ermöglicht. Ursprünglich war sie als Literaturdatenbank konzipiert. Sie 
ermöglichte es den Forschern, den Gebrauch ihrer Ergebnisse durch andere For-
scher zu verfolgen ebenso wie Forschernetzwerke zu identifizieren. Bald jedoch er-
wies sich die Datenbank von ISI, der ‚Science Citation Index’ (SCI), als wertvolles 
Instrument für die Evaluierung von Forschungseinrichtungen und sogar einzelner 
Wissenschaftler. Nach vielen Jahren einer eher zögerlichen Reaktion auf diesen rand-
ständigen Gebrauch seiner Produkte hat ISI nun die wachsende Bedeutung der 
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Nachfrage nach bibliometrischen Indikatoren erkannt und begonnen, maßgeschnei-
derte Evaluationsinstrumente wie ISI Essential Science Indicators und ISI Highly Cited 
Com zu liefern. Dies sind machtvolle Instrumente, die es jedem mit einem Internet-
Zugang zu einer Universitätsbibliothek erlauben, die hochzitierten Wissenschaftler 
ihrer örtlichen Universität, den Rangplatz dieser Universität oder eines bestimmten 
Fachbereichs im Vergleich zu anderen national oder international zu ermitteln. Diese 
Instrumente werden inzwischen aktiv vermarktet, und eine wachsende Nachfrage 
treibt ihre Preise. Der neue Eigentümer von ISI, die Thomson Company in Toronto, 
vertreibt sie aggressiv und fördert damit ihren direkten Gebrauch durch jeden, der 
bereit ist, die Gebühren zu zahlen.  
Die Produktion der Indikatoren, auf die sich Entscheidungen der Mittelzuwei-
sung an Universitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen sowie mitunter der Rekrutierung 
und Besoldung von Wissenschaftlern stützen, liegt also in den Händen einer kom-
merziellen Firma, die praktisch über ein Weltmonopol für sie verfügt. Ob bewusst 
oder nicht prägt sie durch das Profil und die Qualität der Daten die politischen Ent-
scheidungen mit, die die Forschungssysteme überall in der Welt betreffen. Die Eva-
luation der Forschung, soweit sie sich auf bibliometrische Daten stützt, ist damit 
praktisch in die Hände einer privaten Firma mit kommerziellen Interessen gelegt 
worden. 4 
Dies ist umso problematischer, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Daten keineswegs 
über alle Kritik erhaben sind. Bislang haben intermediäre Forschungsgruppen die 
kruden ISI Daten gesäubert und für spezifische Analysen zubereitet. Sie besitzen 
spezifische Kompetenzen für die Interpretation der Daten, so insbesondere Kennt-
nisse über die Namen der Institutionen im Land sowie ihrer Reputation. Darüber 
hinaus arbeiten sie fortlaufend daran, die Indikatoren durch Forschung über ihre 
Anwendungen in Evaluierungsverfahren zu verfeinern. Diese Gruppen drohen jetzt 
aus dem Markt gedrängt zu werden. Dies geschieht aufgrund einer kombinierten 
Verantwortungslosigkeit: ISI produziert und vertreibt ‚Evaluationsprodukte-per-
Druckknopf’, Politiker lassen sich auf diese Produkte ein, weil sie schnell und billig 
anzuwenden sind.5 Wenn dies geschehen sein wird, werden auch die speziellen Fähig-
keiten dieser Gruppen verloren gehen. Schließlich wird der Eindruck übrig bleiben, 
die Daten seien korrekt und bedürften nicht kostspieliger ‚Reinigungsverfahren’. Die 
leichte Verfügbarkeit der scheinbar exakten Indikatoren suggeriert vielmehr, dass 
jeder Laie die Wissenschaftler und ihre Produkte bewerten kann. Tatsächlich sind die 
methodologischen und operationalen Grundlagen dem Endnutzer jedoch verborgen, 
                                                 
4 Es gibt augenblicklich keine ernsthaften Anstrengungen, die Position von ISI in Frage zu stellen. S. 
NATURE, 415, 14. Feb., 2002, 728. Eine Implikation des Status von Thomson als einer privaten 
Firma ist möglicherweise, dass der Druck, die Daten zu früh zu vermarkten, zunimmt, die Qualität der 
Daten damit abnimmt. Vgl. zu einem solchen Kommentar S. Müller, Das Monopol, Deutsche Univer-
sitätszeitschrift (DUZ), 21, 2003, 10-11.  
5 Van Raan will nur Letzteres als Problem sehen. Verantwortungsloser Gebrauch von methodisch 
fragwürdigen Evaluationsmaßen ist aber nur möglich, wenn es sie gibt (van Raan 2004). 
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der aufgrund dessen nicht in der Lage ist, die theoretischen Annahmen kritisch zu 
beurteilen, die ihrer Konstruktion zugrunde liegen. Dies hat bereits zu einer wach-
senden Zahl von Fällen geführt, in denen Ministerialbeamte der Wissenschaftspolitik 
oder Mitglieder der Hochschulverwaltungen sich auf diese Daten beziehen, wenn sie 
Haushaltsentscheidungen treffen, oder in denen Dekane sie für ihre Berufungs- und 
Gehaltsverhandlungen zugrunde legen. Im gleichen Maß, in dem der Diskurs über 
die Rechenschaftspflicht der Wissenschaft an Intensität zunimmt und die Evaluie-
rungen von Forschungseinrichtungen häufiger werden, steigt die Nachfrage nach den 
gebrauchsfertigen ISI – Indikatorenpaketen. Eine Folge unter anderen ist, dass Ran-
kingverfahren, die auf diesen Daten beruhen, eine große Aufmerksamkeitswirkung 
erlangen, denen sich die Rektoren und Präsidenten von Universitäten nicht mehr 
entziehen zu können glauben, obwohl ihre methodischen Unzulänglichkeiten be-
kannt sind. Das inzwischen berühmt-berüchtigte Shanghai – Ranking der führenden 
Universitäten in der Welt erzeugt Sogwirkungen, weil es international ‚sichtbar’ ist, 
obwohl es einer methodischen Prüfung nicht standhalten kann.6 Die gesunde Skep-
sis, gepaart mit Vorsicht, wie sie noch vor ein paar Jahren verbreitet war, ist einem 
unkritischen und zuweilen sogar verantwortungslosen Gebrauch der bibliometri-
schen Maße gewichen. 
Die Implikationen dieser Entwicklungen sind beunruhigend. Der Evaluations-
prozess, der bislang eine wissenschaftsinterne Angelegenheit war, ist ‚externalisiert’ 
worden, d.h. einer Laienöffentlichkeit über Zahlen zugänglich gemacht, die die quan-
titativen Aspekte des Kommunikationsprozesses in der Wissenschaft repräsentieren. 
Das ist gewollt und entspricht der Forderung nach Transparenz, die wiederum die 
Voraussetzung für die Kontrolle und die Bildung von Vertrauen ist. Die Zahlen, die 
zur Grundlage von Budgetentscheidungen werden und den Forschungsprozess sowie 
die Verfahrensweisen von Universitäten, Kliniken und anderen Forschungsein-
richtungen direkt beeinflussen, sind jedoch voraussetzungsreich, interpretationsbe-
dürftig und nicht uneingeschränkt verlässlich. Anders gesagt: Der Politik und der 
Öffentlichkeit, d.h. den Medien werden Instrumente der Steuerung der Wissenschaft 
in die Hand gegeben, die sie nicht in angemessener Weise bedienen können, deren 
unsachgemäße Anwendung aber möglicherweise großen Schaden anrichtet.  
Das macht die kritische Betrachtung der Validität und Verlässlichkeit der Daten 
von ISI, der auf ihnen beruhenden Anwendungen durch die Wissenschaftspolitik 
und vor allem der unbeabsichtigten Steuerungseffekte dieser Anwendungen zu einer vor-
rangigen Aufgabe – sowohl im Interesse der ‚scientific community’ als auch der Re-
gierungen und Wissenschaftsverwaltungen. 
 
                                                 
6 Der Vice – Chancellor einer erstrangigen Universität Süd-Afrikas berichtete, Studenten hätten vor 
einer Entscheidung für die Einschreibung gefragt, warum die Universität nicht im Shanghai – Ranking 
aufgeführt sei. Er sah sich aufgrund dieser Erfahrung veranlasst, das Ranking ernst zu nehmen. Zu 
den methodischen Problemen des Shanghai – Rankings siehe van Raan 2004.  
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3.  Validität und Verlässlichkeit bibliometrischer Indikatoren in  
der Evaluierung von Institutionen und Wissenschaftlern 
 
Seit den frühesten Tagen ihrer Entwicklung haben Forscher Fragen der Validität und 
Verlässlichkeit bibliometrischer Indikatoren behandelt. Diese zunächst akademischen 
Fragen haben jedoch in dem Augenblick eine dringliche politische Qualität ange-
nommen, in dem die Indikatoren mit Finanzentscheidungen verknüpft werden. 
Dann kommt es nämlich darauf an, dass sie valide und verlässlich sind, d.h. sie müs-
sen die Sachverhalte messen bzw. ‚indizieren’, die sie messen sollen, und sie müssen 
Anfechtungen standhalten, da es sich um politisierte Daten handelt, an die sich mate-
rielle Interessen knüpfen. Tatsächlich sind die Indikatoren aber nicht über jeden 
Zweifel an ihrer Verlässlichkeit erhaben. Mängel der Datenverarbeitung, grundsätzli-
che methodische Probleme, Begrenzungen der Datenbanken sowie Einschränkungen 
der Anwendung der Indikatoren sind unter den mit ihnen vertrauten ‚Insidern’ be-
kannt. Wenige markante Beispiele sollen diese Probleme illustrieren.  
Da die Indikatoren zumeist (und vorzugsweise) auf einer großen Zahl von ku-
mulativen Daten beruhen, enthalten sie Fehler der Datenverarbeitung. Ein inhärentes 
Problem sind Überschneidungen bei häufigen Nachnamen und falsch geschriebene 
Namen von Personen und Institutionen. Korrekturen dieser Fehler sind meistens 
nur aufgrund lokaler und sprachlicher Kenntnisse zu leisten, und sie sind aufwendig.  
Die ISI-Datenbank ist gegenüber der Gesamtheit der Fachzeitschriften stark se-
lektiv und repräsentiert nur einen Ausschnitt des gesamten Kommunikationsprozess. 
Abhängig von der Datenbank können die Indikatoren zum Teil erhebliche Verzer-
rungen gegenüber Ländern, Disziplinen und Zeitschriften enthalten (Braun et al. 
2000, Zitt et al. 2003). Die Ingenieurswissenschaften, die Sozial- und Verhaltenswis-
senschaften sowie die Geisteswissenschaften sind unterrepräsentiert. 
Ein weiteres Problem ist die Definition der Gebiete. In bestimmten Fällen wer-
den Publikationen aus der Betrachtung (und damit aus der Bewertung!) ausgeschlos-
sen, weil die Definition eines Forschungsgebiets in der Datenbank, das auf einem 
bestimmten Satz an Fachzeitschriften beruht, unvollständig ist oder sich mit anderen 
Definitionen überschneidet. Vor allem interdisziplinäre Gebiete entziehen sich einer 
angemessenen Kategorisierung. Derartige Probleme der Gebietsabgrenzungen kön-
nen letztlich zu fehlerhaften Zitationszählungen führen. 
Des Weiteren ist viel zu wenig über den Akt des Zitierens im wissenschaftlichen 
Kommunikationsprozess bekannt, seien die Zitationen negativ, positiv oder eher 
rituell (Case & Higgins 2000, Cronin 2000). Bis auf weiteres muss die Anwendung 
von Zitationsindikatoren auf die Überzeugung gestützt werden, dass sich die unter-
schiedlichen Motive, einen Artikel zu zitieren, gegenseitig neutralisieren. Das allen 
gemeinsame Ergebnis ist die Aufmerksamkeit für den zitierten Artikel. Wir wissen 
auch, dass verschiedene Disziplinen sehr unterschiedliche Kulturen des Zitierens 
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entwickelt haben. Artikel in der biomedizinischen Grundlagenforschung werden 
sechsmal so oft zitiert wie Artikel in der Mathematik. Derartige Regelmäßigkeiten 
müssen berücksichtigt werden, wenn Vergleiche zwischen Institutionen über die 
Grenzen von Disziplinen hinweg vorgenommen werden. Eine akzeptierte Theorie 
der Zitationsentscheidungen, auf die sich eine besser informierte Verwendung bibli-
ometrischer Indikatoren stützen könnte, gibt es jedoch nicht, und wird es nie geben 
(van Raan 1998, Small 1998).  
Ein letztes Problem ergibt sich schließlich aus statistischer Perspektive. In vielen 
Evaluationen, die auf Zitaten beruhen, sind die Zahlen klein. Kleine Differenzen der 
Zitationszahlen sind möglicherweise auf das gewählte Zeitfenster zurückzuführen, 
d.h. auf die Zeit, die einem Artikel zur Verfügung stand, zitiert zu werden und kön-
nen sich folglich rasch verändern. In institutionellen Evaluationen und Rangordnun-
gen kann die relativ kleine Zahl involvierter Zitationen zu ‚extremen’ Fällen führen 
wie etwa dem, dass ein hoch zitierter Artikel die relative Stellung einer entsprechen-
den Institution bestimmt, unabhängig von der ‚Qualitätsverteilung’ in der Gesamtheit 
ihrer Mitarbeiter im Vergleich zu anderen. Der betreffende Autor mag vielleicht 
schon vor längerer Zeit die Institution verlassen haben, während sie den durch ihn 
bewirkten Rangplatz nach wie vor einnimmt. Kleine Unterschiede oder Unter-
schiede, die auf einer kleinen Anzahl von Fällen beruhen, können keine Haushalts- 
und Einkommensentscheidungen rechtfertigen, weil sie keine gehaltvollen Unter-
schiede kompetitiver Anstrengungen, der Produktivität und Innovativität und noch 
weniger der Qualität einer Institution oder von Individuen indizieren. Die Schluss-
folgerung, die die im Umgang mit bibliometrischen Maßen erfahrenen Evaluatoren 
daraus ziehen: Sie können nur auf einer hohen Aggregationsebene angewandt wer-
den, sie müssen sorgfältig im Hinblick auf präzise Fragen konstruiert werden, und sie 
müssen mit ebenso großer Sorgfalt und mit Blick auf die technischen und methodi-
schen Probleme interpretiert werden. Evaluationen mit Sanktionsfolgen sind zu 
ernst, als dass sie mit kommerziellen Knopfdruckprodukten wie ISI Highly Cited Com 
zu leisten wären.  
 
 
4. Bibliometrische Indikatoren – besser als ‘peer review’? 
Ein Grund für die neue Popularität der quantitativen bibliometrischen Indikatoren 
unter den Wissenschaftspolitikern ist die wachsende Skepsis, wenn nicht die Enttäu-
schung gegenüber der ‘peer review’, d.h. dem internen Qualitätsprüfverfahren der 
Wissenschaft. Anfängliche Zweifel über die Offenheit des Verfahrens, die in den 
USA schon in den 1970er Jahren geäußert wurden und Vorwürfe der Vetternwirt-
schaft ausgelöst haben sind neuerlich durch eine Anzahl von Betrugsskandalen ge-
nährt worden, die bis weit in die Eliten der Biomedizin und der Physik hineinreichen. 
Aufgrund der Kritik an den Selbstkontrollmechanismen der ‘scientific community’ 
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und des politischen Drucks, die Forschungsmittel auf der Basis umfassender Evalua-
tionen neu zu verteilen, werden die leicht verfügbaren und praktikablen numerischen 
Indikatoren mit ihrem Versprechen von Transparenz und Objektivität für Politiker 
unwiderstehlich attraktiv. Das Vertrauen, das den ‘peer review’ – Mechanismen ent-
zogen wird, wird auf die numerischen Indikatoren verlagert. Das kommt einem Au-
tonomieverlust der Wissenschaft und einer stärkeren Mitwirkung der politischen 
Öffentlichkeit in ihren Angelegenheiten gleich.  
Der ‘peer review’ – Prozess, besonders die Verlässlichkeit und Konsistenz der 
Beurteilungen, sind Gegenstand vieler empirischer Untersuchungen gewesen. 7 Die 
Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchungen erscheinen auf den ersten Blick in der Tat nicht 
ermutigend. Die Urteile divergieren, sie widersprechen sich zum Teil sogar, und sie 
sind über einen gegebenen Zeitraum hinweg nicht konsistent. Bei näherer Betrach-
tung erweisen sich diese Ergebnisse angesichts der Natur des wissenschaftlichen 
Kommunikationsprozess allerdings als wenig überraschend. Dieser Prozess ist näm-
lich offen, kontrovers und unabgeschlossen. Meinungsunterschiede sind von zentra-
ler Bedeutung für seine Produktivität und Innovativität sowie dafür, dass keine Mei-
nung eine unberechtigte Dominanz erhält. Einigkeit wäre die Ausnahme und ist folg-
lich selten zu finden bis eine gegebene Forschungsfrage als beantwortet gilt und die 
Aufmerksamkeit der Forscher sich anderen Themen zuwendet. Die Erwartung über-
einstimmender Beurteilungen entstammt einem ‚enttäuschten Szientismus’ in Ver-
bindung mit Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen (Hirschauer 2002). Als Basis für die unter-
schiedlichen Kritiken an der ‚peer review’ im Allgemeinen und zur Rechtfertigung 
der Anwendung bibliometrischer Indikatoren im Besonderen bilden diese Erwartun-
gen den falschen Bezugsrahmen.  
Warum ist dies für bibliometrisch begründete Evaluierungen relevant? Zunächst 
einmal gilt, dass die ‚peer review’ den Standard bildet, an dem die Validität aller ande-
ren Typen von Forschungsbewertung gemessen wird (Roessner 2002, 86). Letztlich 
kann es keine andere Instanz der Überprüfung wissenschaftlichen Wissens und der 
Qualität der Forschung geben, als die Wissenschaft selbst. Soweit die Einführung der 
Maße durch das Misstrauen gegenüber der ‚peer review’ motiviert ist, unterliegt sie 
deshalb auch zwei Fehlannahmen: Erstens unterstellt sie die Unabhängigkeit der Ma-
ße vom ‚peer review’ – Prozess. Zweitens nimmt sie an, dass die Maße exakter sind 
als die ‚peer review’ weil sie quantitativ und damit objektiver erscheinen.  
Tatsächlich sind Publikations- und Zitationsmaße Repräsentationen des Kom-
munikationsprozess, wie er sich in den Veröffentlichungen in Fachzeitschriften ent-
faltet. Sie verkörpern also auch die ‚peer review’ – Bewertungen, die zu den Publika-
                                                 
7 Siehe u.a. Cichetti 1991; Bakanic et al. 1989; Cole et al. 1981. Die aktivsten Disziplinen in der Unter-
suchung der Funktionsweise ihrer eigenen ‘peer review’ sind die Medizin und die Psychologie. Die 
führende medizinische Fachzeitschrift in den USA, JAMA, hat in den 1990er Jahren vier internationa-
le Konferenzen zur peer review in den Medizinwissenschaften durchgeführt. Nebenbei: es ist eine 
interessante Frage, warum gerade dieser Disziplinen besonders über ihre peer review Mechanismen 
besorgt zu sein scheinen.  
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tionen geführt haben. Aus diesem Grund können sie nicht exakter oder objektiver 
sein, als diese selbst.  
Die wirklichen Vorteile der bibliometrischen Maße liegen auf einer anderen Ebe-
ne. 1. Diese Maße sind (vermeintlich) ‚nicht reaktiv’, d.h. die Ergebnisse beruhen in 
der Regel auf einer großen Zahl von Ereignissen (Publikationen und Zitierungen, die 
die Entscheidungen der Gutachter involvieren). Die entsprechenden Entscheidungen 
sind nicht dadurch motiviert, dass sie für die Zwecke von Evaluierungen gezählt 
werden. 2. Die Verwendung von Bibliometrie kann in verschiedenen Hinsichten ei-
nen günstigen Effekt auf den ‚peer review’ – Prozess haben. Die Maße umfassen 
üblicher Weise eine sehr viel größere Zahl solcher ‚Ereignisse’, als sie in einem be-
grenzten Begutachtungsprozess anfallen. Sie bieten deshalb eine sehr viel breitere 
Perspektive, so dass Vorurteile, die auf den Beschränkungen persönlicher Kenntnisse 
beruhen mit einer größeren Wahrscheinlichkeit eliminiert werden. Weil die biblio-
metrischen Maße auf Massendaten basieren lassen sie Makromuster im Kommunika-
tionsprozess erkennen, die aus der eng begrenzten und selektiven Perspektive des 
individuellen Forschers nicht gesehen werden können. Die Bibliometrie kann zum 
Beispiel die unerwarteten Beziehungen zwischen Forschungsfeldern aufdecken, die 
institutionell noch nicht miteinander verbunden sind. Der einzigartige Beitrag der 
Bibliometrie zum kollektiven Kommunikationsprozess und ihr größter Wert sowohl 
für die Wissenschaft als auch für die Wissenschaftspolitik und die Öffentlichkeit be-
steht darin, dass sie dieses ‚größere Bild’ zu liefern vermag. Die bibliometrische Ana-
lyse und die sich auf sie stützende Evaluation ersetzen jedoch nicht die ‚peer review’: 
Die Interpretation der Muster sowie unerwarteter Widersprüche der Ergebnisse zur 
allgemeinen Überzeugung der ‚scientific community’ oder anderer Unregelmäßigkei-
ten muss den Experten in den entsprechenden Gebieten überlassen bleiben oder 
zumindest von ihnen unterstützt werden.  
Die wichtige, vielleicht sogar die wichtigste Funktion der Bibliometrie besteht al-
so darin, die ‚peer review’ zu ‚kontrollieren’ und zu stärken. Peer review Urteile (be-
sonders solche in politikbezogenen evaluativen Kontexten), die durch bibliometri-
sche Studien ‚geprüft’ worden sind, sind besser gegen die Wirkungsweise von ‚old 
boys networks’ geschützt. Der schnelle Niedergang der Aufmerksamkeit für ein For-
schungsfeld, das zuvor eine prominente Position einnahm und dessen institutionelle 
Dominanz seine vergangene Bedeutung verlängert, kann dem ‚review’ – Prozess auf-
grund seiner inhärenten Selektivität und /oder der involvierten Interessen leicht ent-
gehen. Die Kontrollen dieser Art stärken letztlich die Glaubwürdigkeit dieses Me-
chanismus und rechtfertigen in allererster Linie die Verwendung bibliometrischer 
Indikatoren. 
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5. Beabsichtigte und nicht beabsichtigte Steuerungseffekte der bibli-
ometrischen Maße 
Zusätzlich zu diesen traditionellen Fragen, die mit der Konstruktion jedes politik-
relevanten Indikators verbunden sind, stellt sich eine weitere: Was sind die unbeab-
sichtigten Effekte der Anwendung dieser Indikatoren? Das letztlich entscheidende 
Problem ist, ob sie ihre Ziele als Instrument der Politik erreichen. Reagieren Indivi-
duen und Institutionen in der Weise, wie es mit der Anwendung der Maße beabsich-
tigt ist, oder entziehen sie sich diesen Zielen bzw. umgehen sie sie? Entgegen der 
ursprünglichen Annahme, bibliometrische Indikatoren seien ‚nicht-reaktive’ Maße, 
gibt es Anzeichen dafür, dass diese Annahme falsch war.  
Wenn Menschen betroffen sind, reagieren sie auf die Anwendung bewertender 
Maße durch die Veränderung ihres Verhaltens. Verhaltensänderungen sind durchaus 
beabsichtigt. Die Verknüpfung von Zitationsmaßen und der Mittelzuweisung soll 
zum Beispiel die Forscher dazu veranlassen, sich kompetitiver in ihren Veröffent-
lichungsroutinen zu verhalten, d.h. mehr Artikel zu schreiben und diese in Zeit-
schriften mit einem höheren ‚Impact’ – Faktor zu publizieren. In der Regel werden 
die Mittelzuweisungen an mehr als einen Indikator gebunden, z. B. werden biblio-
metrische Maße mit eingeworbenen Drittmitteln als Indikator kombiniert. Letzterer 
soll die Forscher veranlassen, externe Forschungsmittel zu beantragen und sich in die 
Konkurrenz um sie zu begeben. Ein anderer Indikator für die Forschungsqualität ist 
die Zahl der beaufsichtigten Doktoranden. Hier geht es um die Intensivierung der 
Betreuung. Sir Gareth Roberts, der Präsident des Wolfson College, Oxford, meint, 
die Reform des 'British Research Assessment Exercise’ müsse genau in diese Rich-
tung verlaufen. „Zahlen wie die Anzahl der produzierten Doktoranden, der Dritt-
mittel und der Anzahl der produzierten Artikel können als Indikatoren der For-
schungsqualität benutzt werden, um herauszuarbeiten, wie viel Forschungsmittel eine 
Universität erhalten sollte“ (Roberts 2003). 
Jeder dieser Indikatoren beruht auf der Annahme einer eindimensionalen Reak-
tion, der sogen. Anreizkompatibilität, aber diese Annahme ist eine Illusion. Forscher 
können – und sind bekannt dafür – die Zahl ihrer Publikationen dadurch erhöhen, 
dass sie ihre Arbeiten zu ‚kleinsten publizierbaren Einheiten’ aufteilen. Sie können 
relativ konservative aber sichere Forschungsprojekte vorschlagen, und sie können die 
Standards ihrer Doktoranden absenken. Dies sind nur Beispiele dafür, wie einzelne 
Personen die Indikatoren manipulieren oder den beabsichtigten Steuerungseffekten 
ausweichen können. In einem Kommentar in der Zeitschrift Nature hieß es: „Wissen-
schaftler streben zunehmend danach, in wenigen Spitzenjournalen zu publizieren und 
vergeuden ihre Zeit und Energie damit, ihre Manuskripte zu manipulieren und die 
Herausgeber zu umwerben. Das Resultat ist, dass die objektive Darstellung der Ar-
beit, die Zugänglichkeit der Artikel und die Qualität der Forschung selbst kompro-
mittiert werden“ (Lawrence 2003a, 259).  
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Was für Individuen gilt, gilt in diesem Fall auch für Organisationen. Sie können 
in derselben Weise handeln. Offensichtlich beruht die Effektivität der Forschungs-
politik, die sich der bewertenden Indikatoren bedient, auf der soliden theoretischen 
Basis der Indikatoren und dem entsprechenden Wissen über die Reaktionen, die sie 
seitens der Personen und Organisationen auslösen, deren Verhalten sie allererst ver-
ändern sollen. 
Bislang sind nur wenige Untersuchungen durchgeführt worden, die die Effekti-
vität und die unbeabsichtigten Reaktionen auf diese Art der bibliometrischen Maße 
sowie die sekundären Folgen für die Universität oder den wissenschaftlichen Kom-
munikationsprozess als ganzen untersuchen. Wissenschaftssoziologische und ethno-
graphische Studien zeigen, dass Wissenschaftler in der Tat auf politisch-administra-
tive Einflüsse reagieren (Gläser et al., 2002, 16). Eine australische Untersuchung 
zeigt, dass die Zahl der Veröffentlichungen tatsächlich nach der Einführung der auf 
Formeln gegründeten Förderung (‚formula based funding’), d.h. in diesem Fall der 
Verknüpfung der Zahl der Publikationen in ‚peer reviewed’ Zeitschriften mit der 
Zuweisung von Finanzmitteln, gestiegen ist. Freilich ist die Qualität, gemessen in 
Zitationen, nicht mit angewachsen. Ohne einen Versuch, bei der Mittelzuweisung 
zwischen Qualität, Sichtbarkeit oder dem ‚Impact’ der verschiedenen Zeitschriften zu 
differenzieren, gibt es wenig Anreiz, die Veröffentlichung in einem angesehenen 
Journal anzustreben (Butler 2003, 41). Der offenkundig eindimensionale Anreiz, der 
durch die Politik gesetzt wurde, hat zu voraussehbaren und kontraproduktiven Reak-
tionen geführt. Die Spanische Nationale Kommission für die Evaluierung der For-
schung (CNEAI) belohnt Forscher mit Einkommenserhöhungen, wenn sie in re-
nommierten Zeitschriften publizieren. Eine Untersuchung kommt zu dem plausiblen 
Ergebnis, dass die Wissenschaftler darauf mit einer Erhöhung ihres Forschungsout-
puts reagiert haben (Jiménez-Contreras 2003, 133, 138). In einem Vergleich der aust-
ralischen mit der spanischen Erfahrung erklärt Butler, dass die spanische CNEAI 
„ihr erklärtes Ziel, die Produktivität und die Internationalisierung der spanischen 
Forschung zu erhöhen, erreicht hat. Im Gegensatz dazu sollten die australischen Fi-
nanzierungsformeln die Qualität belohnen, tatsächlich belohnen sie jedoch Quan-
tität“ (Butler 2003, 44). Schlimmer noch, Australien ist hinter fast alle OECD Länder 
zurückgefallen. 
Ein Vergleich zwischen zwei australischen Universitäten (Queensland und Wes-
tern Australia) „liefert weitere Unterstützung für die Annahme, dass die Verknüp-
fung steigender Quantität und abnehmender Qualität auf die Einführung quantitäts-
basierter Finanzierungsformeln zurückgeht“ (Gläser et al. 2002, 14). Die Universität 
‚Western Australia’ (UWA) führte eine Formel ein, die auf eine derartige quantitäts-
orientierte Mittelzuweisung abstellte. Die University von Queensland (UQ) versuchte 
demgegenüber ihre Position im nationalen Ranking durch die Rekrutierung intelli-
genter junger Forscher zu verbessern. Während sich die Position der UWA im Hin-
blick auf ihren relativen Zitationsimpakt (RCI) verschlechterte, konnte UQ ihren 
RCI sogar signifikant verbessern (Gläser et al. 2002, 14). 
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Eine andere Untersuchung über Veränderungen in den Universitäten zeigt, dass 
es inzwischen eine Bevorzugung der Forschungsquantität gegenüber der Qualität 
gibt, ebenso zugunsten der kurzfristigen Leistung, nicht aber der langfristigen For-
schungskapazität, und dass es schließlich eine Bevorzugung konventioneller For-
schungsansätze gibt (Marginson, Considine 2000, 17 zitiert in Gläser et al. 2002,12). 
Unter einem Regime der evaluationsbasierten Finanzierung, so hat sich gezeigt, pub-
lizieren Wissenschaftler mehr aber weniger riskante, ‚mainstream’ Artikel, und sie 
versuchen sie in Zeitschriften von geringerer Qualität unterzubringen, solange diese 
im ISI Zeitschriften Index enthalten sind. Unter solchen Bedingungen ist das Publi-
zieren zu einem Zweck geworden, um die Publikationszahlen zu erhöhen und Fi-
nanzmittel zu erhalten, eine legitime aber unbeabsichtigte Reaktion. Im australischen 
Fall zum Beispiel, können Publikationen mit Preisschildern versehen werden: A$ 
3000 für einen Artikel in einer Zeitschrift mit ‚peer review’. A$ 15000 für ein Buch 
(Butler 2003, 40).  
Da detaillierte Zitationsanalysen kostspielig und zeitraubend sind, haben viele 
Evaluationsagenturen Abkürzungen gewählt. Sie „betrachten die Publikationslisten 
von Wissenschaftlern und bewerten die Qualität ihrer Produktion über die Impakt-
faktoren der Zeitschriften, in denen sie erscheinen – Zahlen, die leicht verfügbar sind 
(Adam 2002, 727). Impaktfaktoren von Zeitschriften sind die „Zitationsanalyse des 
armen Mannes“ (van Raan). Sie sind aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Zitierpraktiken 
als Qualitätsindikatoren problematisch, wenn sie für Vergleiche zwischen Gebieten 
angewandt werden. Sie sind auch unzuverlässig, weil die Verteilung der Zitationen in 
einem gegebenen Journal sehr uneinheitlich sein kann, so dass ein Artikel in einer 
Zeitschrift mit hohem Impaktfaktor erscheint, aber selbst weniger häufig zitiert wird, 
als andere Artikel in einem weniger berühmten Journal. Per Seglen bemerkt, „dass es 
eine allgemeine Korrelation zwischen den Zitationszahlen von Artikeln und dem 
Zeitschriftenimpakt gibt, aber dies ist eine einseitige Beziehung. Die Zeitschrift hilft 
nicht dem Artikel, es ist umgekehrt“ (Adam 2002, 727). Impaktfaktoren sind in ihrer 
undifferenzierten Form überholt und sollten überhaupt in keinem Evaluierungskon-
text verwendet werden. Dennoch sind sie wahrscheinlich die populärsten biblio-
metrischen Maße überhaupt. Sie sind es so sehr, dass die Zeitschrift Nature einen 
Werbeprospekt mit ihrem neuesten Impaktfaktor in großen Lettern versieht und 
dazu den Slogan: ‘No Nature, no impact’. 8  
Auf einer anekdotischen Ebene wird der Redaktionspolitik wissenschaftlicher 
Zeitschriften vorgeworfen, dass sie von Impaktfaktoren beeinflusst sei. Die Zu-
nahme von Artikeln mit einem Bezug zur Medizin in biologischen Spitzenjournalen 
wird auf deren „günstigen Effekt auf den Impaktfaktor statt auf ihre wissenschaftli-
                                                 
8 Auf der Macmillan News Website reiht sich das angesehene Journal in die von ISI gestellten ‘impact 
factor’ Rankings u..a. mit der Feststellung ein:” Nature’s Impact Factor makes it the second-highest 
cited primary journal in any field – a remarkable feat for a multidisciplinary journal - and puts it more 
than 4 points above the closest multidisciplinary journal, Science. The figure of 30.432 also puts Na-
ture more than 3 points above Cell.” http://www.macmillan.com/newsarchive/NPG1.asp .  
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che Qualität“ zurückgeführt. Das gleiche gilt für die Veröffentlichung von sog. ‚Re-
view-Artikeln’ in spezialisierten Journalen, da diese häufiger zitiert werden, als For-
schungsartikel (Lawrence 2003b, 836). Es ist folglich nicht überraschend, dass die 
Verleger wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriften darauf erpicht sind, günstige Impaktfakto-
ren als Werbung für ihre Produkte einzusetzen. Dies hat ein bekanntes Journal im 
Bereich der Notfallmedizin (Shock) zu dem nahezu absurden Versuch verleitet, den 
Kommunikationsprozess zu manipulieren. Der vorläufigen Annahme eines Artikels 
für den Druck fügte der stellvertretende Redakteur die Aufforderung hinzu, dass das 
Journal „darum bitte, dass mehrere Zitate von in Shock erschienenen Artikeln in die 
Literaturliste aufgenommen werden“. Nachdem das Manuskript mit den von den 
Gutachtern geforderten Veränderungen zurückgesandt worden war, insistierte der 
Redakteur, dass es sehr begrüßt werden würde, „wenn Sie 4-6 Zitate geeignete Arti-
kel, die in Shock publiziert sind, in Ihr überarbeitetes Manuskript aufnehmen könn-
ten. Dies wäre… für die Zeitschrift eine enorme Hilfe”. Es geht sogar noch weiter: 
Als der Artikel erschien, wurde der Autor gebeten, Kopien an Kollegen zu schicken 
und sie aufzufordern, ihn zu zitieren. 9 Shock ist keineswegs die einzige Zeitschrift, die 
versucht, durch sanften Druck auf ihre Autoren ihren Impaktfaktor in die Höhe zu 
treiben. Die Zeitschrift Leukemia ist wegen der gleichen Redaktionspolitik sogar der 
Manipulation bezichtigt worden. Eugene Garfield, der Gründer des ‚Science Citation 
Index’ und damit der Basis für die Berechnung von Impaktfaktoren, kam zu ihrer 
Verteidigung, vielleicht weil er sich um dessen Zukunft sorgt. Aber sein Argument, 
die Herausgeber seien „berechtigt, Autoren darum zu bitten, äquivalente Referenzen 
aus demselben Journal zu zitieren, um dem ‚Matthäus-Effekt’ zu begegnen, kann 
kaum überzeugen (Smith 1997, Garfield 1997). 
Unabhängig davon, wie erfolgreich und wie verbreitet diese Praxis ist, demonst-
riert sie, dass nicht nur das Verhalten einzelner Wissenschaftler, sondern auch das 
von Organisationen durch bibliometrische Maße auf eine Weise beeinflusst wird, die 
ganz eindeutig unbeabsichtigt ist. Lange bevor sie die Größenordnung struktureller 
Effekte erreicht hat handelt es sich um Warnsignale. Im Fall des Impaktfaktors ist 
dies deutlicher als bei anderen Indikatoren: „Er hat sich zu einem Selbstzweck ent-
wickelt – die Triebkraft für Wissenschaftler, ihren Ruf zu verbessern oder eine Stel-
lung zu bekommen, und er erzeugt eine schädliche Konkurrenz zwischen Zeit-
schriften“ (Lawrence 2003b, 836).  
Diese Einsicht hat inzwischen auch Wissenschaftspolitiker und –administratoren 
erreicht. Sir Robert May, der Präsident der Royal Society und vormalige Wissen-
schaftsberater Tony Blairs, bekannt für seine offenen Worte, kritisierte im May 2004 
die Auswirkungen des britischen Evaluierungssystems. Die Veröffentlichung in den 
reputierten Zeitschriften Nature und Science nehme eine allzu wichtige Rolle in der 
Bewertung von Wissenschaftlern und Universitätsdepartments ein. „Wir brauchen 
eine fundamentale Überprüfung...Es gibt eine sehr schädliche Veränderung in der 
                                                 
9 Kopien der Briefe sind im Besitz des Autors.  
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(Wissenschafts-)Kultur. Unsere Aufmerksamkeit sollte sich auf die Ideen und ihren 
Wert richten, nicht darauf, wo sie publiziert worden sind“ (Curtis 2004). 
In Verbindung mit der wachsenden Erkenntnis der unbeabsichtigten Anpas-
sungseffekte des britischen Research Assessment Exercise durch einige Untersu-
chungen sind dies dringende Gründe, die Anpassungsprozesse in Reaktion auf evalu-
ationsbasierte Finanzierungssysteme im Allgemeinen und auf die Verwendung biblio-
metrischer Maße im Besonderen sorgfältiger zu erforschen. Welche Auswirkungen 
haben sie auf den Inhalt des Wissens, auf die Fragen, die gestellt werden, die Metho-
den, die verwendet werden, die Verlässlichkeit der Ergebnisse? Welche Effekte ha-
ben sie auf den Kommunikationsprozess der Wissenschaft, auf die Mechanismen des 
organisierten Skeptizismus, auf die Zuweisung von Exzellenz und Reputation? In 
einigen jüngeren Fällen von Betrug und verfrühter Publikation wurden bibliometri-
sche Maße und der durch sie erzeugte Druck, zu publizieren, als Ursachen dieses 
Verhaltens ausgemacht. Würde diese Verbindung nachgewiesen, wäre dies der end-
gültige Beleg dafür, dass die unbedachte Flucht in die evaluationsbasierte Mittelzu-
weisung mehr Schaden anrichtet als sie Nutzen bringt. Es würde letztlich bedeuten, 
dass die akademische Kultur, in der die Wissensproduktion auf der einzigartigen 
Kombination von Konkurrenz, wechselseitigem Vertrauen und kollegialer Kritik 
beruht, zerstört wird. Ob das, was an ihre Stelle treten wird, leichter zu kontrollieren 
und weniger kostspielig zu unterhalten sein wird, ist eine völlig offene Frage. 
 
 
6.  Die Öffentlichkeiten der bibliometrischen Indikatoren 
Ein Teil der zukünftigen Kultur der Wissensproduktion wird an den Rändern der 
wissenschaftlichen Welt und der Welt der Informations- und Datenproduktion sowie 
der Verlagsindustrie und der Medien schon sichtbar. Um zu verstehen, was passiert, 
muss man sich vergegenwärtigen, dass die Evaluierungsindustrie, die geschaffen 
worden ist, mehreren Öffentlichkeiten dient. Eine von ihnen sind die Politiker, die 
diese Industrie ins Leben gerufen haben und für ihr Wachstum verantwortlich sind, 
indem sie sie als Instrument zur Ausübung von Kontrolle über Universitäten und 
Forschungsinstitutionen im Namen des öffentlichen Interesses benutzen. Ihre Mo-
tive sind durch den Bezug auf das öffentliche Interesse legitimiert, dass Steuergelder 
für die Forschung effizient und umsichtig mit Blick auf die Bedürfnisse und Interes-
sen dieser Öffentlichkeit ausgegeben werden. Eine andere Öffentlichkeit sind die 
Medien, die sich ihrerseits auf das öffentliche Interesse berufen, dass die Arbeits-
weisen der Forschungsinstitutionen, ihre relative Stellung und Qualität, dem Laien-
publikum transparent gemacht werden soll.  
Die legitimatorische Kraft dieser Öffentlichkeiten wird am besten durch die Rhe-
torik der öffentlichen Repräsentation von Evaluierungsdaten durch die Produzenten 
dieser Daten und die Medien demonstriert. Die unangemessene Vereinfachung ist 
nur eins der Probleme, die auftreten, wenn zum Beispiel kumulative Publi-
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kationsdaten und Daten der Forschungsmittel ohne die entsprechende Gewichtung 
etwa durch die Größe der Institution präsentiert werden. Die daraus abgeleiteten 
Rangordnungen sind sinnlos und irreführend, sie kommen aber offenbar dem Be-
dürfnis der Medien nach Dramatisierung entgegen. ISI bietet Universitätsrankings 
unter ihrem Produkt ScienceWatch mit reißerischen Titeln wie “Harvard runs high in 
latest ‘Top Ten’ Research Roundup” an. Die Metapher des ‚roundup’, des Viehauf-
triebs also, verlegt die einst als ‚Elfenbeinturm’ mystifizierten akademischen Anstal-
ten in die Welt muhender Rinderherden. Das Ranking beruht auf den kumulierten 
Zitationen – pro – Artikel, dem sog. Impact jeder Universität in 21 Wis-
senschaftsgebieten für den Zeitraum 1997 – 2001. Die entsprechenden Zahlenwerte 
wurden sodann mit einem Weltdurchschnitt für die jeweiligen Gebiete verglichen. 
Daraus ergeben sich dann relative Impactwerte in der Form von Prozentzahlen. Zu-
weilen basieren die Rankings auf einer hundertstel Dezimalstelle. Die dadurch sugge-
rierte Exaktheit der Werte mag ein Werbetrick für die ISI-Produkte sein. Politiker 
werden auf diese Weise jedoch mit eindimensionalen Rankings konfrontiert, die in 
Wirklichkeit mehrdimensional sind. Jeder oberflächliche Versuch, diese Rankings 
ohne die Hilfe von Experten zu interpretieren, die wissen, wie diese Zahlen allererst 
zustande kommen und was sie repräsentieren, ist im Kontext politischer Entschei-
dungen irreführend, sinnlos und unverantwortlich. Man kann sogar so weit gehen, sie 
für unethisch zu halten, wenn man dabei an die Kombination von unvermeidlicher 
Beschränkung der Beurteilungskompetenz seitens der Entscheider und ihrer gleich-
zeitigen Beobachtung durch die Medien denkt. 
Ein anderes Beispiel für die Verwendung der Sprache des Medienhypes durch ISI 
findet sich im Ranking von Personen. In der Schlagzeile von Science Watch im Ja-
nuar/Februar 2003 war zu lesen: “Astrophysicist Andrew Fabian on Rocketing to 
Prominence”. Die Einschätzung von ISI beruhte auf 6000 Zitationen über das ver-
gangene Jahrzehnt. Hier wird offenkundig, dass die Sprache der sensationalisierten 
Konkurrenz auch in die bisher auf sich selbst beschränkten Diskurse der ‚peer re-
view’ eingedrungen ist. Das heißt selbstverständlich nicht, dass die Wissenschaft 
nicht schon vor den Tagen bibliometrischer Indikatoren Konkurrenz gekannt hat.10 
Ganz im Gegenteil. Aber nur selten, wenn überhaupt, hatte sie ein äußeres Publikum 
und Kommentatoren, die sich der Sprache von Sportwettkämpfen bedienten.  
Man kann über die Rückwirkungen dieser Entwicklung spekulieren. Es erscheint 
höchst wahrscheinlich, dass die Orientierung an Medienprominenz, die auch in ande-
ren Kontexten erkennbar ist, stärker werden wird. Kurzfristige Erfolge wie die Spit-
zenposition in einem Ranking, die beobachtet und kommentiert werden wie die nati-
onale Fußball – Liga und die Auslöser für benevolente Entscheidungen der Förder-
organisationen sein mögen, werden wahrscheinlich die Oberhand über nachhaltigere, 
längerfristig angelegte Strategien gewinnen. Ist die Metapher wirklich zu weit herge-
                                                 
10 Das prominenteste Beispiel war die Watson/Crick Geschichte über die Entdeckung der Doppel-
Helix, wie sie Watson erzählt hat.  
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holt? Die Zeitschrift Science kommentierte schon 1997, dass die „Taktiken von Fuß-
ballmanagern die Welt der Hochschulen erfasst hat“. Der Einschätzung des Journals 
zufolge hätten die Ergebnisse der britischen Forschungsevaluation desselben Jahres 
gezeigt, “how soccer style transfers of researchers and other tactics aimed at impro-
ving department’s rating are now part of British academic life” (Williams 1997, 18). 
Dieser Kontrollverlust über die eigene systemspezifische Zeitspanne und Art der 
Evaluierung wird voraussichtlich einen tiefgreifenden Einfluss auf die Wissenspro-
duktion haben. Unglücklicherweise wird dies nie im Einzelnen bekannt sein, da die 
Vergleichsmöglichkeit fehlt. 
Das Plädoyer richtet sich nicht gegen die Anwendung von Evaluationsverfahren 
in der Wissenschaft, die auf Indikatoren beruhen und geeignet sind, die unkontrol-
lierbaren Äußerungen einflussreicher Persönlichkeiten einer unabhängigen Kontrolle 
zu unterwerfen. Gerade die Wissenschaft mit ihren für die Öffentlichkeit undurch-
schaubaren Verfahren (dem ‚peer review – Prozess) bedarf derartiger Kontrollen, um 
nach außen Transparenz zu erzeugen und dadurch Vertrauen zu schaffen. Aber 
Technologien können klug oder unverantwortlich eingesetzt werden. Bibliometrische 
Indikatoren sind eine forschungsbasierte Sozialtechnologie, und da sie Politikern und 
Medien Wissen über einen sonst unzugänglichen Prozess liefern, sind sie anfällig 
dafür, für alle möglichen wissenschaftspolitischen Interessen instrumentalisiert zu 
werden. Das bedeutet, dass Fragen der Validität und Verlässlichkeit, der theoreti-
schen Begründung und der Qualität der Daten eine politische Rolle einnehmen. Die 
Datenproduzenten und die Bibliometriker haben eine Verantwortung für die Qualität 
ihrer Instrumente. Politiker haben eine Verantwortung für ihren Gebrauch. Die oben 
beschriebenen Tendenzen verweisen jedoch auf eine andere Realität. Die Warnung 
richtet sich gegen das kommerzialisierte Marketing generalisierender Produkte, deren 
Qualität fragwürdig ist, gegen die unkritische Verwendung bibliometrischer oder 
anderer Indikatoren unabhängig vom ‚peer – review’ Prozess und gegen deren Ver-
wendung ohne Beachtung ihrer Rückwirkungen auf Individuen und Institutionen. 
Bibliometrische Indikatoren sind ein derart mächtiges Instrument im Kontext der 
Wissenschaftspolitik geworden, dass ihre potentiell irreführende und destruktive 
Verwendung bedacht werden muss. Gerade ihre Wirkmächtigkeit verlangt einen Ko-
dex professioneller Ethik für ihre Anwendung. 
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Shifting Boundaries between Science and Politics 
New Research Perspectives in Science Studies 
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 25/26 June 2004 
 
 
Conference theme 
The two day conference “Shifting Boundaries between Science and Politics – New 
Research Perspectives in Science Studies” explores the intersections between science 
policy studies and science studies. In recent years, the boundaries between science 
and politics have blurred so that both domains seem to be linked more closely to 
each other. The 'blind delegation' of authority from the political to the scientific sys-
tem that marked the decades after the Second World War is no longer seen as a valid 
principle of science policy. New forms of the 'governance of science' have emerged, 
both for the self-regulation of scientific institutions and in science and technology 
policy. The aim of the conference is to assess recent tendencies in science and tech-
nology policy, focusing on the case of Germany and contextualizing it within a 
European and transatlantic perspective.  
 
The conference focuses on recent developments in the political domain. Two theses 
will be of particular interest: first the changing regimes of science policy and second 
the new forms of expert decision-making in science policy.  
 
a) Changing regimes of science policy: trends and paradoxes 
There is evidence to suggest that the regimes of science policy, traditionally based 
upon the delegation from political to scientific and intermediary institutions, are be-
ing fundamentally transformed. New forms of governance and new mechanisms of 
accountability have been introduced by different actors in recent years. Governments 
for example, in order to foster capacities for socio-economic and technological inno-
vation, are demanding more flexible and effective forms of scientific self-regulation. 
As a consequence, new and more detailed instruments of quality assurance, such as 
program based funding, evaluations, or cost-benefit-analyses, are becoming prevalent 
in universities and research institutions. Intermediary institutions like the German 
Wissenschaftsrat are calling for a realignment of the scientific system by demanding 
more complementary cooperation between scientific institutions – a call at least 
partly motivated by the expectation of synergy effects and the ambition to economise 
the academic system. Also, to support processes of knowledge and technology trans-
fer, universities and research institutions are actively strengthening links between 
science and industry, for example by supporting spin-offs and start-ups.  
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However, the variety of actors and steering principles implicates that the changing 
regimes in science policy remain contested, their common direction unclear and their 
effects sometimes paradoxical. The conference tries to assess the changing science 
policy regimes, for example by asking in what direction the boundaries between sci-
ence and policy have recently shifted. Also, the conference discusses the question 
whether these trends are really a fundamental transformation of the previous relation 
between policy and science or just a more specified continuation of the traditional 
delegation principle.  
 
b) New forms of expert decision-making in science policy: potentials and limitations 
In the controversies over environmental and technological risks in recent years, the 
procedures of expert-based decision-making in science policy, particularly the domi-
nance of economic expertise, have repeatedly been criticised. Critics have demanded 
that expert-based deliberation become more transparent or that the public be more 
actively involved in expert decision-making. It has also been suggested that in order 
to avoid the dead-ends of technological 'entrapments' and 'lock-in', participation in 
science and technology policy should become more diversified, thus producing plural 
and conditional advice. Parallel to these criticisms, science and technology has itself 
changed its relation to political decision-making by becoming actively engaged in the 
shaping of policy agendas. Increasingly, scientific expertise is entangled with political 
decision-making already in the beginning, not only at the end, of decision processes – 
giving rise to a new status of expertise that has also been called 'anticipatory science 
and technology'. The conference assesses the potentials and limitations of transpar-
ent and participatory forms of decision-making in different areas of science policy.  
 
The changing regimes of science policy will be discussed from an internationally 
comparative perspective. The conference discusses whether recent trends in science 
policy reflect the specific circumstances of particular countries (like the Humboldtian 
heritage in Germany) or whether they represent more general trends. Also, the con-
ference addresses the role of the European Union for science policy debates on the 
national level. Are recent developments of national science policies just reflecting 
earlier or superordinate trends on the European level?  
 
 
The conference is hosted by president of the WZB, Prof. Jürgen Kocka. It is initiated 
and organized by Dr. Dagmar Simon and Dr. Martin Lengwiler, in collaboration with 
Prof. Sheila Jasanoff who joined the WZB as Karl W. Deutsch Professor in summer 
2004.  
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Conference program 
 
Friday 25 June 
 
11:00 hrs Jürgen Kocka (WZB, Berlin): opening address 
11:10 hrs Dagmar Simon (WZB, Berlin): Shifting Boundaries between Science and Poli-
tics (introduction)  
11:30 hrs Sheila Jasanoff (Harvard, USA/WZB, Berlin): The New Social Contract: 
Democratic Challenges to Science and Technology Policy (opening lecture) 
Comment: Helga Nowotny (ETH Zurich / Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin) 
12:15 hrs Discussion 
12:45 hrs Lunch break 
 
Session I: Changing regimes of science policy  
(papers: 25 min; comments: 5 min; 15 min discussion) 
14:00 hrs Ulrich Wengenroth (TU München, Germany): Changing regimes of science 
policy: historical perspectives 
Commentator: Joerg Potthast (TU Berlin, Germany) 
14:45 hrs Dietmar Braun (University of Lausanne, Switzerland): New Policy Rationales 
in the Funding of Research 
Commentator: Raymund Werle (Max-Planck-Institute, Cologne, Germany) 
15:30 hrs Coffee break (30 min) 
16:00 hrs Andrew Stirling (SPRU, Sussex, UK): Opening Up and Closing Down? Justifi-
cation, precaution and pluralism in science and technology policy 
Commentator: Willem Halffman (Public Administration, Twente University) 
16:45 hrs Clark Miller (University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA): Constituting Reason, 
Securing Legitimacy: Scientific Institutions as Proto-Democratic Experiments 
in International Governance 
Commentator: Katie Vann (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science) 
 
Session II: New forms of accountability in science policy 
(papers: 25 min; comments: 5 min; 15 min discussion) 
14:00 hrs Brian Wynne (University of Lancaster, UK): The Reflexive Character of Sci-
ence in Policy - the new mood of Dialogue with Publics 
Commentator: Ragna Zeiss (Free University, Amsterdam, Netherlands) 
14:45 hrs Michel Callon (CSI, Ecole des Mines, Paris): Do some patients organizations 
usher in a new regime of science policy, and, if yes, which one? Some lessons 
from the French Association of people suffering from neuromuscular diseases  
Commentator: Malte Schophaus (University of Bielefeld, Germany) 
15:30 hrs Coffee break (30 min) 
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16:00 hrs Christophe Bonneuil (Centre Alexandre Koyré, Paris, France): The effect of 
the French public controversy on genetically modified organisms on research 
orientations 
Commentator: Astrid Epp (University of Bielefeld, Germany) 
 
17:30 hrs Reception 
19:00 hrs Conference dinner for speakers and commentators 
 
 
Saturday 26 June 
 
Session III: New forms of steering science 
(each paper: 25 min; comments: 5 min; 15 min discussion) 
09:00 hrs Henry Etzkowitz (State University, New York, USA): The role of the state in the 
Triple Helix: Toward a meta-innovation system Commentator: Niki Vermeulen 
(Maastricht University, Netherlands) 
09:45 hrs Arie Rip (University of Twente, Netherlands): New and emerging governance 
arrangements for science Commentator: Katy Whitelegg (ARC Systems Research 
GmbH, Austria) 
10:30 hrs Coffee break (30 min) 
11:00 hrs Peter Weingart (University of Bielefeld, Germany): Impact of Bibliometrics 
upon the Science System: Inadvertent Consequences? Commentator: Stefan 
Sperling (Harvard University, Cambridge MA, USA) 
11:45 hrs Dominique Pestre (EHESS, Paris; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin): For a critical 
broadening of STS questions on Science, finance and the political: which regu-
lations? which accountabilities?  
Commentator: Bruno Strasser (University of Geneva, Switzerland) 
12:30 hrs Martin Lengwiler (WZB): Conclusions for a future research agenda 
13:00 hrs Round table and final discussion (chair: Sheila Jasanoff, Harvard/WZB): open 
questions, research lacunae (discussants: Daniel Barben, University of Biele-
feld, and others) 
 
14:00 hrs End of second day 
 
 
 
 
 
